| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/30/2004 - 07/01/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40788 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STAN GAMBLE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 06/03/2004
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2004
Event Time: 12:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF FAILURE OF SPRING CHARGING FUNCTION IN CIRCUIT BREAKER
"Limerick has completed the 10CFR Part 21 evaluation of the failure of the spring charging function on an Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) Model HK circuit breaker. The investigation determined that the primary contributor to the failure was the replacement of ABB latch reset torsion spring number 195205A00 with a weaker spring that was supplied with the breaker overhaul kit number 716656T104. Secondary contributors to the failure were normal wear on additional parts in the operating mechanism.
"ABB supplied a six-turn latch reset torsion spring and a five-turn latch reset torsion spring under spring part number 195205A00 and overhaul kit number 716656T104. The spring of concern is a six-turn spring that does not provide as much force as the original six-turn or five-turn spring. When informally tested during the investigation the six-turn spring provided approximately 66 ounces of force and the five-turn spring provided approximately 102 ounces of force. The original six-turn spring provided a force of 88 ounces.
"Limerick's evaluation concluded that installation of the replacement six-turn latch reset torsion spring could create a substantial safety hazard depending on the breaker's application. Therefore, this notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i). The required 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(ii) 30-day written notification will provide more detail when submitted. ABB evaluation of this issue is still in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/30/04 @ 1451 HRS. EDT FROM GAMBLE TO CROUCH * * *
"This is a retraction of the Part 21 initial notification made per 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i) on 6/3/04 at 12:47 EDT (EN# 40788). The issue involved an in-service malfunction of the closing spring charging function of an Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) Model HK circuit breaker following replacement of the latch reset torsion spring (ABB number 195205A00) during breaker maintenance. The spring was supplied with ABB overhaul kit number 716656T104.
"Upon further review of the Part 21 reporting requirements it has been determined that this issue does not require reporting. NUREG-1022 Rev.2 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73' provides guidance for Part 21 reporting in section 5.1.8. The NUREG section references a federal register notice (56 FR 36081, July 31, 1991) in footnote 18, which provided notification of an amendment to 10CFR Parts 21 and 50. The amendment was intended to reduce duplicate reporting of defects.
"The notice provides the following guidance for components that have been installed in operating plants:
"Operating license holders can reduce duplicate evaluation and reporting effort by evaluating deviations in basic components installed in operating plants which produce events which could meet the criteria of 50.72 and 50.73. If the evaluation of events using the criteria of 50.72 and 50.73 results in a finding that the event is reportable and the event is reported via these sections, then as indicated in 21.2(c), the evaluation, notification, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations of part 21 are met. If the event is determined not to be reportable under 50.72 or 50.73, then the obligations of part 21 are met by the evaluation.
"The evaluation using the criteria of 50.72 and 50.73 resulted in a finding that the event was not reportable. There was no reasonable expectation of preventing fulfillment of a safety function, no equipment was declared inoperable, and the principle safety barriers were not seriously degraded.
"Therefore, this event is not reportable using the criteria of 50.72 and 50.73 and the Part 21 evaluation obligation is met."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this retraction.
The Headquarters Operations officer notified R1DO (Barkley), R2DO (Evans), R3DO (Gardner), R4DO (Whitten), and NRR (Dennig). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40841 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SAN DIEGO TESTING ENGINEERS
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County: SANDIEGO
License #: 5846-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 06/25/2004
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 06/25/2004
Event Time: 13:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER GAUGE
The following was emailed from the CA Department of Health Services:
"On June 25, 2004, one of the gauge users stopped at a gas station [in Encinitita, CA] to get gas. The gauge user came out of the gas station building to find his truck had been stolen with the gauge in the back of the truck inside a camper top. The gauge was inside the case. The case was secured to the bed of the truck by a chain that had been passed through the case handle and returned back to the tie down. The case was latched and locked, the gauge handle was locked with a key lock secured through the gauge handle. A police report was filed with the San Diego County Sheriff's office. A notification and reward will be given to the local paper. The gauge user was asked to notify us immediately if the truck and gauge were recovered. The gauge is a Troxler model 3411B, serial number 5275, containing 8 mCi [milliCuries] Cs-137 and 40 mCi [milliCuries] Am241:Be sources. The gauge was last leak tested on 5/16/04, with no excessive leakage detected."
CA Report number 032504
Emailed to TAS (Hahn) and faxed to Mexico's national Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards.
* * * UPDATE 1640 EDT ON 6/28/04 FROM ROBERT GREGER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was provided via email:
"This stolen gauge was recovered unharmed, along with the vehicle in which it was being transported at the time of its theft. We received the report of the recovery this morning from the licensee."
Notified R4DO Jack Whitten) and NMSS (Roberto Torres).
Emailed and faxed update to Mexico's national Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40847 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 06/30/2004
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2004
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF A RPS BUS
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On May 22, 2004, at approximately 4:29 am EDT, while the plant was operating at 100% power, the normal power supply to the Division 1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. This caused the actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation logic circuit. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip setpoint), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.
"Operators implemented the applicable response procedures, and shifted Division 1 RPS to its alternate power supply. The containment isolation signal was reset, and systems were restored to normal alignment. Reactor power was not affected by this event.
"All safety related equipment controlled by the affected circuits responded to the loss of Division 1 RPS as required, with one exception. The Division 1 control building emergency filtration train should have automatically initiated, but did not. Subsequent troubleshooting discovered a failed relay in its control circuitry. This defect would not have prevented the Division 2 control building emergency filtration train from performing its safety function.
"It was determined that a relay coil in the control circuitry for the Division 1 RPS motor-generator set failed. This caused the main output contactor on the MG set to open, interrupting power to the bus. Repairs were completed on June 3, 2004, and the Division 1 RPS bus was then shifted back to its normal power supply."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification. | |