Event Notification Report for October 28, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/27/2004 - 10/28/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41157411544115541156
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41157
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 13:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 13:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"At 1314 EDT on 10/28/04, all 34 of the Mecklenburg County ANS sirens failed a scheduled weekly test. The silent test checks only the radio circuitry involved in actuating the sirens. This test failure was attributed to a phenomena known as 'Tropospheric Ducting,' which is essentially radio frequency interference on the frequencies utilized for siren control. At 1448 EDT on 10/28/04, the radio frequency interference had cleared and the siren test was repeated with 100% success rate. The remaining 33 sirens in the other four EPZ counties were tested satisfactorily in the same time frame."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1314 EDT on 10/28/04, all 34 of the Mecklenburg County ANS sirens failed a scheduled weekly test. The silent test checks only the radio circuitry involved in actuating the sirens. This test failure was attributed to a phenomena known as 'Tropospheric Ducting,' which is essentially radio frequency interference on the frequencies utilized for siren control. At 1448 EDT on 10/28/04, the radio frequency interference had cleared and the siren test was repeated with 100% success rate. The remaining 33 sirens in the other four EPZ counties were tested satisfactorily in the same time frame."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41154
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN HORNE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN HORNE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 03:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 00:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 03:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 00:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER SHUTDOWN BANK DROPPED INTO CORE
"At 0052 on 10/28/04 the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped after an electrical fault caused Shutdown Bank D control rods to drop into the core. An automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred when water levels in all four Steam Generators reduced to the Lo-Lo level setpoint. A letdown isolation occurred on Lo Pressurizer level resulting from the cooldown of the primary system after the Auxiliary Feedwater system start. Reactor Coolant system temperature has been recovered and the plant has been stabilized at Hot Shutdown conditions."
The licensee stated that there were no complications during the trip. All systems functioned as required. No significant safety systems were out of service when the trip occurred. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is currently being removed using aux feedwater to the steam generators steaming to the main condenser. Tave dropped to a low point of 540 degrees F during the transient. The reactor was manually tripped in approximately 18 seconds after the shutdown bank dropped. The licensee plans to remain in mode 3.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify state and local authorities in North and South Carolina.
"At 0052 on 10/28/04 the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped after an electrical fault caused Shutdown Bank D control rods to drop into the core. An automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred when water levels in all four Steam Generators reduced to the Lo-Lo level setpoint. A letdown isolation occurred on Lo Pressurizer level resulting from the cooldown of the primary system after the Auxiliary Feedwater system start. Reactor Coolant system temperature has been recovered and the plant has been stabilized at Hot Shutdown conditions."
The licensee stated that there were no complications during the trip. All systems functioned as required. No significant safety systems were out of service when the trip occurred. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is currently being removed using aux feedwater to the steam generators steaming to the main condenser. Tave dropped to a low point of 540 degrees F during the transient. The reactor was manually tripped in approximately 18 seconds after the shutdown bank dropped. The licensee plans to remain in mode 3.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify state and local authorities in North and South Carolina.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41155
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE LOPER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE LOPER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
SCOTT BARBER (R1)
GENE CANUPP (FEMA)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
SCOTT BARBER (R1)
GENE CANUPP (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A TOXIC GAS RELEASE IN THE SECURITY CENTER
"At 1003 [hrs] on October 28, 2004, an Unusual Event was declared at the Hope Creek Generating Station in accordance with EAL 9.4.1.b due to an uncontrolled release of freon gas from a chiller located in the top floor of the PSEG Nuclear Security Center. Although the top floor of the security center is a normally locked security area, access restrictions to the top floor of the security center were imposed by the Site Protection (or Fire) Department with breathing apparatus required. This was due to freon concentrations of 2000 ppm at the site of the leak, which exceed the threshold limit value of 1000 ppm. No injuries resulted from the freon leak and no access restrictions were imposed to the main entry/exit level of the security center or the basement (where maximum freon levels were 100 ppm or 10% of the TLV and 1000 ppm respectively). The TLV represents a concentration acceptable for 40 hrs per week, 50 weeks per year occupancy. As of 1040 [hrs] freon levels in the top floor of the security center are 0 ppm."
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM M. SHAFFER TO H. CROUCH AT 1324 ON 10/28/04 * * *
Hope Creek secured from Unusual Event at 1316. The leakage has stopped, the machine has been evacuated of freon and normal personnel access has been restored.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1 (R. Blough), NRR (T. Reis), IRD (P. Wilson), DHS (A. Costa and M. Cohen), and FEMA (K. Sweetser).
"At 1003 [hrs] on October 28, 2004, an Unusual Event was declared at the Hope Creek Generating Station in accordance with EAL 9.4.1.b due to an uncontrolled release of freon gas from a chiller located in the top floor of the PSEG Nuclear Security Center. Although the top floor of the security center is a normally locked security area, access restrictions to the top floor of the security center were imposed by the Site Protection (or Fire) Department with breathing apparatus required. This was due to freon concentrations of 2000 ppm at the site of the leak, which exceed the threshold limit value of 1000 ppm. No injuries resulted from the freon leak and no access restrictions were imposed to the main entry/exit level of the security center or the basement (where maximum freon levels were 100 ppm or 10% of the TLV and 1000 ppm respectively). The TLV represents a concentration acceptable for 40 hrs per week, 50 weeks per year occupancy. As of 1040 [hrs] freon levels in the top floor of the security center are 0 ppm."
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM M. SHAFFER TO H. CROUCH AT 1324 ON 10/28/04 * * *
Hope Creek secured from Unusual Event at 1316. The leakage has stopped, the machine has been evacuated of freon and normal personnel access has been restored.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1 (R. Blough), NRR (T. Reis), IRD (P. Wilson), DHS (A. Costa and M. Cohen), and FEMA (K. Sweetser).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41156
Rep Org: SCIENTECH LLC
Licensee: SCIENTECH LLC
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: SCIENTECH LLC
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
POTENTIAL DEFECT UNDER 10CFR21
"Investigation of failures of two NUS instruments modules revealed that the Kepco power supplies used in the current output circuit failed. Further investigation by the manufacturer of the power supplies revealed that these failures were due to a manufacturing error - in some cases, a surface mount capacitor had been installed with reverse polarity. The capacitor is lightly loaded and takes up to 1000 hours fail, so this problem will not usually be detected by functional testing or normal burn-in tests. The Kepco power supply with the failure is model number FCP-032K. Kepco has identified the manufacturing period of risk for the FCP-032K power supplies as being from April 2003 through July 2004; the period during which the surface mount capacitor was manually installed during a conversion to new automated manufacturing facilities. Not all Kepco FCP-032K power supply components are affected by this problem, nor are other Kepco power supply models."
The affected facilities are: Fitzpatrick, Indian Point 2 and 3, Pilgrim, Beaver Valley, Duane Arnold, and Watts Bar.
"Investigation of failures of two NUS instruments modules revealed that the Kepco power supplies used in the current output circuit failed. Further investigation by the manufacturer of the power supplies revealed that these failures were due to a manufacturing error - in some cases, a surface mount capacitor had been installed with reverse polarity. The capacitor is lightly loaded and takes up to 1000 hours fail, so this problem will not usually be detected by functional testing or normal burn-in tests. The Kepco power supply with the failure is model number FCP-032K. Kepco has identified the manufacturing period of risk for the FCP-032K power supplies as being from April 2003 through July 2004; the period during which the surface mount capacitor was manually installed during a conversion to new automated manufacturing facilities. Not all Kepco FCP-032K power supply components are affected by this problem, nor are other Kepco power supply models."
The affected facilities are: Fitzpatrick, Indian Point 2 and 3, Pilgrim, Beaver Valley, Duane Arnold, and Watts Bar.