Event Notification Report for June 23, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/22/2004 - 06/23/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40836
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 14:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 14:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AND MEDIA INTEREST IN FIRE IN CAFETERIA
At 1425 PDT, a grease fire started in the cafeteria which is in the protected area. The fire was extinguished by onsite fire fighting personnel. The fire reflashed and was again extinguished. Due to the reflash, the California Department of Forestry was notified for offsite fire assistance. Offsite fire fighting personnel responded. There were no injuries. There has been one media inquiry.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1425 PDT, a grease fire started in the cafeteria which is in the protected area. The fire was extinguished by onsite fire fighting personnel. The fire reflashed and was again extinguished. Due to the reflash, the California Department of Forestry was notified for offsite fire assistance. Offsite fire fighting personnel responded. There were no injuries. There has been one media inquiry.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40837
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIMMY BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIMMY BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/23/2004
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2004
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2004
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO FIRE PROTECTION CABLE SEPARATION
"This is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) - Unanalyzed Condition, 50.72(b)(3)(v) - event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and Catawba License Condition 2F - violation of License Condition 2.C.5 - Fire Protection Program. This report applies to Catawba Unit 2.
"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria was discovered. The condition relates to a postulated fire in the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Essential Bus switchgear room (ETA). The 'A' and 'B' Train Volume Control tank (VCT) outlet valves are in series providing the normal suction source for the centrifugal charging pumps (standard Westinghouse design). Cables related to the 'A' Train Volume Control Tank outlet valve are in the same fire area as the switchgear for the 'A' Train centrifugal charging pump. Therefore, if a hot short closes the VCT outlet valve, with the 'B' pump running, both centrifugal charging pumps could be rendered inoperable.
"Additional switchgear related to component cooling, and power cables for our Standby Shutdown Facility (backup reactor coolant pump seal cooling), are also located in this fire area. An all consuming fire scenario in ETA Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling to at least 2 of 4 reactor coolant pumps. The actual distance between the ETA switchgear and SSF cables is approximately 20 ft; therefore the probability of an actual fire resulting in a loss of seal cooling is very low.
"The unanalyzed condition only exists when the 'B' centrifugal charging pump is in operation (both units currently have 'A' centrifugal charging pump in operation).
"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved.
"Catawba is currently evaluating if a similar concern exists on Unit 1. A follow-up report will be issued if necessary."
The licensee will notify the applicable counties and states and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM McCONNELL TO GOTT AT 1636 ON 6/24/04 * * *
"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria for Unit 2 was discovered.
"The report stated that Catawba was evaluating if a similar concern existed on Unit 1 and that a follow-up report would be issued if necessary.
"A similar but slightly different condition exists on Unit 1. For Unit 1 the Standby Shutdown Facility (backup seal cooling) cables go through the Train "B" 4160 Essential Switchgear Room (1ETB) rather than 2ETA on Unit 2. This means that for Unit 1, an all consuming fire scenario in 1ETB Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling.
"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved."
Notified R2DO (Haag)
"This is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) - Unanalyzed Condition, 50.72(b)(3)(v) - event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and Catawba License Condition 2F - violation of License Condition 2.C.5 - Fire Protection Program. This report applies to Catawba Unit 2.
"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria was discovered. The condition relates to a postulated fire in the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Essential Bus switchgear room (ETA). The 'A' and 'B' Train Volume Control tank (VCT) outlet valves are in series providing the normal suction source for the centrifugal charging pumps (standard Westinghouse design). Cables related to the 'A' Train Volume Control Tank outlet valve are in the same fire area as the switchgear for the 'A' Train centrifugal charging pump. Therefore, if a hot short closes the VCT outlet valve, with the 'B' pump running, both centrifugal charging pumps could be rendered inoperable.
"Additional switchgear related to component cooling, and power cables for our Standby Shutdown Facility (backup reactor coolant pump seal cooling), are also located in this fire area. An all consuming fire scenario in ETA Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling to at least 2 of 4 reactor coolant pumps. The actual distance between the ETA switchgear and SSF cables is approximately 20 ft; therefore the probability of an actual fire resulting in a loss of seal cooling is very low.
"The unanalyzed condition only exists when the 'B' centrifugal charging pump is in operation (both units currently have 'A' centrifugal charging pump in operation).
"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved.
"Catawba is currently evaluating if a similar concern exists on Unit 1. A follow-up report will be issued if necessary."
The licensee will notify the applicable counties and states and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM McCONNELL TO GOTT AT 1636 ON 6/24/04 * * *
"On 6/23/04 an original design deficiency related to fire protection cable separation criteria for Unit 2 was discovered.
"The report stated that Catawba was evaluating if a similar concern existed on Unit 1 and that a follow-up report would be issued if necessary.
"A similar but slightly different condition exists on Unit 1. For Unit 1 the Standby Shutdown Facility (backup seal cooling) cables go through the Train "B" 4160 Essential Switchgear Room (1ETB) rather than 2ETA on Unit 2. This means that for Unit 1, an all consuming fire scenario in 1ETB Switchgear Room could cause a temporary loss of seal cooling.
"This situation is analogous to a degraded fire rated assembly such that an all consuming fire in one area would affect multiple trains of safe shutdown equipment. Per our Fire Protection Program we are establishing appropriate fire watches as a remedial action until the issue is resolved."
Notified R2DO (Haag)