Event Notification Report for July 30, 2004

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) TURBINE FAILED TO ACHIEVE DESIGN PRESSURE AND FLOW DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"During a surveillance of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC), the RCIC turbine failed to achieve design pressure and flow. Other safety systems, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, are available.

"This failure is believed to be due to a RCIC flow controller problem. Investigation is continuing."

Design pressure/flow is 1250 psig/400 gpm. Actual pressure/flow was 1220 psig/350 gpm.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ALERT DECLARED AT COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION

The following information was obtained by the licensee via facsimile:

"Reactor SCRAM received at 0924 [hrs] PDT. Initial indications are the scram signal was caused by RPS [Reactor Protection System] High Pressure. Following the scram, 2 [two] control rods did not immediately indicate [fully inserted]. Control room staff entered [procedure] PPM5.1.2 and took the required actions. All control rods subsequently indicated [fully inserted].

"An ALERT Classification was declared at 1000 [hrs] based on PPM 13.1.1 Criteria 2.2.A.1, 'RPS Setpoint exceeded and automatic actions failed to result in a rod pattern which alone assures reactor shutdown'. Manual actions resulted in all rods [fully inserted] and reactor power [less than or equal to] 5 percent.

"All other plant systems responded as expected with the exception of a wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker which indicates open. Investigation into the cause of the scram and actual control rod position is ongoing. Further details will be provided when available."

The licensee also reports that no relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. Reactor level is steady at 36 inches. Reactor temperature and pressure are 507 degrees and 710 psig respectively. Offsite power is available. All emergency systems are available in standby.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the incidents. The NRC entered Monitoring mode at 1327 hrs EDT with Region IV leading. The NRC exited Monitoring at 1530 hrs. EDT and returned to Normal mode.

Notified HHS (Ayles) as well as others noted in notification block.

* * * UPDATE AT 2130 HRS EDT ON 7/30/04 FROM COLEMAN TO CROUCH * * *

"At 1358 [hrs.] EDT on 7/30/04, NRC was notified of an Alert at Columbia Generating Station (EN #40910).

"This is a follow-up to inform NRC that the event was terminated at 1457 [hrs] (EDT) (1157 PDT). All control rods are inserted. Reactor is shutdown and water level is normal. All required emergency systems are operable. All offsite and onsite power sources are operable. Reactor pressure is normal."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Washington and local authorities of the termination.

The NRC Operations Center notified R4DO(Bywater), DHS, FEMA, DOE(NRC), USDA, EPA and CDC(HHS).

* * * UPDATE AT 1930 EDT ON 08/03/04 FROM M. HEDGES TO A. COSTA * * *

"At 1358 EDT on July 30, 2004, NRC was notified of an Alert at Columbia Generating Station (EN #40910). A subsequent notification was made to inform the NRC that the event was terminated at 1157 PDT (1457 EDT) on July 30, 2004.

"This is a follow-up to inform the NRC that Columbia Generating Station is retracting its Alert Emergency Declaration due to the following reason. Following the RPS actuation, control rod position indication for two control rods was indeterminate for approximately two minutes to the control room staff. A subsequent review of control rod position indication from the Plant Data Information System (PDIS), Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) logs, and Auto Scram Timer (AST) data by Columbia Generating Station personnel shows that all rods were successfully inserted to the 'Full-in' position following the initial RPS actuation, assuring that the reactor was shutdown under all conditions. The Emergency Action Level for this Alert classification requires that the following three conditions be met: Any RPS set point (including manual) has been exceeded per T.S. 3.3.1.1 AND RPS actuation failed to result in a control rod pattern which alone always assures reactor shutdown under all conditions AND Manual actions (mode switch in shutdown, manual push buttons, and ARI) result in reactor power LE 5%.

"Since all rods were successfully inserted without the assistance of any manual actions and within the Technical Specification required time, Columbia Generating Station staff now believes that no emergency classification should have been made, and we are retracting the Alert emergency classification from this event notification.
The problem with control rod position indication following the scram is being addressed through our corrective action program."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify local, State, and other Government Agencies of this update.

Notified R4 DO (Runyan).

PART 21 SAFETY HAZARD WITH RADECO PORTABLE AIR SAMPLER MODEL H-809VI

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection in Richland, WA has identified a potential safety issue with Radeco portable air sampler model H-809VI. This type of portable air sampler is utilized in the commercial nuclear industry.

A Health Physics Technician experience a mild shock while handling a Radeco portable air sampler when the sample holder was touched. Radeco has issued a recommendation or opinion for H-809V series electrical grounding.

Facilities should check sample holders on the Radeco H-809 and H-810 series samplers to assure proper grounding and no voltage on the sample holder.

** RETRACTION OF PART 21 FROM TANK FARMS (T.SMITH) TO J. KNOKE ON 07/01/05 ***

"The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) in Richland, Washington requests closure of the referenced submitted courtesy notification of a potential safety issue with RADeCO, portable air sampler, model H-809VI to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ORP's basis for closure of the submitted courtesy notification is as follows:

"The Underwriters Laboratory (UL) concluded the RADeCO Portable Air Sampler Model H-809VI, serial Number 8499, instrument DOES NOT present a generic safety problem. The report is available by request only.

"The RADeCO Portable Air Sampler instrument passed all of the UL tests.

"ORP concludes the matter does not represent a reportable concern covered by 10 CFR Part 21 requirements because loss of a single air monitor because of this issue would not increase risk to public health and safety when other instruments are in place to detect atmospheric radioactivity."

Notifications were provided to R1DO(White), R2DO( Bonser), R3DO(Cameron), R4DO(Clark), NMSS (Holonich), and NRR (Carpenter).

LPCI LOOP SELECT LOGIC FOUND DEGRADED DUE TO PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS OUT-OF-TOLERANCE

"On July 30, 2004 at approximately 2125 hours CDT, Instrument Maintenance personnel were performing the Unit One Reactor Low Pressure (RHR/LPCI) Calibration and Functional Test. At this time, the technicians determined that two out of the four "Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low" switches in LPCI loop select logic were out of tolerance high. These switches delay completion of the LPCI loop select logic during Single Loop Reactor Recirculation Pump operations (SLO) until the reactor pressure is less than 900 psig. With these switches out of tolerance high, LPCI loop select logic sensitivity was degraded, increasing the potential to select the wrong loop for injection during periods of SLO. At the time of discovery, both Reactor Recirculation pumps were in operation.

"Both switches were recalibrated immediately upon discovery to within Technical Specification tolerances."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

AIR VOID IN POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION PIPING SYSTEM

"On July 30, 2004, at approximately 18:45 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating at approximately 100% power at normal operating temperature and pressure when it was discovered that a void in the post-LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident) recirculation piping from the containment sump may have prevented fulfillment of the safety function to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident. The volume of the ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) piping sections between the closed containment sump isolation butterfly MOVs (SIAUV0673/0674 and SIBUV0675/0676) and the associated train sump recirculation check valves (SIAV205 and SIBV206) are void of water and occupied with air (Approx. 120 cubic feet). The concern is that during a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) the trapped volume of air between the isolation valves and the downstream check valve cold potentially enter the operating SI pumps (HPSI and CS), which could potentially cause cavitations and/or air binding of the pumps or possibly a water hammer event.

"RAS does not occur for approximately 20 minutes, or longer following a LOCA. In accordance with Generic Letter 91-18, substitution of manual action for automatic action to open the inner containment sump isolation valves following a LOCA, but prior to the RAS setpoint will allow the void to clear, with the exception of a small section between the outer containment isolation valve and the check valve. Engineering had provided reasonable assurance that the recirculation check valve void will not result in an unacceptable void fraction forming in the HPSI/Containment Spray pump suction piping and pump.

"The Control Room Operators have been briefed on the need to perform the manual Operator action to open the inboard ECCS Sump isolation valves (SIAUV673 and SIBUV675) upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation System (CSAS) actuation. Each Shift Crew will be briefed accordingly until the EOPs are revised to incorporate this action (will take about 24 hours to be incorporated).

"Engineering continues to evaluate this condition.

"There were no RPS/ESF actuations, and none were required.

"There were no structures, systems or components that were inoperable at the start of (the) event that contributed to the event.

"This condition did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. This condition did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

SUSPECTED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA FOUND IN THE PROTECTED AREA

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:

"Drug paraphernalia [a baggie and rolling paper] was found by the turbine building operator in a trash container located on the turbine building mezzanine level. The turbine building operator was emptying the container at the time. The paraphernalia was turned over to the security shift supervisor. Security is confident, based on a veteran law enforcement officer's experience, that the empty bag found in the trash once contained an illegal substance. Further confirmation by testing will be determined on Monday. Our procedure SO-R-1 requires FCS [Fort Calhoun Station] to make a 24-hour report to the NRC per 10CFR26.73."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/31/04 AT 1317 HRS EDT FROM HODGSON TO CROUCH * * *

"The Security Shift Supervisor was notified by the Washington County Sheriff Department that the bag with the unknown substance has been tested positive for marijuana."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. NRC Operations Officer notified R4DO (Bywater).