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Event Notification Report for May 6, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/05/2004 - 05/06/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40639 40717 40727

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40639
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JASON MIKULKA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/03/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2004
Event Time: 10:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

VALID ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING MAINTENANCE

"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report that a valid ESF Auxiliary Feed actuation occurred. Salem Unit 1 is in mode 5 with RHR providing shutdown cooling. '11' Aux Feed Pump was in service to fill '13' and '14' steam generators for wet lay-up conditions. Actual levels were low in both '13' and '14' steam generators but jumpers were installed on steam generator narrow range level channel III and IV to prevent an ESF actuation. On 4/03/04 at 1050 AM, a breaker effecting reactor protection system channel III was cleared and tagged as part of preparations to remove 1C 4KV vital bus from service. The actual low level in '13' and '14' steam generators along with the power loss to channel III caused 2 out of 3 logic to be satisfied and initiated an AFW actuation. '11' Auxiliary Feed Pump remained running. '12' Auxiliary Feed Pump auto started. '13' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was removed from service prior to the actuation and did not start. The '13' and '14' steam generators continued to fill. '11' and '12" Auxiliary Feed Valves (11AF21 and 12AF21) were closed and no level rise was observed. The breaker was restored and reactor protection system channel III was placed back in service. All auto start signals cleared after power was restored and the '12' Aux Feed Pump was stopped at 1101. There were no unusual or unexpected plant response from the actuation. All safety systems and equipment performed as expected. Entry into mode 6 is expected this afternoon and progress of the refueling outage is expected to continue. There were no personnel injured."

The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township (LAC) and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTION ON 05/05/04 AT 1252 EDT FROM S. SAUER TO A. COSTA * * *

"On April 3, 2004 at 1410 PSEG made an 8 hour notification to report a valid ESF actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (Event Number 40639). At the time of the report 11 Auxiliary feedwater pump was in service to fill the 13 and 14 steam generators for wet lay-up. The levels on those generators were low (as previous plant condition had demanded) and the jumpers had been installed in the level detectors to prevent the automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. 12 auxiliary feedwater pump was out of service. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump was tagged out of service. Core heat removal was being provided by the Residual Heat Removal System. On April 3, with the steam generator level being carried below the low level setpoint, in accordance with procedures, as a result of other activities associated with the refueling outage the installed jumpers were removed causing the auto start of the 12 pump.

"Subsequent investigation Into this event and further review of NUREG 1022 has determined that the condition described above is not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) or 50.73(a)(2)(iv). As stated In NUREG 1022 the intent of reporting under this paragraph is '..to report actuations of systems that mitigate the consequences of significant events .. The Staff does not consider this to include single component actuation because single components of complex systems, by themselves usually do not mitigate the consequences of significant events.' Furthermore valid signals are defined as ' those signals that are Initiated in response to actual plant conditions .. Satisfying the requirements for initiation of a safety function of the system.' (emphasis added on safety function).

"In this particular event the required Safety Function to maintain the core cooled and decay heat removal was being accomplished by the Residual Heat Removal System and it remained unaffected throughout this event. The plant was in a condition where the steam generators in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System were not part of the ultimate heat sink or a principal means to remove decay heat. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was only functional and available to provide a means to place the steam generators in wet lay-up in support of outage activities. The 11 pump was already in service providing for this non-safety related function. Thus the auto start of the 12 pump was not as a result of a valid signal for a significant event that required initiation of a mitigating function; e.g. an ESF actuation.

Therefore this event was not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73, as per the guidance provided in NUREG 1022."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO(Della Greca).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40717
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LABORATORY
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1509-19-CA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/30/2004
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2004
Event Time: 17:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)

Event Text

A STATE OF CALIFORNIA LICENSEE CADMIUM-109 SOURCES LOST IN BRAZIL

At 1717 PDT on 04/29/04, the CA Licensee, Isotope Products Laboratory, Valencia, CA, Radiation Safety Officer notified a CA Radiation Control Program Officer by voicemail that a transport container containing several sealed sources totaling 50 millicuries of Cadmium-109 was shipped from Burbank, CA to Chile. The shipment was transported by air on Lan Chile Airlines from Los Angles International Airport to Chile. However, the aircraft landed in Brazil and the package was offloaded at the Brazilian airport. The Brazilian Customs Agents at the Brazilian Airport are on strike and the package is thought to be in a warehouse at the airport (location unknown). Lan Chile Airlines notified the International Air Transport Association. The transport container contains a sealed source comprised of several sealed sources in a ring configuration; the ring being only a holder for the sealed sources. The source is used for X-ray fluorescence.

The RSO plans to provide information on the packaging and labeling, transport index, surface reading, shipper, date/time shipped from Isotope Products Laboratory, leak tests, contact name/phone number at Lan Chile Airlines, Brazil Airport location, number of sources and activity of each source, time/date when package was determined to be missing and by whom.

There has been no press/media involvement. CA does not consider this event to be a threat to health and safety.

The licensee was notified of this event at 1510 PDT on 04/29/04. CA received the voicemail at 1100 PDT on 04/30/04.

CA plans to issue a written report to the NRC within 30 days.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1842 EDT ON 04/30/04 FROM KAUFMAN TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The licensee reported to CA that the Brazilian Customs have the package in their possession.

Notified R4DO Charles Marschall and NMSS EO Patricia Holahan.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40727
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID GRONECK
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/05/2004
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2004
Event Time: 13:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
BOB DENNING (NRR)
HO NIEH (DIRO)
JEFF GRANT (DRA)
JAMES CALDWELL (RA)
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

"Unit 3 scrammed as a result of a loss of offsite power. An unusual event was declared and the state was notified at 1352 [EST]. A Group I, II, and III [isolation] was received. The Isolation Condenser was manually initiated for reactor pressure control. HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] was manually initiated to control reactor water level. All systems operated as expected. The Unit 3 and 2/3 emergency diesel generators automatically started and closed on to their respective busses. The reason for the loss of offsite power is not know at this time. Switchyard work was in progress at the time of the event."

All control rods fully inserted into the core during the reactor scram.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/05/04 AT 1746 FROM D. GRONEK TO W. GOTT * * *

"At 1601 Dresden Station Unit 3 terminated from an Unusual Event for a loss of offsite power. Bus 8 in the 345 KV switchyard was restored from circuit breaker 4-8. Transformer 32 was energized and supplied to Bus 33 and 33-1. Bus 34 remains energized from the Unit 3 SBO diesel generator. Bus 34-1 remains powered from the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator. Actions are being taken to restore those busses to the normal offsite power source. Plant cooldown is in progress and the unit is proceeding to Mode 4. Reactor water level is being maintained by HPCI and reactor pressure is being controlled with HPCI and the Isolation Condenser. LPCI is running in the torus cooling mode of operation. The LCO action requirement for secondary containment inoperability was exited at 1630."

The licensee notified the State and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS (McIntire), FEMA (M. Eaches), DIRO (Nieh), R3DO (Lipa) and NRR EO (Lyons).

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