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Event Notification Report for June 25, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/24/2004 - 06/25/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40831 40837 40838

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40831
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GALLET ASSOC.
Region: 1
City: FLOWOOD State: MS
County:
License #: AL991
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: B. J. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/22/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/21/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
LlINDA PSYK-GERSEY (NMSS)

Event Text

MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: TROXLER GAUGE RUN OVER BY A BULLDOZER.


On 06/21/04 at 1800 CDT an Alabama licensee, Gallet Associates, had one of their Troxler gauges; Model # 3401, gauge serial number 12283; run over by a bulldozer in Flowood, Mississippi. The rod was broken off. Surveys taken of the rod was 10 mRem/hr at one foot. The gauge has been stored and the licensee will call Troxler. The gauge contained 8.6 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Am-241/Be.

State of Mississippi assigned event for this incident is MS-04-005

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40837
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIMMY BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION CABLE SEPARATION

"This is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) - Unanalyzed Condition, 50.72(b)(3)(v) - event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and Catawba License Condition 2F - violation of License Condition 2.C.5 - Fire Protection Program. This report applies to Catawba Unit 2.

"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria was discovered. The condition relates to a postulated fire in the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Essential Bus switchgear room (ETA). The 'A' and 'B' Train Volume Control tank (VCT) outlet valves are in series providing the normal suction source for the centrifugal charging pumps (standard Westinghouse design). Cables related to the 'A' Train Volume Control Tank outlet valve are in the same fire area as the switchgear for the 'A' Train centrifugal charging pump. Therefore, if a hot short closes the VCT outlet valve, with the 'B' pump running, both centrifugal charging pumps could be rendered inoperable.

"Additional switchgear related to component cooling, and power cables for our Standby Shutdown Facility (backup reactor coolant pump seal cooling), are also located in this fire area. An all consuming fire scenario in ETA Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling to at least 2 of 4 reactor coolant pumps. The actual distance between the ETA switchgear and SSF cables is approximately 20 ft; therefore the probability of an actual fire resulting in a loss of seal cooling is very low.

"The unanalyzed condition only exists when the 'B' centrifugal charging pump is in operation (both units currently have 'A' centrifugal charging pump in operation).

"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved.

"Catawba is currently evaluating if a similar concern exists on Unit 1. A follow-up report will be issued if necessary."

The licensee will notify the applicable counties and states and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM McCONNELL TO GOTT AT 1636 ON 6/24/04 * * *

"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria for Unit 2 was discovered.

"The report stated that Catawba was evaluating if a similar concern existed on Unit 1 and that a follow-up report would be issued if necessary.

"A similar but slightly different condition exists on Unit 1. For Unit 1 the Standby Shutdown Facility (backup seal cooling) cables go through the Train "B" 4160 Essential Switchgear Room (1ETB) rather than 2ETA on Unit 2. This means that for Unit 1, an all consuming fire scenario in 1ETB Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling.

"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved."

Notified R2DO (Haag)

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 40838
Rep Org: AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES
Licensee: AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: Wilmington State: DE
County: Newcastle
License #: 07-28762-02G
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/24/2004
Notification Time: 12:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2004
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)

Event Text

LOSS OF NICKEL-63 SOURCE

On March 18, 2004, Agilent Technologies of Wilmington, DE shipped a 15 milliCurie Nickel-63 (Ni-63) source to their Germany distribution center for shipment to the end-user, AVT McCormick in Cochin, India. The package was shipped out of the Germany distribution center via Air Express on April 12, 2004. When the package was received by the end-user, the source could not be found in the package. According to the end-user, the package received did not have any damage or indication of being opened previously.

The sealed source was for an electron capture detector. Nickel-63 is a beta emitter.

The licensee has notified Region 1 (Modes).

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