Event Notification Report for June 10, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/09/2004 - 06/10/2004
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40807
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 092-0121-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES D. ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 092-0121-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES D. ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE NC - NOTIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE DUE TO METAL FATIGUE
"The licensee [Flowserve US Inc.] performing Booth IR has an automatic IR setup that uses source switches to stop the extension of the source for IR operations. The source switch at the end of the guide tube failed and the source [Ir-192] extended beyond the end of the guide tube and got stuck. The licensee contacted Amersham (the manufacturer of the camera) for advice. By following Amersham's suggestions the licensee was able to remotely retract the source back into the guide tube, and from there to retract the source back into the camera in the fully shielded position. The licensee intends to have the source leak tested as soon as possible and said they would submit a complete report within 30 days."
No one was injured or overexposed during this incident.
"The licensee [Flowserve US Inc.] performing Booth IR has an automatic IR setup that uses source switches to stop the extension of the source for IR operations. The source switch at the end of the guide tube failed and the source [Ir-192] extended beyond the end of the guide tube and got stuck. The licensee contacted Amersham (the manufacturer of the camera) for advice. By following Amersham's suggestions the licensee was able to remotely retract the source back into the guide tube, and from there to retract the source back into the camera in the fully shielded position. The licensee intends to have the source leak tested as soon as possible and said they would submit a complete report within 30 days."
No one was injured or overexposed during this incident.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40802
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 05:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 02:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 05:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 02:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTUATION
"One emergency response siren (Number 10 Brunswick County) located in Southport, NC inadvertently actuated at 0205, apparently due to a lightning strike, and was silenced at 0312. The Brunswick County, New Hanover County and North Carolina State Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) were notified of the inadvertent actuation. The Brunswick County 911 Center received calls from local residents reporting the siren actuation.
"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: Minimal safety significance. The loss of the single siren will not significantly impact the public notification system. The remaining sirens in both Brunswick and New Hanover Counties have been verified to be operable.
"Corrective Actions: The siren was silenced at 0312 on June 10, 2004. The cause of the inadvertent actuation will be determined and repaired."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"One emergency response siren (Number 10 Brunswick County) located in Southport, NC inadvertently actuated at 0205, apparently due to a lightning strike, and was silenced at 0312. The Brunswick County, New Hanover County and North Carolina State Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) were notified of the inadvertent actuation. The Brunswick County 911 Center received calls from local residents reporting the siren actuation.
"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: Minimal safety significance. The loss of the single siren will not significantly impact the public notification system. The remaining sirens in both Brunswick and New Hanover Counties have been verified to be operable.
"Corrective Actions: The siren was silenced at 0312 on June 10, 2004. The cause of the inadvertent actuation will be determined and repaired."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40804
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
MARK LESSER (R2)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WHILE PERFORMING SCHEDULED SOLID STATE PROTECTION TESTING
A Unit 2 automatic reactor trip occurred while the licensee was performing planned periodic testing on train "A" solid state protection. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as expected immediately following the reactor trip due to low-low level in the steam generators. The unit is being maintained stable in mode 3 and heat sink is being performed via steam dump to the condensers. All other systems functioned as required. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 6/11/04 AT 12:23 EDT FROM B. BROWN TO A. COSTA * * *
"This is an update to event notification 40804. At 1313 hours on June 10, 2004, North Anna Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from 100 percent during the performance of 2-PT-36.1A (Train 'A' Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation Logic Test). The cause of the reactor trip, was determined to be an incorrect configuration of the cell switch (52h contract) on 'A' Reactor Bypass Breaker, 2-EP-BKR-BYA. The incorrect cell switch configuration resulted in a turbine trip signal being generated during testing which resulted in a reactor trip signal being generated in the 'B' train Reactor Protection System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated in response to the event.
"Control room personnel responded to the event in accordance with emergency procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The control room team stabilized the plant using ES-0.1 Reactor Trip recovery. The lowest Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure during the event was 1988 psig and the lowest RCS temperature was 549 degrees. No human performance issues were identified during this event.
"A non-emergency four-hour report was made to the NRC operations center at 1611 hours pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an actuation of the Reactor Protection System while critical. An eight-hour report was also made to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts (Engineering Safety Features Actuation). The Reactor Protection System, AMSAC [ATWAS Mitigating System Actuation Circuit], and the Auxiliary Feedwater System operated properly in response to the event. During the Unit 2 reactor trip, a blown output fuse on a logic card (that feeds the permissive for arming the Steam Dumps from loss of load) prevented the Main Steam Dump Valves from opening in Tavg Mode as expected. The Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) lifted and operated to control RCS temperature until transferring Steam Dump control to the Steam Pressure Mode. The fuse was replaced.
"A post trip review was conducted at 1500 hours on June 10, 2004. The cell switches on the Reactor Trip Bypass breakers have been repaired and post maintenance testing has been completed. Management approval was granted to start-up Unit 2. North Anna Unit 2 is currently in Mode 1 and is preparing to be placed on-line."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Lesser) and NRR EO (Bateman).
A Unit 2 automatic reactor trip occurred while the licensee was performing planned periodic testing on train "A" solid state protection. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as expected immediately following the reactor trip due to low-low level in the steam generators. The unit is being maintained stable in mode 3 and heat sink is being performed via steam dump to the condensers. All other systems functioned as required. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 6/11/04 AT 12:23 EDT FROM B. BROWN TO A. COSTA * * *
"This is an update to event notification 40804. At 1313 hours on June 10, 2004, North Anna Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from 100 percent during the performance of 2-PT-36.1A (Train 'A' Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation Logic Test). The cause of the reactor trip, was determined to be an incorrect configuration of the cell switch (52h contract) on 'A' Reactor Bypass Breaker, 2-EP-BKR-BYA. The incorrect cell switch configuration resulted in a turbine trip signal being generated during testing which resulted in a reactor trip signal being generated in the 'B' train Reactor Protection System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated in response to the event.
"Control room personnel responded to the event in accordance with emergency procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The control room team stabilized the plant using ES-0.1 Reactor Trip recovery. The lowest Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure during the event was 1988 psig and the lowest RCS temperature was 549 degrees. No human performance issues were identified during this event.
"A non-emergency four-hour report was made to the NRC operations center at 1611 hours pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an actuation of the Reactor Protection System while critical. An eight-hour report was also made to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts (Engineering Safety Features Actuation). The Reactor Protection System, AMSAC [ATWAS Mitigating System Actuation Circuit], and the Auxiliary Feedwater System operated properly in response to the event. During the Unit 2 reactor trip, a blown output fuse on a logic card (that feeds the permissive for arming the Steam Dumps from loss of load) prevented the Main Steam Dump Valves from opening in Tavg Mode as expected. The Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) lifted and operated to control RCS temperature until transferring Steam Dump control to the Steam Pressure Mode. The fuse was replaced.
"A post trip review was conducted at 1500 hours on June 10, 2004. The cell switches on the Reactor Trip Bypass breakers have been repaired and post maintenance testing has been completed. Management approval was granted to start-up Unit 2. North Anna Unit 2 is currently in Mode 1 and is preparing to be placed on-line."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Lesser) and NRR EO (Bateman).