Event Notification Report for October 08, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/07/2004 - 10/08/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
4110441105411064110341142
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41104
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE NUNBERG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE NUNBERG
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 14:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 13:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 14:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 13:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
TERRY REISS (EO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
JANIE EVERETTE (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
TERRY REISS (EO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
JANIE EVERETTE (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 74 | Power Operation | 74 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO ACTUATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN TURBINE BUILDING
The licensee experienced an apparently spurious actuation of the CO2 (carbon dioxide) suppression system in the North Anna Unit 1 turbine building (specifically the main turbine, low pressure turbine, and exciter area). The licensee responded and determined there was no fire and secured the CO2 release within two minutes. The event was classified as an unusual event per item K.13 of the emergency action levels due to onsite release of a toxic gas.
The licensee has pulled the actuation fuses on the system, isolated the CO2 storage tank, and is in the process of ventilating the area. A fire watch has been posted and the licensee is checking CO2 levels throughout the area.
There were no injuries as a result of the discharge and no significant operational impairment. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required due to the declaration of an unusual event. The licensee will also notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 14:53 EDT ON 10/08/04 FROM DAVE NUNBERG TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 14:45 EDT following inspection of the turbine building and confirmation that CO2 levels did not represent a personnel hazard. R2DO (Ogle); NRR EO (Reis); NSIR IRD (Wilson); FEMA (Dunker); and the DHS senior watch officer have been notified.
The licensee experienced an apparently spurious actuation of the CO2 (carbon dioxide) suppression system in the North Anna Unit 1 turbine building (specifically the main turbine, low pressure turbine, and exciter area). The licensee responded and determined there was no fire and secured the CO2 release within two minutes. The event was classified as an unusual event per item K.13 of the emergency action levels due to onsite release of a toxic gas.
The licensee has pulled the actuation fuses on the system, isolated the CO2 storage tank, and is in the process of ventilating the area. A fire watch has been posted and the licensee is checking CO2 levels throughout the area.
There were no injuries as a result of the discharge and no significant operational impairment. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required due to the declaration of an unusual event. The licensee will also notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE 14:53 EDT ON 10/08/04 FROM DAVE NUNBERG TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 14:45 EDT following inspection of the turbine building and confirmation that CO2 levels did not represent a personnel hazard. R2DO (Ogle); NRR EO (Reis); NSIR IRD (Wilson); FEMA (Dunker); and the DHS senior watch officer have been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41105
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MATZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MATZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 14:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 14:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
TERRT REIS (EO)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
TERRT REIS (EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFISTE NOTIFICATION TO FIRE DEPARTMENT DUE TO NATURAL GAS LINE BREAK
A natural gas pipeline was broken by a backhoe while digging at a location between 300 to 400 feet outside the protected area fence southwest of the plant. The licensee made offsite notifications to local fire departments and Rochester Gas and Electric which have responded to the scene and are in the process of isolating the line break.
The broken gas line is 2.5 inches in diameter and the licensee does not consider the break a threat to the plant and will continue normal operation. The licensee is monitoring the situation and is monitoring for excessive natural gas concentrations.
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
A natural gas pipeline was broken by a backhoe while digging at a location between 300 to 400 feet outside the protected area fence southwest of the plant. The licensee made offsite notifications to local fire departments and Rochester Gas and Electric which have responded to the scene and are in the process of isolating the line break.
The broken gas line is 2.5 inches in diameter and the licensee does not consider the break a threat to the plant and will continue normal operation. The licensee is monitoring the situation and is monitoring for excessive natural gas concentrations.
The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41106
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WAHLHEIM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WAHLHEIM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 22:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 21:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 22:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 21:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
CONTOL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 2120 [hrs. CDT] on October 8, 2004, while performing the 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test,' which verifies the integrity of the control room envelope, it was determined that the positive pressure requirement of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge for the control room envelope in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.7.4.4 could not be met for all specified test points. As a result, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A was entered.
"Recently completed surveillance testing has demonstrated that a positive pressure ranging from 0.056 to 0.301 inches water gauge is being maintained in the control room envelope; therefore it is expected that the safety function is being met.
"However, this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System is a single train safety system and the Technical Specification requirement is not met. The affect of the failure to meet the Technical Specification requirements on the ability to perform the safety function is continuing to be evaluated."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"At 2120 [hrs. CDT] on October 8, 2004, while performing the 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test,' which verifies the integrity of the control room envelope, it was determined that the positive pressure requirement of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge for the control room envelope in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.7.4.4 could not be met for all specified test points. As a result, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A was entered.
"Recently completed surveillance testing has demonstrated that a positive pressure ranging from 0.056 to 0.301 inches water gauge is being maintained in the control room envelope; therefore it is expected that the safety function is being met.
"However, this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System is a single train safety system and the Technical Specification requirement is not met. The affect of the failure to meet the Technical Specification requirements on the ability to perform the safety function is continuing to be evaluated."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41103
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/08/2004
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 10/08/04 on Unit Two, the HPCI Valve Operability was being performed. During the course of this evolution the suction path was transferred from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Suppression Pool. When the HPCI System was aligned to the Suppression Pool the Suction Pressure decreased from 25.5 psig to 1.5 psig. With HPCI aligned to the suppression pool and with suction pressure less than 14 psig the HPCI System was declared INOPERABLE.
"Investigation continues as to the cause of the low suction pressure. Preliminarily it is suspected that the Suppression Pool suction path was not adequately filled and vented following a recent tag out of that suction path for maintenance inspection activities. Investigation continues."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DISMUKE TO CROUCH AT 1521 EDT ON 10/28/04 * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"The Unit 2 HPCI system was considered inoperable, since the technical information that would conclusively support its continued operability given the condition encountered could not be assembled within the time constraints of the reporting requirements. Subsequent to the event the system was confirmed be properly filled and vented with a negligible amount of air vented in the process. It was determined that this small amount of air was introduced to the suction piping as a result of an inspection activity performed for the HPCI suction check valve prior to the event. A limited amount of air remained in the torus suction piping causing the decrease in suction experienced during the event. Engineering reviewed the implications of the low suction pressure on the ability of the HPCI system to perform its safety function given the design of the system and the suction sources available. In each case Engineering was able to conclusively determine that the HPCI system would not have tripped due to low suction pressure had it received an automatic initiation signal and was actually operable during the time frame that Operations had conservatively treated the system as inoperable. Additionally, the effect of the trapped air being entrained in the pump suction was also analyzed, and the conclusion reached was that the air would not have prevented the pump's proper performance. Based on this information, the event reported on 10/08/2004 is not reportable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Bonser).
"On 10/08/04 on Unit Two, the HPCI Valve Operability was being performed. During the course of this evolution the suction path was transferred from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Suppression Pool. When the HPCI System was aligned to the Suppression Pool the Suction Pressure decreased from 25.5 psig to 1.5 psig. With HPCI aligned to the suppression pool and with suction pressure less than 14 psig the HPCI System was declared INOPERABLE.
"Investigation continues as to the cause of the low suction pressure. Preliminarily it is suspected that the Suppression Pool suction path was not adequately filled and vented following a recent tag out of that suction path for maintenance inspection activities. Investigation continues."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DISMUKE TO CROUCH AT 1521 EDT ON 10/28/04 * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"The Unit 2 HPCI system was considered inoperable, since the technical information that would conclusively support its continued operability given the condition encountered could not be assembled within the time constraints of the reporting requirements. Subsequent to the event the system was confirmed be properly filled and vented with a negligible amount of air vented in the process. It was determined that this small amount of air was introduced to the suction piping as a result of an inspection activity performed for the HPCI suction check valve prior to the event. A limited amount of air remained in the torus suction piping causing the decrease in suction experienced during the event. Engineering reviewed the implications of the low suction pressure on the ability of the HPCI system to perform its safety function given the design of the system and the suction sources available. In each case Engineering was able to conclusively determine that the HPCI system would not have tripped due to low suction pressure had it received an automatic initiation signal and was actually operable during the time frame that Operations had conservatively treated the system as inoperable. Additionally, the effect of the trapped air being entrained in the pump suction was also analyzed, and the conclusion reached was that the air would not have prevented the pump's proper performance. Based on this information, the event reported on 10/08/2004 is not reportable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Bonser).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41142
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 10/22/2004
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 18:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2004
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2004
Event Time: 18:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
BOB DENNIG (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
BOB DENNIG (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
PART 21 REPORT: AUXILIARY RELAYS FAILURE
"In accordance with 10CFR21.21(d)(3), initial notification of a reportable defect is being made by James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF).
"The failure of two General Electric (GE) IRMA auxiliary relays in a short period of time were identified in the corrective action system as a potential common mode failure. Initial troubleshooting revealed that both relay coils indicated open. There was no evidence of any obvious cause for the coils to open circuit (e.g. discoloration, smell, physical damage). Both relays are normally de-energized relays located in a mild environment in the relay room (controlled humidity, no vibration at the panels, no local heat source that could cause accelerated aging). Both relays were installed in 1988 along with 21 other relays. A total of 33 relays were purchased from GE with the same lot/date code.
"An extent of condition review was conducted. By checking the continuity of related relay coils, two other coil failures were detected. A failure analysis of the relays was performed. The failure mode was determined to be an open in the coil due to corrosion of the coil wire. This open in the coil will prevent the relay from changing state as the relay is energized. An independent laboratory concluded that the coil insulation was damaged and that the under lying wire was damaged during coil manufacture. The damage allowed the copper wire to corrode over the years to the point of failure.
"These HMA relays were installed in multiple Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and other systems. Each component was evaluated to determine the specific impact on the respective system. The systems affected included: Residual Heat Removal (RHR, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of operation), Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray (CS), and High Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI).
"JAFs evaluation concluded that a substantial safety hazard existed in that there was a potential for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment, specifically for the RHR (LPCI mode of operation) and HPCI systems.
"No other safety functions would have been lost for the other identified systems.
"Component and Supplier:
GE HMA Type auxiliary relays
GE Part No. 12HMA124A2
GE Dwg No. DA137C6164P001
Date Code 14VC; 8836
Serial #s: D88542-0001D R02 through D88542-0033D R02
"All were purchased as safety-related from GE under JAF PO # 88-5628
"All installed safety-related relays from this lot were replaced during the recent refueling outage."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In accordance with 10CFR21.21(d)(3), initial notification of a reportable defect is being made by James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF).
"The failure of two General Electric (GE) IRMA auxiliary relays in a short period of time were identified in the corrective action system as a potential common mode failure. Initial troubleshooting revealed that both relay coils indicated open. There was no evidence of any obvious cause for the coils to open circuit (e.g. discoloration, smell, physical damage). Both relays are normally de-energized relays located in a mild environment in the relay room (controlled humidity, no vibration at the panels, no local heat source that could cause accelerated aging). Both relays were installed in 1988 along with 21 other relays. A total of 33 relays were purchased from GE with the same lot/date code.
"An extent of condition review was conducted. By checking the continuity of related relay coils, two other coil failures were detected. A failure analysis of the relays was performed. The failure mode was determined to be an open in the coil due to corrosion of the coil wire. This open in the coil will prevent the relay from changing state as the relay is energized. An independent laboratory concluded that the coil insulation was damaged and that the under lying wire was damaged during coil manufacture. The damage allowed the copper wire to corrode over the years to the point of failure.
"These HMA relays were installed in multiple Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and other systems. Each component was evaluated to determine the specific impact on the respective system. The systems affected included: Residual Heat Removal (RHR, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of operation), Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray (CS), and High Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI).
"JAFs evaluation concluded that a substantial safety hazard existed in that there was a potential for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment, specifically for the RHR (LPCI mode of operation) and HPCI systems.
"No other safety functions would have been lost for the other identified systems.
"Component and Supplier:
GE HMA Type auxiliary relays
GE Part No. 12HMA124A2
GE Dwg No. DA137C6164P001
Date Code 14VC; 8836
Serial #s: D88542-0001D R02 through D88542-0033D R02
"All were purchased as safety-related from GE under JAF PO # 88-5628
"All installed safety-related relays from this lot were replaced during the recent refueling outage."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.