Event Notification Report for May 03, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/02/2004 - 05/03/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40723
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01) REPORT
"At 1600 on 5-03-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of SRI 5.4.1 of NCSE 052. The oil seals and bearing housing for the C-310 cell 6 stage 2B pump failed allowing significant quantities of oil to be accessible for entry to the cascade through a failed process seal in violation of SRI 5.4.1 in NCSE 052. Also, greater than 3.7 gallons (5.1 [measured]) of oil was found inside the pump casing in violation of the unlikely arguments which limit the amount of oil that will enter the process side of the pump.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The pump contains less than the [DELETED] 235U process limit at an enrichment of less than 5.5 wt %235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2, but significant wet air inleakage continued for a period of time which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:
Double Contingency
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2 but significant wet air inleakage continued for a time period which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained. The NCS parameter of moderation was not maintained.
"Potential Critical Pathways:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"Safety Significance:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"At 1600 on 5-03-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of SRI 5.4.1 of NCSE 052. The oil seals and bearing housing for the C-310 cell 6 stage 2B pump failed allowing significant quantities of oil to be accessible for entry to the cascade through a failed process seal in violation of SRI 5.4.1 in NCSE 052. Also, greater than 3.7 gallons (5.1 [measured]) of oil was found inside the pump casing in violation of the unlikely arguments which limit the amount of oil that will enter the process side of the pump.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The pump contains less than the [DELETED] 235U process limit at an enrichment of less than 5.5 wt %235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2, but significant wet air inleakage continued for a period of time which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:
Double Contingency
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2 but significant wet air inleakage continued for a time period which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained. The NCS parameter of moderation was not maintained.
"Potential Critical Pathways:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"Safety Significance:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40720
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RON FRANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RON FRANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/03/2004
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2004
Event Time: 01:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2004
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2004
Event Time: 01:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed employee was identified as under the influence during for cause testing. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE FROM RON FRANTZ TO MIKE RIPLEY 5/13/04 AT 1132 EDT * * *
Followup testing at the hospital confirmed the previous positive test results. The employee's plant access remains suspended. The employee has been referred to the Employee Assistance Program. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RDO (Stone)
A non-licensed employee was identified as under the influence during for cause testing. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE FROM RON FRANTZ TO MIKE RIPLEY 5/13/04 AT 1132 EDT * * *
Followup testing at the hospital confirmed the previous positive test results. The employee's plant access remains suspended. The employee has been referred to the Employee Assistance Program. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RDO (Stone)