Event Notification Report for August 17, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2004 - 08/17/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40963
Facility: HUMBOLDT BAY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: LARRY PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: LARRY PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
74.11(a) - LOST/STOLEN SNM 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
74.11(a) - LOST/STOLEN SNM 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
ELIOT BRENNER (PAO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
ELIOT BRENNER (PAO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
"REPORT OF MISSING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
"This is a non-emergency Event Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 74.11 to inform the NRC of missing special nuclear material of low strategic significance. On July 16, 2004, Pacific Gas, and Electric (PG&E) notified the NRC of a material accountability discrepancy involving a portion of a spent fuel rod used at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 (reference NRC Event Notification 40877). The discrepancy in plant records called into question the location of three approximately 18-inch segments that were cut from a single spent fuel rod in a used fuel assembly (A-49) in 1968. PG&E initiated a comprehensive search of the on-site HBPP spent fuel pool (SFP), a review of plant and nuclear materials shipping records, and interviews with present and former employees and contractors to resolve the material accountability discrepancy and locate the unaccounted for fuel segments.
"On August 17, 2004, at 08:30 PDT, the HBPP Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) reviewed the results of the search of the SFP to-date and concluded that the search of the most likely locations for the unaccounted for fuel segments (storage containers within the SFP) and all easily accessible spaces in the SFP was thorough and complete and that the search had not located the unaccounted for fuel segments in the SFP. The PSRC also reviewed the results to-date of the in-progress review of plant records, interviews, and nuclear material shipping records and concluded that the relevant information obtained did not definitively identify the on-site or off-site location of the unaccounted for fuel segments. Though it remains probable that the unaccounted for fuel segments will ultimately be found in the SFP or shown to have been shipped to a facility licensed to reprocess or store nuclear materials, PG&E is conservatively considering these segments as missing and making this 1-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 74.11.
"PG&E will be issuing a press release later today describing the current status of this issue.
"PG&E has embarked upon a 'phase II' search of the remaining less-accessible SFP areas and will continue its review of plant records, nuclear materials shipping records (plant and waste repository records), and interviews of plant personnel to definitively locate the missing fuel segments. A supplemental LER will be provided to the NRC when the segments are located or when the phase II search is concluded.
"No evidence has been uncovered to support the possibility of theft or diversion of the unaccounted for fuel segments. Due to the high radioactivity of the material, to be handled safely, the segments would have to be encased in a heavy shielded container that would have to be moved with special handling equipment designed for this purpose, precluding an abrupt loss. Since plant start-up, HBPP has been equipped with a system of radiation monitors for the refueling building (where the SFP is located) with alarm setpoints that are capable of alerting plant personnel of the movement of highly radioactive material should the fuel segments have been removed from the SFP without being in a shielded container. This could not have occurred casually without plant staff or security personnel observing the movement.
"Because the three approximately 18-inch segments are not readily identifiable in the SFP, three possible scenarios exist. The highest probability is that the fuel segments are in a SFP area that is not readily accessible, and will be located during a more detailed search of these locations. The second highest probability is that the fuel segments were shipped offsite to an appropriately controlled and restricted facility for either analysis or reprocessing. The least probable location, but not yet capable of being ruled out, is that the fuel segments were inadvertently included in a shipment to a licensed, monitored, and restricted LLRW facility. Since these possible locations are licensed, monitored and restricted radiological control areas, the public health and safety has not been adversely affected.
"For additional information, refer to licensee event report (LER) 2004-001-00,'Three Missing Fuel Rod Segments,' dated August 16, 2004, and submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(2)(ii), (Reference H BL-04-020).
"NRC personnel at headquarters and in Region IV have been notified of the status of this issue."
"This is a non-emergency Event Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 74.11 to inform the NRC of missing special nuclear material of low strategic significance. On July 16, 2004, Pacific Gas, and Electric (PG&E) notified the NRC of a material accountability discrepancy involving a portion of a spent fuel rod used at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 (reference NRC Event Notification 40877). The discrepancy in plant records called into question the location of three approximately 18-inch segments that were cut from a single spent fuel rod in a used fuel assembly (A-49) in 1968. PG&E initiated a comprehensive search of the on-site HBPP spent fuel pool (SFP), a review of plant and nuclear materials shipping records, and interviews with present and former employees and contractors to resolve the material accountability discrepancy and locate the unaccounted for fuel segments.
"On August 17, 2004, at 08:30 PDT, the HBPP Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) reviewed the results of the search of the SFP to-date and concluded that the search of the most likely locations for the unaccounted for fuel segments (storage containers within the SFP) and all easily accessible spaces in the SFP was thorough and complete and that the search had not located the unaccounted for fuel segments in the SFP. The PSRC also reviewed the results to-date of the in-progress review of plant records, interviews, and nuclear material shipping records and concluded that the relevant information obtained did not definitively identify the on-site or off-site location of the unaccounted for fuel segments. Though it remains probable that the unaccounted for fuel segments will ultimately be found in the SFP or shown to have been shipped to a facility licensed to reprocess or store nuclear materials, PG&E is conservatively considering these segments as missing and making this 1-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 74.11.
"PG&E will be issuing a press release later today describing the current status of this issue.
"PG&E has embarked upon a 'phase II' search of the remaining less-accessible SFP areas and will continue its review of plant records, nuclear materials shipping records (plant and waste repository records), and interviews of plant personnel to definitively locate the missing fuel segments. A supplemental LER will be provided to the NRC when the segments are located or when the phase II search is concluded.
"No evidence has been uncovered to support the possibility of theft or diversion of the unaccounted for fuel segments. Due to the high radioactivity of the material, to be handled safely, the segments would have to be encased in a heavy shielded container that would have to be moved with special handling equipment designed for this purpose, precluding an abrupt loss. Since plant start-up, HBPP has been equipped with a system of radiation monitors for the refueling building (where the SFP is located) with alarm setpoints that are capable of alerting plant personnel of the movement of highly radioactive material should the fuel segments have been removed from the SFP without being in a shielded container. This could not have occurred casually without plant staff or security personnel observing the movement.
"Because the three approximately 18-inch segments are not readily identifiable in the SFP, three possible scenarios exist. The highest probability is that the fuel segments are in a SFP area that is not readily accessible, and will be located during a more detailed search of these locations. The second highest probability is that the fuel segments were shipped offsite to an appropriately controlled and restricted facility for either analysis or reprocessing. The least probable location, but not yet capable of being ruled out, is that the fuel segments were inadvertently included in a shipment to a licensed, monitored, and restricted LLRW facility. Since these possible locations are licensed, monitored and restricted radiological control areas, the public health and safety has not been adversely affected.
"For additional information, refer to licensee event report (LER) 2004-001-00,'Three Missing Fuel Rod Segments,' dated August 16, 2004, and submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(2)(ii), (Reference H BL-04-020).
"NRC personnel at headquarters and in Region IV have been notified of the status of this issue."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40964
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN MAGILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN MAGILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 05:28 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 05:28 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 20 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TRIP OF REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP "A" ON LOW SUCTION PRESSURE.
"With a reactor startup in progress at 0528 PDT, operators at Columbia Generating Station inserted a manual reactor scram when the operating Reactor Feed Water (RFW) pump RFW-P-1A tripped. Reactor power was approximately 20% at the time of RFW pump trip. The cause of the RFW pump trip was due to low suction pressure; the cause of the low suction pressure is currently under investigation. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system [was manually started and] was used to maintain reactor vessel water level until reactor pressure was reduced to within the capacity of the condensate booster pumps (500 to 600 psi). The RCIC system has been returned to a standby lineup. The reactor is in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) with both reactor recirculation pumps running at minimum speed (15 Hertz). Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via auxiliary steam loads. All ECCS systems are operable. All emergency diesel generators are operable. No Safety Relief valves lifted during the scram."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
See similar event number 40959 that occurred on 08/15/04.
"With a reactor startup in progress at 0528 PDT, operators at Columbia Generating Station inserted a manual reactor scram when the operating Reactor Feed Water (RFW) pump RFW-P-1A tripped. Reactor power was approximately 20% at the time of RFW pump trip. The cause of the RFW pump trip was due to low suction pressure; the cause of the low suction pressure is currently under investigation. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system [was manually started and] was used to maintain reactor vessel water level until reactor pressure was reduced to within the capacity of the condensate booster pumps (500 to 600 psi). The RCIC system has been returned to a standby lineup. The reactor is in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) with both reactor recirculation pumps running at minimum speed (15 Hertz). Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via auxiliary steam loads. All ECCS systems are operable. All emergency diesel generators are operable. No Safety Relief valves lifted during the scram."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
See similar event number 40959 that occurred on 08/15/04.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40965
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GLENN HUTTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GLENN HUTTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2004
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - POSSIBLE DISCHARGE PERMIT VIOLATION
At 1145 EDT the Chemistry Tech sampled the Rad Waste Service water overboard line. The sample showed less than 0.02 milligrams per liter (mg/l) residual chloride. The Chemistry Tech adjusted up the chlorination rate.
At 1315 a second sample yielded a result of 0.29 mg/l residual chloride. The tech immediately secured the Chloride system, and sampled the intake canal. The results were less than 0.02 mg/l residual chloride.
Oyster Creek is monitoring for any environmental impact. The change in residual chloride may not correlate to the increase in chlorination rate, therefore sample error is possible and is under review.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/17/04 AT 2123 EDT BY JEFF DOFTAL TAKNE BY MACKINNON * * *
"This is a follow-up to an earlier notification made at 15:30 today. Based upon further investigation the Potential NJPES Violation was found to be valid. The residual intake Cl - (Chloride) concentrations were found to be 0.29 mg/l. This is in excess of the 0.2 mg/l limit. The over chlorination event lasted for approximately 2 hours." R1DO (Todd Jackson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this update by the licensee.
At 1145 EDT the Chemistry Tech sampled the Rad Waste Service water overboard line. The sample showed less than 0.02 milligrams per liter (mg/l) residual chloride. The Chemistry Tech adjusted up the chlorination rate.
At 1315 a second sample yielded a result of 0.29 mg/l residual chloride. The tech immediately secured the Chloride system, and sampled the intake canal. The results were less than 0.02 mg/l residual chloride.
Oyster Creek is monitoring for any environmental impact. The change in residual chloride may not correlate to the increase in chlorination rate, therefore sample error is possible and is under review.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/17/04 AT 2123 EDT BY JEFF DOFTAL TAKNE BY MACKINNON * * *
"This is a follow-up to an earlier notification made at 15:30 today. Based upon further investigation the Potential NJPES Violation was found to be valid. The residual intake Cl - (Chloride) concentrations were found to be 0.29 mg/l. This is in excess of the 0.2 mg/l limit. The over chlorination event lasted for approximately 2 hours." R1DO (Todd Jackson) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this update by the licensee.