Event Notification Report for July 07, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/06/2004 - 07/07/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40855
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40855
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: C. SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: C. SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/07/2004
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2004
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 - 4 HOUR REPORT
The following was submitted via email:
"Reason for Notification
A canvas lined cart was found in the UF6 [Uranium Hexafluoride] bay. The cart dimensions met the criteria for a non favorable geometry [NFG] container however slits had been cut into the bottom of the cart. The presence of the slits makes it questionable as to whether or not this is a true NFG. Taking a conservative approach and assuming that the cart is an NFG, its presence in the Chemical area is prohibited by SNM-1107, Section 6.1.4 without a nuclear criticality safety analysis.
"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (b.2), this event satisfies the criteria for a 4-hour notification. Specifically, any determination that a criticality safety analysis or evaluation was deficient, or that a particular system was not previously analyzed; and that less than two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would be required before a criticality accident would be possible.
"As Found Condition
An NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] Engineer was notified by a member of the EH&S [Environmental Health and Safety] Department that a canvas cart was in the UF6 bay. The canvas cart had several slits approximately five inches in length cut in the bottom that would preclude the build-up of liquid materials. There was no process equipment in the general area where the cart was located. There was no SNM [Special Nuclear Material] in the cart and the cart was not a part of any existing process.
"Summary of Activity
-The cart was dismantled immediately.
-NCS notified NRC Region II of the cart.
"Conclusions
-This particular system was not previously analyzed for criticality safety.
-There was no SNM involved.
-At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
-The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
-A causal analysis will be performed."
The Licensee notified Region 2 (Ayres, Crespo).
The following was submitted via email:
"Reason for Notification
A canvas lined cart was found in the UF6 [Uranium Hexafluoride] bay. The cart dimensions met the criteria for a non favorable geometry [NFG] container however slits had been cut into the bottom of the cart. The presence of the slits makes it questionable as to whether or not this is a true NFG. Taking a conservative approach and assuming that the cart is an NFG, its presence in the Chemical area is prohibited by SNM-1107, Section 6.1.4 without a nuclear criticality safety analysis.
"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (b.2), this event satisfies the criteria for a 4-hour notification. Specifically, any determination that a criticality safety analysis or evaluation was deficient, or that a particular system was not previously analyzed; and that less than two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would be required before a criticality accident would be possible.
"As Found Condition
An NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] Engineer was notified by a member of the EH&S [Environmental Health and Safety] Department that a canvas cart was in the UF6 bay. The canvas cart had several slits approximately five inches in length cut in the bottom that would preclude the build-up of liquid materials. There was no process equipment in the general area where the cart was located. There was no SNM [Special Nuclear Material] in the cart and the cart was not a part of any existing process.
"Summary of Activity
-The cart was dismantled immediately.
-NCS notified NRC Region II of the cart.
"Conclusions
-This particular system was not previously analyzed for criticality safety.
-There was no SNM involved.
-At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
-The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
-A causal analysis will be performed."
The Licensee notified Region 2 (Ayres, Crespo).