Event Notification Report for October 29, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/2004 - 10/29/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41158
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
CRITICALITY CONTROL REPORT
"At 0945 on 10/29/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that NCSE/A 3972-11 did not establish the necessary moderation controls for the sump in the C-360 elevator pit to ensure that double contingency is maintained if a UF6 release occurs in the transfer room. The sump is an unfavorable geometry. The C-360 basement transfer room is small and relatively air-tight once placed in containment resulting from a UF6 release. A credible UF6 release in the Transfer Room could consume all moisture in the room and leave gaseous UF6 available to react directly with pre-existing liquids in the elevator sump. Over an extended period of time this reaction could support a uranium concentration that results in a critical configuration. The current configuration of the sump does not prevent less than an always safe slab depth of 3.5 inches of solution in the sump.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Stop fissile operations in the C-360 transfer room until the necessary NCS controls for double contingency can be ensured for the sump in the elevator pit."
The regulatee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0945 on 10/29/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that NCSE/A 3972-11 did not establish the necessary moderation controls for the sump in the C-360 elevator pit to ensure that double contingency is maintained if a UF6 release occurs in the transfer room. The sump is an unfavorable geometry. The C-360 basement transfer room is small and relatively air-tight once placed in containment resulting from a UF6 release. A credible UF6 release in the Transfer Room could consume all moisture in the room and leave gaseous UF6 available to react directly with pre-existing liquids in the elevator sump. Over an extended period of time this reaction could support a uranium concentration that results in a critical configuration. The current configuration of the sump does not prevent less than an always safe slab depth of 3.5 inches of solution in the sump.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Stop fissile operations in the C-360 transfer room until the necessary NCS controls for double contingency can be ensured for the sump in the elevator pit."
The regulatee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41159
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: BARD BRACHYTHERAPY
Region: 3
City: CAROL STREAM State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02062-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: BARD BRACHYTHERAPY
Region: 3
City: CAROL STREAM State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02062-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2004
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"On October 29, the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Bard Brachytherapy, Mr. Ed Zduenk called the Division to report an excessive radiation level from a package that they had received. Federal Express had delivered a container that was shipped by Northwest Hospital, Randallstown, Maryland on October 26, 2004. The maximum measured radiation level on the surface of the package was 500 milliRem/h. At a distance of 3 feet, the measured radiation level was indistinguishable from background.
"After verifying that the package was intact and undamaged, the RSO proceeded to take measurements in the delivery vehicle. No elevated radiation levels were noted. With the package repositioned in the vehicle as described by the driver, additional measurements were made. There were no elevated readings detected on the exterior of the truck nor at the driver's position. As such, the RSO estimated the driver's exposure to be minimal from handling the package and briefly working at the rear of the delivery vehicle. The carrier was subsequently contacted with this information as well.
"After the package was accepted and moved to a safe location at the facility, additional measurements were taken. The maximum dose rate measured at 1 foot was 10 milliRem/h and at 2 feet was 2 milliRem/h. The container was expected to have 112 sealed sources of I-125 with an actual activity of 0.476 milliCurie each for a total of 53.3 milliCurie. After the package was opened and its contents inventoried, it was determined that all of the sources were accounted for. When the package was opened, the RSO observed that the lid of the interior primary shielded container was not in its expected position. Although some of the sources remained in the shielded container, the other sources were only in their shielded applicator. No sources were 'loose' in the box.
"Considering the shipper, the state of Maryland was notified of this event. This item is still open pending investigation to determine the cause of the event."
IL report number IL040068
"On October 29, the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Bard Brachytherapy, Mr. Ed Zduenk called the Division to report an excessive radiation level from a package that they had received. Federal Express had delivered a container that was shipped by Northwest Hospital, Randallstown, Maryland on October 26, 2004. The maximum measured radiation level on the surface of the package was 500 milliRem/h. At a distance of 3 feet, the measured radiation level was indistinguishable from background.
"After verifying that the package was intact and undamaged, the RSO proceeded to take measurements in the delivery vehicle. No elevated radiation levels were noted. With the package repositioned in the vehicle as described by the driver, additional measurements were made. There were no elevated readings detected on the exterior of the truck nor at the driver's position. As such, the RSO estimated the driver's exposure to be minimal from handling the package and briefly working at the rear of the delivery vehicle. The carrier was subsequently contacted with this information as well.
"After the package was accepted and moved to a safe location at the facility, additional measurements were taken. The maximum dose rate measured at 1 foot was 10 milliRem/h and at 2 feet was 2 milliRem/h. The container was expected to have 112 sealed sources of I-125 with an actual activity of 0.476 milliCurie each for a total of 53.3 milliCurie. After the package was opened and its contents inventoried, it was determined that all of the sources were accounted for. When the package was opened, the RSO observed that the lid of the interior primary shielded container was not in its expected position. Although some of the sources remained in the shielded container, the other sources were only in their shielded applicator. No sources were 'loose' in the box.
"Considering the shipper, the state of Maryland was notified of this event. This item is still open pending investigation to determine the cause of the event."
IL report number IL040068
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41160
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DISCOVERED IN 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR ROOM
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On October 29, 2004, at approximately 1600 hours, control room operators were informed by engineering personnel that raceways were located closer than 20 feet from the redundant division without being protected by a fire barrier wrap in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
"In 480 volt switchgear room E7, Brunswick is committed to maintaining redundant safe shutdown circuits by a minimum of 20 feet with no-intervening combustibles, unless the circuits are protected by a one-hour fire barrier wrap. Two conduits containing Division II circuits were identified closer than 20 feet to their redundant counterparts with no wrap installed.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. When the condition was recognized, impairments were established in accordance with the fire protection program and compensatory measures were implemented. In addition, fire detection systems in the affected area have been verified to be operable. The affected area is maintained as a combustible free separation zone.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"Impairments have been initiated and appropriate compensatory measures established. The root cause and additional corrective actions are being documented in accordance with the corrective action program."
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On October 29, 2004, at approximately 1600 hours, control room operators were informed by engineering personnel that raceways were located closer than 20 feet from the redundant division without being protected by a fire barrier wrap in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
"In 480 volt switchgear room E7, Brunswick is committed to maintaining redundant safe shutdown circuits by a minimum of 20 feet with no-intervening combustibles, unless the circuits are protected by a one-hour fire barrier wrap. Two conduits containing Division II circuits were identified closer than 20 feet to their redundant counterparts with no wrap installed.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. When the condition was recognized, impairments were established in accordance with the fire protection program and compensatory measures were implemented. In addition, fire detection systems in the affected area have been verified to be operable. The affected area is maintained as a combustible free separation zone.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"Impairments have been initiated and appropriate compensatory measures established. The root cause and additional corrective actions are being documented in accordance with the corrective action program."