Event Notification Report for May 21, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/20/2004 - 05/21/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
4076440767407684076940770
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40764
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SAUER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN
A unit shutdown was commenced to comply with the technical specification for containment integrity. A service water isolation valve supplying the turbine generator area lost power when the 2B vital bus 230v transformer failed at 1147 on 5/21/04. This results in entry into a restore in 1 hour or hot shutdown in 6 hours LCO (3.6.1.1) since the valve cannot be isolated and maintain the unit in service. The failure of the transformer is currently under investigation. A power reduction of 20% per hour is currently in progress.
Other equipment affected by the transformer loss, various containment isolation valves, 2B emergency diesel generator, 22 chiller, 22 and 24 containment fan coil units, and 23 and 24 service water pumps. Prior to the event the only safety related equipment out of service was the service 23 service water pump that was out for planned maintenance. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
A unit shutdown was commenced to comply with the technical specification for containment integrity. A service water isolation valve supplying the turbine generator area lost power when the 2B vital bus 230v transformer failed at 1147 on 5/21/04. This results in entry into a restore in 1 hour or hot shutdown in 6 hours LCO (3.6.1.1) since the valve cannot be isolated and maintain the unit in service. The failure of the transformer is currently under investigation. A power reduction of 20% per hour is currently in progress.
Other equipment affected by the transformer loss, various containment isolation valves, 2B emergency diesel generator, 22 chiller, 22 and 24 containment fan coil units, and 23 and 24 service water pumps. Prior to the event the only safety related equipment out of service was the service 23 service water pump that was out for planned maintenance. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40767
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM CASE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM CASE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN
Emergency Service Water "A" (ESW) Pump failure results in inoperability of all Div 1 ECCS systems. The plant entered the Limiting Condition for Operation for the ESW inoperability at 0150 on 05/21/04. The action times for Tech Spec 3.7.1 are as follows: restore ESW to operable status within 72 hours, if this cannot be accomplished be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in the following 12 hours and Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. Reactor power was reduced at 1600 to begin the shutdown process. Division 2 and 3 ECCS are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Emergency Service Water "A" (ESW) Pump failure results in inoperability of all Div 1 ECCS systems. The plant entered the Limiting Condition for Operation for the ESW inoperability at 0150 on 05/21/04. The action times for Tech Spec 3.7.1 are as follows: restore ESW to operable status within 72 hours, if this cannot be accomplished be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in the following 12 hours and Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. Reactor power was reduced at 1600 to begin the shutdown process. Division 2 and 3 ECCS are fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40768
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY HUFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY HUFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 21:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Notification Time: 21:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
EDWIN HACKETT (NRR)
DICK WESSMAN (DIRO)
M. A. DOYLE (DHS)
DAVID BARDEN (FEMA)
JAY HENSON (R2)
EDWIN HACKETT (NRR)
DICK WESSMAN (DIRO)
M. A. DOYLE (DHS)
DAVID BARDEN (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED
At 2108 hours a main generator lead failed (exploded) causing a generator lead differential lockout/turbine trip/reactor trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. Both Motor Driven and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as expected and are supplying water to the steam generators. Electrical power is being supplied from offsite and all systems are operating as expected. The reactor tripped at 2108 hours and a report of a fire in the switchyard was reported to Control Room at 2109 hours. Fire Brigade was dispatched and the fire was reported out at 2142 hours. Reflash fire watch has been set. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. Surry Unit 1 remains at 100% power. Licensee notified State and Local officials of their declaration of an Unusual Event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/21/04 AT 2310 EDT FROM CHARLES YOUNG TO G. WAIG * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 2256 EDT. Damage appears to be confined to the main generator leads with one lead missing and some damage to other leads. The plant is stable with RCS temperature at 547 degrees Fahrenheit, 2235 psia. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the NOUE termination by the licensee.
Notified R2DO (Jay Henson), NRR EO (Edwin Hackett), DIRO (Tom Andrews), FEMA (David Barden), DHS (Robert Bozzo).
See EN 40769 , 40770 & 40771 for related Non Emergency notifications.
At 2108 hours a main generator lead failed (exploded) causing a generator lead differential lockout/turbine trip/reactor trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. Both Motor Driven and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as expected and are supplying water to the steam generators. Electrical power is being supplied from offsite and all systems are operating as expected. The reactor tripped at 2108 hours and a report of a fire in the switchyard was reported to Control Room at 2109 hours. Fire Brigade was dispatched and the fire was reported out at 2142 hours. Reflash fire watch has been set. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. Surry Unit 1 remains at 100% power. Licensee notified State and Local officials of their declaration of an Unusual Event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/21/04 AT 2310 EDT FROM CHARLES YOUNG TO G. WAIG * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 2256 EDT. Damage appears to be confined to the main generator leads with one lead missing and some damage to other leads. The plant is stable with RCS temperature at 547 degrees Fahrenheit, 2235 psia. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the NOUE termination by the licensee.
Notified R2DO (Jay Henson), NRR EO (Edwin Hackett), DIRO (Tom Andrews), FEMA (David Barden), DHS (Robert Bozzo).
See EN 40769 , 40770 & 40771 for related Non Emergency notifications.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40769
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GROVER M. WOODZELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GROVER M. WOODZELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/22/2004
Notification Time: 00:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2004
Notification Time: 00:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GENERATOR LEADS FAILURE
"Unit 2 Reactor tripped at 2108, first out is F-E-2, 500KV leads differential lockout relay trip.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of RPS Activation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of AFW. Plant responded as expected with the exception of 'C' SG AFW flow indication. The 'C' SG level responded normally to Unit conditions. The NRC resident has been notified of this event and is on site. Notification was made to NRC duty officer upon declaration on NOUE[See EN#40768], which was declared based on EAL Tab K-6 for 'Confirmed report of unplanned explosion within Protected Area or Switchyard.' An electrical fault was observed in the 500 KV switchyard and is currently being investigated. No further damage has been detected in the switchyard. The NOUE, which was declared at 2116, has been terminated as of 2256."
Reactor shutdown with all control rods fully inserted. Electric plant is in a normal shutdown mode lineup. The other operating unit was unaffected by this event. Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves.
See Surry Unit 2 event # 40770 & 40771.
"Unit 2 Reactor tripped at 2108, first out is F-E-2, 500KV leads differential lockout relay trip.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of RPS Activation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of AFW. Plant responded as expected with the exception of 'C' SG AFW flow indication. The 'C' SG level responded normally to Unit conditions. The NRC resident has been notified of this event and is on site. Notification was made to NRC duty officer upon declaration on NOUE[See EN#40768], which was declared based on EAL Tab K-6 for 'Confirmed report of unplanned explosion within Protected Area or Switchyard.' An electrical fault was observed in the 500 KV switchyard and is currently being investigated. No further damage has been detected in the switchyard. The NOUE, which was declared at 2116, has been terminated as of 2256."
Reactor shutdown with all control rods fully inserted. Electric plant is in a normal shutdown mode lineup. The other operating unit was unaffected by this event. Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves.
See Surry Unit 2 event # 40770 & 40771.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40770
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/22/2004
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2004
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2004
Event Time: 21:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER NOT BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION (JCO).
"At 2146 hours on 05/21/04, Unit 2 entered a 30 Hr. clock to Cold Shutdown (CSD) in accordance with T.S.3.0.1 due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being in compliance for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 configuration. Auxiliary Feedwater was declared inoperable at 2146 hours. During post trip recovery, Emergency Procedure, 2-ES-0.1, directed that the six (6) AFW motor operated valves (MOVs) be checked opened after securing the AFW Pumps. This is contrary to the AFW JCO, which requires four (4) MOVs out of six (6) to be closed for AFW to remain Operable. At 0040 hours on 5/22/04 the correct valve alignment in accordance with the JCO was established and the 30 hour TS 3.0.1 clock was exited.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B); any event or condition that results in the Station being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The licensee found out about this event today during event investigation. See Surry Unit 2 events 40769, 40768 and 40771.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WOODZELL TO CROUCH ON 05/25/04 @ 2347 EDT * * *
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1506 hours on 5/22/04, Surry Power Station made an 8-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being aligned in accordance with Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 for 2 hours and 54 minutes following a reactor trip. (Event Number 40770).
"Upon further analysis, this event was determined not to be immediately reportable. Based on calculations performed by Dominion Nuclear Safety Analysis in Engineering Transmittal ET NAF-04-0045, Rev 0, a risk-based period of time was calculated to allow operations personnel a defined period of time to realign the AFW system in accordance with this JCO. Operators must not exceed 150 hours to restore the acceptable JCO configuration during all modes where AFW is required to be operable. Since the amount of time the system was not in the JCO alignment was less than 150 hours, plant risk increase was maintained less than the limits specified in Regulatory Guide 1.177.
"This notification is being made to retract the report made on 5/22/04 based on the above discussion. The NRC resident has been notified."
The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Ayres).
"At 2146 hours on 05/21/04, Unit 2 entered a 30 Hr. clock to Cold Shutdown (CSD) in accordance with T.S.3.0.1 due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being in compliance for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 configuration. Auxiliary Feedwater was declared inoperable at 2146 hours. During post trip recovery, Emergency Procedure, 2-ES-0.1, directed that the six (6) AFW motor operated valves (MOVs) be checked opened after securing the AFW Pumps. This is contrary to the AFW JCO, which requires four (4) MOVs out of six (6) to be closed for AFW to remain Operable. At 0040 hours on 5/22/04 the correct valve alignment in accordance with the JCO was established and the 30 hour TS 3.0.1 clock was exited.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B); any event or condition that results in the Station being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The licensee found out about this event today during event investigation. See Surry Unit 2 events 40769, 40768 and 40771.
* * * RETRACTION FROM WOODZELL TO CROUCH ON 05/25/04 @ 2347 EDT * * *
The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 1506 hours on 5/22/04, Surry Power Station made an 8-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) not being aligned in accordance with Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) SC 03-002 for 2 hours and 54 minutes following a reactor trip. (Event Number 40770).
"Upon further analysis, this event was determined not to be immediately reportable. Based on calculations performed by Dominion Nuclear Safety Analysis in Engineering Transmittal ET NAF-04-0045, Rev 0, a risk-based period of time was calculated to allow operations personnel a defined period of time to realign the AFW system in accordance with this JCO. Operators must not exceed 150 hours to restore the acceptable JCO configuration during all modes where AFW is required to be operable. Since the amount of time the system was not in the JCO alignment was less than 150 hours, plant risk increase was maintained less than the limits specified in Regulatory Guide 1.177.
"This notification is being made to retract the report made on 5/22/04 based on the above discussion. The NRC resident has been notified."
The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified R2DO (Ayres).