Event Notification Report for June 17, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/16/2004 - 06/17/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40826
Facility: YANKEE ROWE
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NEIL OLESON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HIXON
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NEIL OLESON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HIXON
Notification Date: 06/17/2004
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 12:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2004
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 12:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Three 55 gallon drums of sand, each impregnated with 1.73 microCuries Cs-137, were shipped to Yankee Rowe from Atlanta, Georgia via Federal Express. The specific activity of the material is 32 picoCuries per gram. Upon arrival at Yankee Rowe, a hole in one of the drums was noticed and about 70 pounds of sand was determined to be missing. About 3 pounds of material was recovered from the shipping truck. The hole appeared to be caused by a fork lift puncture.
The specific activity of the material is less than the Department of Transportation reportable quantity.
Yankee Rowe contacted state of Vermont and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Three 55 gallon drums of sand, each impregnated with 1.73 microCuries Cs-137, were shipped to Yankee Rowe from Atlanta, Georgia via Federal Express. The specific activity of the material is 32 picoCuries per gram. Upon arrival at Yankee Rowe, a hole in one of the drums was noticed and about 70 pounds of sand was determined to be missing. About 3 pounds of material was recovered from the shipping truck. The hole appeared to be caused by a fork lift puncture.
The specific activity of the material is less than the Department of Transportation reportable quantity.
Yankee Rowe contacted state of Vermont and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40823
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DeSANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DeSANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/17/2004
Notification Time: 03:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 00:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2004
Notification Time: 03:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 00:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 48 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
At 0338 EDT on 06/17/04, the licensee reported that at 0321 EDT on 06/14/04, the licensee identified that the Salem Unit 1 #12 charging pump was declared inoperable due to an inoperable discharge check valve. Repairs to the check valve are not expected to be completed by 0321 EDT on 06/17/04. At 0022 EDT on 06/17/04, the licensee commenced a shutdown of Salem Unit 1 from 100% power to comply with Tech Spec 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling System Inoperable (72 hour LCO). #15 service water pump and #11 auxiliary building exhaust fan have been declared inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
There were no personnel injuries or radiological occurrences associated with this event.
This event has no effect on Salem Unit 2 which is at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify State and Local officials.
At 0338 EDT on 06/17/04, the licensee reported that at 0321 EDT on 06/14/04, the licensee identified that the Salem Unit 1 #12 charging pump was declared inoperable due to an inoperable discharge check valve. Repairs to the check valve are not expected to be completed by 0321 EDT on 06/17/04. At 0022 EDT on 06/17/04, the licensee commenced a shutdown of Salem Unit 1 from 100% power to comply with Tech Spec 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling System Inoperable (72 hour LCO). #15 service water pump and #11 auxiliary building exhaust fan have been declared inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
There were no personnel injuries or radiological occurrences associated with this event.
This event has no effect on Salem Unit 2 which is at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify State and Local officials.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40824
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/17/2004
Notification Time: 06:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 05:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Notification Time: 06:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2004
Event Time: 05:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE
While changing out a light bulb in the Unit 1 HPCI room, the surveillance operator noticed that the bolts for the HPCI pump discharge check valve, 1E41-F005, bonnet on pressure seal were loose. All six bolts could be turned by hand. HPCI was declared inoperable until an investigation is performed. The bolts were properly torqued and HPCI pump run is complete and sat. Licensee entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable including the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DISMUKE TO CROUCH AT 1700 EDT ON 10/28/04 * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"A subsequent investigation revealed that a hot torque of the Unit 1 HPCI pump discharge check valve (1E41-F005) was performed during the 165 psig pump operability surveillance test which was performed following reassembly during the Unit 1 refueling outage. During this surveillance, the pump discharge pressure and thus internal pressure on the pressure seal cover, is maintained between 265 and 305 psig. However, during the rated pressure run, the pump discharge pressure achieved is required to be greater than or equal to 1135 psig. This difference in internal pressure (1135-305 = 830 psig minimum), acting on the bottom of the pressure seal cover, forced the pressure seal cover to move upward toward the cover retainer, compressing the pressure seal more tightly. As the pressure seal cover moved toward the cover retainer, the retainer bolts also moved upward, but the cover retainer remained stationary, due to gravity. Therefore, the retainer bolts were no longer torqued against the retainer cover, creating the 'as found' condition. It is site and vendor (Flowserve) experience that once the pressure seal cover is wedged upward, sufficient friction exists between the pressure seal cover, the pressure seal, and the valve body to prevent the pressure seal cover from relaxing the sealing force on the pressure seal once the valve internal (system) pressure is removed. Furthermore, no gap existed between the head of any of the retainer bolts and the retainer cover. The sealing function of the pressure seal was never lost, and the valve would have performed its design function while the retainer bolts were in the 'as found' 'finger tight' condition. Therefore, the valve remained operable at all times when the HPCI system was required to be operable following the Unit 1 refueling outage. This was further substantiated by the fact that no leakage was observed during the rated pressure pump operability run on 3/14/04. Following discovery of the 'finger tight' condition, the retainer bolts were cold torqued to the appropriate value (370 ft-lbs) by Maintenance personnel on 6/17/04. A HPCI pump surveillance was then performed and a hot torque of 370 ft-lbs was performed immediately after the system was shutdown.
"Tampering was considered as a possible cause for the loosened bolts, but no evidence could be found to support these bolts being loosened intentionally. All evidence available suggests that the bolts were loosened by internal pressure, which is consistent with vendor experience.
"Based on the above information this event is not reportable, and this notification serves to withdraw the previous notification made on 6/17/2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Bonser).
While changing out a light bulb in the Unit 1 HPCI room, the surveillance operator noticed that the bolts for the HPCI pump discharge check valve, 1E41-F005, bonnet on pressure seal were loose. All six bolts could be turned by hand. HPCI was declared inoperable until an investigation is performed. The bolts were properly torqued and HPCI pump run is complete and sat. Licensee entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable including the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DISMUKE TO CROUCH AT 1700 EDT ON 10/28/04 * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"A subsequent investigation revealed that a hot torque of the Unit 1 HPCI pump discharge check valve (1E41-F005) was performed during the 165 psig pump operability surveillance test which was performed following reassembly during the Unit 1 refueling outage. During this surveillance, the pump discharge pressure and thus internal pressure on the pressure seal cover, is maintained between 265 and 305 psig. However, during the rated pressure run, the pump discharge pressure achieved is required to be greater than or equal to 1135 psig. This difference in internal pressure (1135-305 = 830 psig minimum), acting on the bottom of the pressure seal cover, forced the pressure seal cover to move upward toward the cover retainer, compressing the pressure seal more tightly. As the pressure seal cover moved toward the cover retainer, the retainer bolts also moved upward, but the cover retainer remained stationary, due to gravity. Therefore, the retainer bolts were no longer torqued against the retainer cover, creating the 'as found' condition. It is site and vendor (Flowserve) experience that once the pressure seal cover is wedged upward, sufficient friction exists between the pressure seal cover, the pressure seal, and the valve body to prevent the pressure seal cover from relaxing the sealing force on the pressure seal once the valve internal (system) pressure is removed. Furthermore, no gap existed between the head of any of the retainer bolts and the retainer cover. The sealing function of the pressure seal was never lost, and the valve would have performed its design function while the retainer bolts were in the 'as found' 'finger tight' condition. Therefore, the valve remained operable at all times when the HPCI system was required to be operable following the Unit 1 refueling outage. This was further substantiated by the fact that no leakage was observed during the rated pressure pump operability run on 3/14/04. Following discovery of the 'finger tight' condition, the retainer bolts were cold torqued to the appropriate value (370 ft-lbs) by Maintenance personnel on 6/17/04. A HPCI pump surveillance was then performed and a hot torque of 370 ft-lbs was performed immediately after the system was shutdown.
"Tampering was considered as a possible cause for the loosened bolts, but no evidence could be found to support these bolts being loosened intentionally. All evidence available suggests that the bolts were loosened by internal pressure, which is consistent with vendor experience.
"Based on the above information this event is not reportable, and this notification serves to withdraw the previous notification made on 6/17/2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Bonser).