Event Notification Report for July 28, 2004

UNIDENTIFIED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK


"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for the reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. An unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leak of 1.0 gpm on Salem Unit 1 occurred on 7/28/04 at 2100 hours. It was discovered (that) a pressure instrument weld from 13 charging pump [PDP] discharge piping failed in the auxiliary building. Tech Specs for RCS unidentified leakage was entered. Station abnormal operating procedures (ABRC-001 RCS Leak) were entered and leakage monitoring program referenced. The leak was isolated closing the root valve of the instrument line (discharge pressure transmitter) by 2135 hours. The RCS leakage was outside of containment and was greater than design of 3840 cc/hr. This leakage would have exceeded the GDC-19 limits for control room habitability during the time of the leak initiation and leak isolation. 13 charging pump remained in service and the leak is locally isolated. The tech spec for RCS unidentified leakage was exited and ASME tech spec for the failed weld was entered. There were no unusual or unexpected responses. All systems functioned as required. There were no personnel injuries."

A maintenance tech in the auxiliary building notified control room of a leak about the same time that control room personnel noticed that the Volume Control Tank level was decreasing approx. 0.3gpm. The area around the Positive Displacement Pump (PDP) was roped off and the leak was isolated. Airborne levels in the roped off area was 8000 cpm (from 2130 to 2200 hours). Nobody was evacuated from auxiliary building. At 0040 hours airborne samples were within normal limits. The area around # 13 PDP is still roped off until the surface contamination is cleaned up. Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified of this by the licensee.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SAUER TO CROUCH AT 1543 HRS. EDT ON 9/21/04 * * *

The following retraction was obtained from the licensee via e-mail:

"On July 28, 2004, it was discovered that a pressure instrument weld from 13 charging pump developed a leak into the auxiliary building. An 8-hour call to the NRC was made for exceeding the ECCS leakage outside containment (Event Number 40904).

"The leak was self-revealing, in that the area radiation detectors as well as the fire protection sensors detected it. The leak was identified and isolated by closing the manual root valve for the instrument line in approximately 35 minutes from discovery.

"Section 5 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.183 states that engineered safeguards feature (ESF) systems that recirculate sump water outside of the primary containment are assumed to leak during their intended operation. The guidance indicates that this release source includes leakage through valve packing glands, pump shaft seals, flanged connections, and other similar components. The guidance further indicates that this release source may also include leakage through valves isolating interfacing systems. The leak that was identified and isolated shortly after discovery was a piping system failure and not the type of leakage that is considered to be a release source for which the radiological consequences should be analyzed. Therefore, further review of the event indicated that identified leak did not challenge the limits of 10CFR100 for offsite releases and 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 19 (GDC-19), thus event report 40904 is withdrawn."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the retraction. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R1DO (Caruso).

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"Event: At 08:00 hours Oconee Unit 1 initiated a unit shutdown per Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3. Unit 2 initiated shutdown at 0900 [ET]. It is expected that Unit 3 will initiate shutdown at 1000 hours. Target for entry into Mode 3 is 1300 hours on all units. At 0129 hours all three Oconee units received a number of alarms related to power to the 230 KV switchyard (SWYD) battery chargers. At 0200 hours Operations determined that both AC power sources to the SWYD battery chargers required by TS 3.8.3 had tripped and declared entry into TS 3.0.3 because no specific condition of TS 3.8.3 applied. Evaluation for potential applicability of other reporting criteria is still in progress.

"Initial Safety Significance: The SWYD batteries currently have normal voltage (being monitored hourly) but are NOT considered operable per TS 3.8.5 at this time, which would also require TS 3.0.3 entry. However, if voltage drops too low the ability to remotely operate SWYD power circuit breakers would be affected, which would impact SWYD isolation capability. Local manual operation would still be possible, and operations personnel are stationed in the SWYD as a contingency.

"Corrective Action: 1. Maintenance has identified a fault in a power transfer switch. Actions have been completed to isolate the fault and restore power to the battery chargers. 2. Measurements of battery voltages are being taken hourly. A surveillance will be performed to verify TS 3.8.5 compliance after the charger power supply is restored. 3. Shutdown of Oconee units will follow schedule above unless power and battery voltages are restored sooner (as expected)."

The electrical grid is stable and standby emergency power remains operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee does not intend to make any State, local or other Federal notifications or issue any press release at this time.

* * * UPDATE AT 1400 EDT ON 7/28/04 FROM PHIL NORTH TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 0945 EDT both SWYD battery chargers were energized to restore battery parameters. At 1205 EDT the affected batteries were declared operable and all three (3) Units exited their respective LCOs. Units 1, 2, and 3 are currently holding at 80%, 84% and 89% power, respectively, and will commence power escalation after review and closeout of their paperwork. Notified R2DO (Decker).

MARINE CORP TRITIUM DEVICE INCIDENT

"On 28 July 2004, at approximately 0920 hours, the installed Tritium-in-Air monitor for the Tritium Instrument Repair Room (TIRR) at Maintenance Center Albany [(MCA), Georgia] abruptly alarmed.

"On 27 July 2004, the six counter sources (0.45 Curies each/2.7 Curie total) contained within the gear box of an M137 panoramic telescope had been replaced. The M137 unit was placed on an alignment fixture on the morning of 28 July.

"Upon alarm actuation, the TIRR and the Optics/Fire Control Shop were evacuated. Assembly of personnel was in a common area exterior to the shop. The MCA radiation protection assistant (RPA) and the Base radiation safety officer (BRSO) were summoned. Entry into the TIRR was made with the use of a Johnston Labs Model 111 portable tritium-in-air monitor. Suspicions were satisfied when the portable tritium-in-air monitor indicated 30-microCuries/m3 of tritium gas in the immediate vicinity of the test fixture and mounted M137 panoramic telescope. The TIRR utilizes a negative pressure ventilation system, which is directly ducted to the environment. The door to the TIRR was opened and within approximately one-half hour, the gaseous tritium levels had been reduced to background. The M137 was double bagged and placed within the TIRR vent hood.

"Two workers were present in the TIRR when the evacuation alarm sounded. The shop supervisor entered the area to assess the accuracy of the alarm condition. These three individuals were sent to the on-base medical clinic for urine collection. Samples were taken at time zero plus four hours, time zero plus eight hours, and for the-twenty-four hour period immediately following the time zero plus eight hour sample. The primary worker received a slight uptake of gaseous tritium. Dose calculations for that uptake proved the uptake to be [statistically] less than 0.0 milliRem. The other worker and the supervisor showed no evidence of any tritium uptake. Contamination wipes revealed no contamination of the test fixture or the wall."

* * * UPDATE 1120 EDT ON 8/17/04 FROM T. GIZICKI TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"This note is to rescind the incident report number 40941. The event occurred at a Marine Corp Base in Albany, GA. The initial call into the NRC Operation Center on 10 August, 2004, stated that this was a potential incident under Part 30.5.

"After further review of the incident we have concluded and concurred with by Mr. Darrel Wiedeman, Region III, that the release of tritium was very minimal resulting in no closure of work areas, no surface contamination of work areas, or radiation dose to employees involved. The event therefore is determined to be non-reportable."

Notified R1DO(Jackson), R2DO(Julian), R3DO(Clayton) and NMSS (Essig).

SOURCE TRAIN DID NOT RETRACT

"After IVB therapy the source train did not retract due to a kink in the IVB catheter, did not retract to the remote Beta-Cath device. The IVB catheter was immediately withdrawn and placed in the Novoste emergency plexiglass storage safe and then in the IVB storage room. No overexposure was received by the patient or attending staff. Novoste has been notified of the malfunction. The Novoste Beta Cath was returned to the manufacture on August 2, 2004. The IVB manufacturer is Novoste Beth Cath, source Sr-90, 1.71 GBq (46 millicuries). Transfer device Serial No. 92917, and Source train Serial No. ZA543. The device was packaged and returned to the manufacturer on August 2, 2004. This agency did not receive notice of the event within 24-hours"

Texas Incident No.: I-8155