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Event Notification Report for June 24, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/23/2004 - 06/24/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40703 40835 40836 40837

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40703
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DENNIS FRANCIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/24/2004
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2004
Event Time: 10:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

ISOLATION CONDENSER DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).

"On 04/24/2004 at 06:03 [CDT], Dresden Unit 2 was using the Isolation Condenser to control reactor pressure following a Unit Scram. The isolation condenser operated properly until 10:50 [CDT] when the Isolation Condenser 2-1301-3 valve could not be opened to the full open position. ISO Condenser was declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation 3.5.3. Condition 'A' was ENTERED. High Pressure Coolant Injection has been administratively verified OPERABLE.

"Reactor Pressure is being maintained 550-1000 psig and being maintained with Reactor Water Clean Up Flow and Gland Seal System.

"Investigation into the cause of the valve failure is in-progress."

Unit 2 had been operating approximately 30 days prior to the scram reported previously in EN #40702. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/23/04 AT 2036 EDT FROM GLEN MORROW TO ARLON COSTA * * *

"On April 24, 2004, Dresden made an ENS call due to the failure of Isolation Condenser valve 2-1301-3 to fully open and the subsequent determination that the Isolation Condenser was inoperable. The ENS call was made based on the decision that this was required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'

"Isolation Condenser System operation is not credited in Dresden's accident analyses. Transients and Events treated as transients are listed under section 15.0.2.1 of the UFSAR. Accidents are described and analyzed under section 15.0.2.2 of the UFSAR. The isolation condenser is not credited for fulfilling safety function of removal of residual heat of any accident as described in section 15.0.2.2, Accidents. In accordance with the guidance contained in NUREG 1022, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73,' Section 3.2.7, 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' a functional failure of the Isolation Condenser System is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). Therefore, Dresden is retracting this ENS call.

"This Isolation Condenser System event will be described in a Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 'Any event or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications'"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Kozak).

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 40835
Rep Org: AGERE SYSTEMS
Licensee: AGERE SYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIANNE SANTARELLI
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2004
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)

Event Text

THE LICENSEE IS MISSING 2 TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

Agere Systems reported they are missing two Safetylite Corp Tritium exit signs model SLX 60 with current calculated activity of 6.8 curies each. The signs were last seen 12/03 when they were removed from their location at the Reading PA. facility and placed in a secure area at that site. This site is being closed and while performing inventory the licensee discovered the 2 signs missing approximately 5/23/04. Construction workers, however, did have access to the area and it is assumed that the signs may have been discarded or taken by the construction workers. The licensee has made and still making a complete search of the facility and posting signs for the return of the signs. Region 1 has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40836
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 14:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AND MEDIA INTEREST IN FIRE IN CAFETERIA

At 1425 PDT, a grease fire started in the cafeteria which is in the protected area. The fire was extinguished by onsite fire fighting personnel. The fire reflashed and was again extinguished. Due to the reflash, the California Department of Forestry was notified for offsite fire assistance. Offsite fire fighting personnel responded. There were no injuries. There has been one media inquiry.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40837
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIMMY BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION CABLE SEPARATION

"This is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) - Unanalyzed Condition, 50.72(b)(3)(v) - event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and Catawba License Condition 2F - violation of License Condition 2.C.5 - Fire Protection Program. This report applies to Catawba Unit 2.

"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria was discovered. The condition relates to a postulated fire in the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Essential Bus switchgear room (ETA). The 'A' and 'B' Train Volume Control tank (VCT) outlet valves are in series providing the normal suction source for the centrifugal charging pumps (standard Westinghouse design). Cables related to the 'A' Train Volume Control Tank outlet valve are in the same fire area as the switchgear for the 'A' Train centrifugal charging pump. Therefore, if a hot short closes the VCT outlet valve, with the 'B' pump running, both centrifugal charging pumps could be rendered inoperable.

"Additional switchgear related to component cooling, and power cables for our Standby Shutdown Facility (backup reactor coolant pump seal cooling), are also located in this fire area. An all consuming fire scenario in ETA Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling to at least 2 of 4 reactor coolant pumps. The actual distance between the ETA switchgear and SSF cables is approximately 20 ft; therefore the probability of an actual fire resulting in a loss of seal cooling is very low.

"The unanalyzed condition only exists when the 'B' centrifugal charging pump is in operation (both units currently have 'A' centrifugal charging pump in operation).

"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved.

"Catawba is currently evaluating if a similar concern exists on Unit 1. A follow-up report will be issued if necessary."

The licensee will notify the applicable counties and states and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Friday, March 30, 2012