| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/07/2004 - 05/10/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40614 | Rep Org: CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF RAD. PROT.
Licensee: CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF RAD. PROT.
Region: 1
City: EAST LYME State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE FIRSICK
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 03/27/2004
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2004
Event Time: 20:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AARAN DANIS (NSIR)
| Event Text STATE OF CONNECTICUT REPORTED THE DISCOVERY OF A STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE
The item was found adjacent to a house in a wooded area in East Lyme, CT. It was a cylinder measuring 6 inches in length and 2 inches in diameter. The bottom of the cylinder had the following serial number: M2477. It was a general licensed strontium-90 source. The source was contained inside a metal box with a radioactive material symbol on the outside. The State response personnel conducted a radiological survey. The source read 250 millirem per hour on contact for gamma. The source read 3.2 rem per hour on contact for beta. At 12 inches, the source measured 5 millirem per hour. At one meter the source measured less than 1 millirem per hour. The State took the source to a secure locked location for followup on Monday to try to determine the owner.
* * * UPDATE 0900 ON 3/29/04 MOSS (NMSS) TO GOTT * * *
The item was identified as a component to a helicopter In-flight Blade Inspection System. Notified Mark Evetts at the Homeland Security Operations Center.
* * * UPDATE 1120 ON 05/07/04 USNA Capt. Dave Farrand TO John MacKinnon * * *
U.S. NRC, Region I (Mr. Jim Schmidt) informed the U. S. Navy (NAVSEADET RASO) on March 31, 2004 that an IBIS device (serial number 2397) containing 500 microCi of Sr-90 was found on private property in East Lyme, Connecticut, on March 28, 2004. The NRC also informed the Navy that the IBIS device was confiscated by the State of Connecticut, and placed in safe and secure storage.
Early results of NRC inquiries pointed to the U.S. Navy as the probable owner of the IBIS device. A preliminary investigation by the Navy has found that the these devices are routinely returned to the manufacturer (General Nucleonics) for refurbishing, where they may be resold, through the Defense Logistic Agency to the Navy, the Marine Corp, the Army, or the Coast Guard. The Navy's preliminary investigation also found that these devices are also used on some commercial aircraft. The Navy's preliminary investigation verified that the Navy possessed the device until at least 1989, but found no conclusive data or documentation to show that the device was returned to the manufacturer after that time. Therefore, the Navy has accepted responsibility for the device.
The Navy's preliminary investigation was unable to determine how the IBIS device came to be located on private property.
The Navy has contacted the State of Connecticut, and has initiated actions to retrieve the device for proper disposal or facilitate its return to the manufacturer.
The Navy will follow-up with a 30 day report as required by 10 CFR 20.2201. United States Navy General Radioactive Material license number is 45-23645-01NA.
R1DO (Della Greca) & NMSS (Roberto Torres) notified. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40722 | Rep Org: TES CONSULTANTS
Licensee: TES CONSULTANTS
Region: 3
City: FARMINGTON HILLS State: MI
County:
License #: 21-32150-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICK HUCHINSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2004
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At approximately 0800 EDT on 05/04/04, an equipment operator backed an excavator over a Troxler density gauge model 3430, Serial No. 29858, containing an 8 millicurie Cs-137 and a 40 millicurie Am-241:Be source. The exterior cover of the gauge was damaged, the source rod was bent and stuck in the exposed position at the time the incident occurred. The technician removed personnel from the area and contacted the local Hazmat fire department which placed the damaged gauge in a steel drum. The licensee is in possession of the steel drum containing the damaged gauge and has plans to return it to the manufacturer for disposal. The licensee believes that based on the structure of the damaged gauge, there was no source leakage and they are in process of performing personnel exposure calculations as warranted. The licensee contacted Region 3 and will submit a written report of this incident, as required.
* * * UPDATE AT 0937 EDT ON 05/07/04 TO JOHN MACKINNON FROM NICK HUTCHINSON * * *
Correct gauge serial number mentioned above should be 30162 instead of 29858. R3DO (Christine Lipa) & NMSS (Roberto Torres) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40725 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TIMKEN COMPANY
Region: 3
City: CANTON State: OH
County:
License #: 31-201770025
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE SNEE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 05/05/2004
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2004
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION DUE TO MELTED SOURCE
State of Ohio reported that a Cs 137 source was destroyed in a furnace at the Timken Steel Company. The initial detection of a problem occurred with high radiation being detected in the bag house exhaust system. Dose rates are 660 micro R/hr in the bag house. It is not known at this time the origin of the radioactive material. The licensee is conducting surveys to determine if there is contamination anywhere else in the facility. The licensee is also conducting an inventory of their radioactive material to determine if it was their material. It is suspected that the radioactive material may have been in a load of scrap steel that was being melted for reprocessing. The licensee has contacted a contractor to perform decontamination activities.
Licensee notified the NRC Agreement States representative (J. Lynch). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40733 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD ROLAND
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2004
Event Time: 12:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS IN MORE THAN ONE SYSTEM
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On 03/21/04 at 12:32 hours [EST], a JLG Manlift working on the Unit 1 Cooling Tower came into contact with a 230 KV transmission line, causing the loss of one of two off-site power supplies to the plant [Startup Transformer T-10 and its associated loads]. The other Startup Transformer [T-20] assumed the extra electrical load, as designed, and restored power to the station. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was in Mode 1. Both Units continued in Modes 5 and 1, respectively.
"As a result of the loss of the T-10 transformer, the following Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation [Valves][PCIVs] closed on loss of logic power: Containment Atmosphere Control PCIVs HV-25740A, HV-25750A, HV-25776A, HV25780A, HV-25736A, and HV-25742A, HV-25752A, HV-25774A, HV-25782A, HV-25734A. Drywell Sump PCIVs HV-261108 A1 and A2 closed. Reactor Building Chilled Water PCIVs HV-28791 A1 and A2 and HV-28792 A1 and A2 closed. Recirculation Sample PCIV HV-243F019 closed. All isolation signals were successfully reset and the T-10 line was subsequently restored.
"The Unit 2 electrical transient event resulted in general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system and is therefore being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A voluntary ENS Phone Notification to the NRC, related to this event, was previously made on 03/21/04, due to notification of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency [PEMA], because an emergency vehicle entered plant property.
"The above listed systems' Division 1 containment isolation valve actuations were completed and functioned successfully on loss of logic power."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40734 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/07/2004
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY DUE TO INABILITY TO ACTIVATE SIRENS
The following information was obtained by the licensee via facsimile:
"During the May 7, 2004 monthly siren test, it was determined that the Ottawa County Sheriff dispatcher did not have the capability to activate the EPZ [Emergency Preparedness Zone] Sirens. Follow-up investigation determined that a time difference between the control station in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the sheriff's dispatch control station caused the sheriff's control station to be unable to activate the sirens. This condition was corrected within minutes of discovery, however it appears that the Sheriff's dispatcher had lost capability to activate the sirens when the EOF computer clock was reset due to daylight savings time (reset manually on April 5, 2004).
"All 54 sirens were successfully tested using the vendors control station. The ability to [activate] the sirens from the Sheriff's control station was restored. The EOF control station retained the ability to activate the sirens throughout this time period.
"Because the sirens could not be sounded from a 24-hour manned station, in accordance with station procedures, this event represents a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability. Therefore, this event is reportable within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The Ottawa County Sheriff's Office was notified of this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40735 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BRILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 07:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 04:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR STARTUP CANCELLED DUE TO ERRATIC SOURCE RANGE MONITOR
While performing a unit start-up, SRM 24 was declared inoperable due to erratic indications. SRM 22 was already inoperable which resulted in falling below the Technical Specification 3.3.1.2 mode 2 requirement of 3 operable SRMs.
The cause of the erratic indications on SRM 24 is unknown at this time. All control rods were fully inserted at 0527 CDT.
The license plans to go to a cold shutdown condition to investigate the erratic source range monitor.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40736 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ART LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/08/2004
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"At 0912 [EDT] the Salem Township sirens, zone 14, sounded for 3 minutes. All ten sirens in zone 14 sounded. The reason for the siren sounding was unknown at that time. The Sheriff Dispatcher notified Emergency Preparedness of the sirens sounding. Emergency Preparedness called the vendor, Transco, to investigate the siren sounding. Transco went to the 500 [foot] siren tower and polled the siren system and found that the Zone 14 sirens had been activated by a signal from the Sheriff Dispatch office at 0912 [hrs.]. Transco then went to the Sheriff Dispatch office to look at the system and found no problems. At 1158 [hrs.], on 5/8/04, a quiet test, e.g. low noise level test, was conducted for siren 91, next to the Sheriff's office, to ensure the siren system was operating properly.
"Discussions with the Sheriff Dispatchers indicated that they were not in the vicinity of the siren console and did not have the siren screen called up. Therefore, it was not possible for the Sheriff Dispatchers to inadvertently activate the sirens. The only other activity in the siren console area was an exterminator working. Therefore, at this time, the most likely cause of the sirens sounding is the exterminator inadvertently activating the Zone 14 sirens.
"The Prompt Notification System (sirens) were verified capable of performing [their] intended function (operable), at no time was Emergency Notification capability impaired, it was also validated, that once activated by the inadvertent action, the system responded as expected. This spurious activation does not appear in any way to be related to Event #40734 regarding the test failure on May 7, 2004."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40737 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN GUNN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 05/09/2004
Notification Time: 02:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2004
Event Time: 20:39 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING PHYSICS TESTING DUE TO CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY SLIPPING 6 INCHES.
On May 8, 2004, at approximately 20:39 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Unit 1 operations manually tripped the reactor when a Control Element Assembly (CEA) slipped approximately 6 inches (CEA # 89) while conducting physics testing (at 10E-02 percent power) following Unit 1's eleventh refueling outage. Unit 1 was at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the trip. All CEAs inserted fully into the reactor core (Initial Conditions: Regulating groups 1, 2 & 5 were fully withdrawn, regulating group 3 was fully inserted, regulating group 4 was being inserted when CEA # 89 slipped approximately 6 inches. Shutdown groups were fully withdrawn). This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. No automatic ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. No LCOs (Limiting Conditions of Operations) have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.
Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
The Senior Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40738 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/09/2004
Notification Time: 20:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2004
Event Time: 01:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Event Text FAILURE OF THE HIGH VOLTAGE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM
The following information was obtained by the regulatee via facsimile:
"At 0130 [hrs. CDT] on 05-09-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-316 High Voltage UF6 Release Detection System. The High Voltage UF6 detection system was disabled by a computer malfunction. This High Voltage UF6 Release System is designed to activate alarms in the event of a UF6 release. The PSS declared the system inoperable and TSR [Technical Safety Requirement] LCO 2.3.4.4.A actions were implemented to post a continuous smoke watch in the affected area. The event is reportable as a 24 hour event, as required by 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i); 'An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a preestablished safe condition after an accident.' The equipment was required by TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The Automatic Data Processing (ADP) computer can be used to interface with the Process Gas Detection (PGD) system part of which is the High Voltage UF6 detection system. The PSS directed that the ADP be bypassed to isolate the fault from the system. The release detection system was tested satisfactorily and returned to service and the smoke watch was secured. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40739 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK A. SCHRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 05/10/2004
Notification Time: 00:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2004
Event Time: 20:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text BOTH UNIT 2 EMERGENCY DIESELS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO SHIMS/SUPPORTS FOUND TO BE EITHER MISSING OR NOT PROPERLY FASTENED.
"2-EE-EG-2H was out of service for scheduled maintenance. During an inspection, 4 shims on the exhaust stack seismic support on the south wall were found missing. The shims provide baseplate bearing on the concrete wall near each anchor bolt and had fallen to the floor. In addition, both lower anchor bolt nuts had worked loose and had fallen to the floor and one of the upper anchor bolt nuts had worked loose and was partially disengaged.
"Following this discovery 2-EE-EG-2J was inspected and 3 of the 4 supports were not properly fastened. 2J EDG was declared inoperable based on this discovery. Due to both U-2 Emergency Diesel Generators being in operable the safety functions needed to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition and remove residual heat would have been imparted in the event of a loss of off site power
"2-EE-EG-2J was repaired and returned to operable at 2313 EST on May 09, 2004."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | |