Event Notification Report for June 04, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/03/2004 - 06/04/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40793
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
LICENSEE REPORTED A 4 HOUR 91-01 RESPONSE BULLETIN
Material accumulation discovered in a 55-gallon drum. The 55-gallon drum was used as a knock-out pot for moisture condensate during high-pressure nitrogen drying of clean UF6 cylinders undergoing re-certification.
In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (b.2), this event satisfies the criteria for a 4-hour notification. Specifically, any determination that a criticality safety analysis or evaluation was deficient, or that a particular system was not previously analyzed; and that less than two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would be required before a criticality accident would be possible.
During a normal process hazards assessment an NCS Engineer was informed of a 55-gallon drum in the cylinder re-certification process. The drum was found to contain approximately 28 kilograms of dry material. Laboratory analyses determined a maximum concentration of 53.5 weight percent uranium in the form of uranyl fluoride. This corresponds to a uranium mass of approximately 15 kilograms.
UF6 cylinders contain virtually no uranium at the time they undergo drying in the cylinder re-certification process. Preliminary investigation has revealed that the drum was inspected from 1993 to 1996 and repeatedly found to contain no solid accumulation before the inspections were discontinued.
Cylinder re-certification was not in operation at the time of discovery.
NCS formally notified Operations not to operate cylinder re-certification.
The drum was removed from the system and inspected.
The material was removed from the drum, sampled, and analyzed.
This particular system was not previously analyzed for criticality safety.
Much less than a critical mass was involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed.
Material accumulation discovered in a 55-gallon drum. The 55-gallon drum was used as a knock-out pot for moisture condensate during high-pressure nitrogen drying of clean UF6 cylinders undergoing re-certification.
In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (b.2), this event satisfies the criteria for a 4-hour notification. Specifically, any determination that a criticality safety analysis or evaluation was deficient, or that a particular system was not previously analyzed; and that less than two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would be required before a criticality accident would be possible.
During a normal process hazards assessment an NCS Engineer was informed of a 55-gallon drum in the cylinder re-certification process. The drum was found to contain approximately 28 kilograms of dry material. Laboratory analyses determined a maximum concentration of 53.5 weight percent uranium in the form of uranyl fluoride. This corresponds to a uranium mass of approximately 15 kilograms.
UF6 cylinders contain virtually no uranium at the time they undergo drying in the cylinder re-certification process. Preliminary investigation has revealed that the drum was inspected from 1993 to 1996 and repeatedly found to contain no solid accumulation before the inspections were discontinued.
Cylinder re-certification was not in operation at the time of discovery.
NCS formally notified Operations not to operate cylinder re-certification.
The drum was removed from the system and inspected.
The material was removed from the drum, sampled, and analyzed.
This particular system was not previously analyzed for criticality safety.
Much less than a critical mass was involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40791
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEE BOERNEKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEE BOERNEKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 08:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 04:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 08:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 04:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INTAKE STRUCTURE SEAWEED FOULING
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) experienced a large influx of seaweed that required securing one of the four running Circulating Water (CW) pumps. When conditions continued to degrade, the Operations Department decided to manually trip the unit.
During the trip, all control rods inserted into the core. No manual or power-operated relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The Operations staff is maintaining the unit at normal operating pressure and temperature. The electrical grid is stable. Currently, only one CW pump is running. Unit 2 is unaffected and is not experiencing a seaweed influx at this time.
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) experienced a large influx of seaweed that required securing one of the four running Circulating Water (CW) pumps. When conditions continued to degrade, the Operations Department decided to manually trip the unit.
During the trip, all control rods inserted into the core. No manual or power-operated relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The Operations staff is maintaining the unit at normal operating pressure and temperature. The electrical grid is stable. Currently, only one CW pump is running. Unit 2 is unaffected and is not experiencing a seaweed influx at this time.
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector
General Information or Other
Event Number: 40796
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: WALTER O. BOSWELL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: SUN CITY WEST State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ-07-138
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: WALTER O. BOSWELL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: SUN CITY WEST State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ-07-138
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/08/2004
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2004
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)
ARIZONA STATE LICENSEE REPORTED A MISSING I-125 SEED
The State of Arizona has been informed of a missing source by two State Licensees (Walter O. Boswell Hospital lic # AZ-07-138 and Amersham Health lic # AZ-07-346). The missing source is an Iodine-125 seed containing 0.225 millicuries of Iodine-125. The seed was loaded into a shipping container by two employees of Licensee 1. Both employees independently described and certified the loading of the seed into the shipping container. Licensee 2 received the package but did not locate the seed that was supposed to be inside. This is information from the 30 day report, pursuant to Arizona rules equivalent to 10CFR20.2201(a)(ii). The seed was first detected missing April, 18, 2004.
The Agency has opened an active investigation into the circumstances of the loss of this seed. Initial surveys at each Licensee failed to locate the missing seed.
The State of Arizona has been informed of a missing source by two State Licensees (Walter O. Boswell Hospital lic # AZ-07-138 and Amersham Health lic # AZ-07-346). The missing source is an Iodine-125 seed containing 0.225 millicuries of Iodine-125. The seed was loaded into a shipping container by two employees of Licensee 1. Both employees independently described and certified the loading of the seed into the shipping container. Licensee 2 received the package but did not locate the seed that was supposed to be inside. This is information from the 30 day report, pursuant to Arizona rules equivalent to 10CFR20.2201(a)(ii). The seed was first detected missing April, 18, 2004.
The Agency has opened an active investigation into the circumstances of the loss of this seed. Initial surveys at each Licensee failed to locate the missing seed.