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Event Notification Report for June 16, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/15/2004 - 06/16/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40785 40803 40807 40819

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40785
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRANDON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 05/30/2004
Notification Time: 18:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2004
Event Time: 11:37 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 65 Power Operation 65 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was declared inoperable due to the pump's failure to meet the flow requirement specified in TS Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.4. This surveillance is normally performed on a quarterly basis in accordance with the plant's In-service Testing (IST) Program. The flow values measured during the performance of this surveillance were below both the normal and alert ranges. This test had also been run on 5/27/04 with results in the alert range; HPCS system instruments had been vented between the two tests to rule out the possibility that the results were due to measurement errors.

"Upon declaring the HPCS pump inoperable, TS 3.5.1 Action B was entered. In accordance with Action B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. With the RCIC system verified operable, Action B provides a 14-day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status.

"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were operable during this event. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident. The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 06/14/04 @1752 BY MIKE BRANDON TO C. GOULD * * * RETRACTION

On May 30, 2004, Energy Northwest provided an 8-hour notification pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This notification reported the apparent failure of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system's pump to meet the flow requirements of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.4. Upon the apparent failure to satisfy this SR, Energy Northwest entered Action B of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 (14 day completion time) and initiated actions to investigate the cause of this apparent failure.

This investigation determined the cause of this apparent failure was due to an anomaly in the processing of the pressure and flow input signals and the instrumentation used for documenting the results of the surveillance. Additional testing using alternative instrumentation determined the HPCS pump was fully capable of providing flow within the existing acceptance criteria of the plant's In-service Testing (IST) Program and thus capable of satisfying the SR.

This investigation determined that no actual degradation of the pump existed that would have caused a valid failure of the SR. This was an instrumentation issue only. The HPCS system would have been capable of performing its specified safety function in the as-found condition and was capable of fully satisfying the SR. Therefore, this condition would not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and is therefore not reportable under 10CFR50.72.

The HPCS system was declared OPERABLE on June 03, 2004 at 22:59 PDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40803
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GEOTECK, INC OF NEVADA
Region: 4
City: NORTH LAS VEGAS State: NV
County: CLARK
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2004
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)

Event Text

NEVADA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN DENSITY GAUGE

A Campbell Pacific Nuclear Density Gauge, Model #MC-3 (Serial #37117979) containing 50 millicuries Am-241/Be and 10 millicuries Cs-137, was stolen from a transport container in North Las Vegas, Nevada. The transport container was secured in a truck, but the gauge was not locked in the transport case. The licensee notified the North Las Vegas Police Dept.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40807
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 092-0121-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES D. ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE NC - NOTIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE DUE TO METAL FATIGUE

"The licensee [Flowserve US Inc.] performing Booth IR has an automatic IR setup that uses source switches to stop the extension of the source for IR operations. The source switch at the end of the guide tube failed and the source [Ir-192] extended beyond the end of the guide tube and got stuck. The licensee contacted Amersham (the manufacturer of the camera) for advice. By following Amersham's suggestions the licensee was able to remotely retract the source back into the guide tube, and from there to retract the source back into the camera in the fully shielded position. The licensee intends to have the source leak tested as soon as possible and said they would submit a complete report within 30 days."

No one was injured or overexposed during this incident.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40819
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE FOSS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/15/2004
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2004
Event Time: 01:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS).

"On 4/25/04, at approximately 0105 hours, the 343SU startup source tripped resulting in a fast transfer of expected 4 kV emergency busses to the alternate offsite power source. The fast transfer resulted in a half PCIS Group II isolation on both Units 2 and 3 as expected. The half isolation of PCIS Group II resulted in outboard isolation valves closing on Unit 2 and inboard isolation valves closing on Unit 3. The isolations involved various PCIS Group II process lines such as Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 0130 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.

"The offsite source (343SU) was lost as a result of a ground fault. Subsequent investigation determined that a raccoon had climbed a takeoff tower where the startup source transitions from an aerial line to underground cabling. The associated equipment was located in a small fenced area near the plant. The offsite source was inspected, tested and returned to an operable condition by approximately 2220 hours on 4/25/04. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 216811) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012