Event Notification Report for April 12, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/11/2004 - 04/12/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
40667406704067140806
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40667
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/12/2004
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 03:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2004
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 03:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP DURING STARTUP DUE TO AN INVALID SR TRIP SIGNAL
"Unit 2 reactor tripped during low power physics testing. Trip appeared to be from an invalid source range [SR] trip signal in one train of solid state protection system. All systems responded properly. The Unit is currently stable in mode 3."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Unit 2 reactor tripped during low power physics testing. Trip appeared to be from an invalid source range [SR] trip signal in one train of solid state protection system. All systems responded properly. The Unit is currently stable in mode 3."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40670
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: VAN FORD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: VAN FORD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 04/12/2004
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 10:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2004
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 10:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
"Salem Unit 2 was placed in a configuration that affected the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident due to an inadvertent actuation of the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). CREACS was actuated as a result of an invalid safety injection signal initiated on April 12, 2004 at 1033 hours, during solid state protection system testing on Salem Unit-1. Salem Unit-1 is currently defueled. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. Unit 2 has two shutdown LCOs in effect. The first is for the CREACS system, which is shared between Unit 1 & 2, being aligned for single train operation with the Unit 1 CREACS train out of service per LCO 3.7.6a. The second shutdown LCO is for two outside air intake dampers being inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
"With Unit 1 having an invalid Safety Injection signal, the CREACS system actuates in accident pressurized mode. This mode of actuation starts the CREACS fans, isolates the Control Room Envelope from the normal control room ventilation system and aligns the two sets of CREACS outside air intake dampers. With a Unit 1 Sl signal, the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers close and the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers open. These damper positions are locked in until manually reset. With only one train of CREACS operable, the dose analysis indicates that the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 can only be met during a the worst case design basis accident if the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers are closed and the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers open. Therefore, until the CREACS intake dampers were reset and realigned, Salem Unit 2 would not have been able to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The CREACS system actuation was reset and the dampers were re-aligned to their pre-actuation alignment at 1232 hours, restoring Salem Unit 2 to within the assumptions of the dose analysis.
"As a result of the Unit 1 Safety Injection signal, all available equipment started as designed. Since the SI signal has been determined to be invalid the start of this equipment is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The Unit-1 Safety Injection signal has been cleared and an investigation of the cause is in progress.
"The only piece of major equipment out of service on Salem Unit 2 is the 25 Service water pump which is out of service for scheduled maintenance."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Salem Unit 2 was placed in a configuration that affected the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident due to an inadvertent actuation of the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). CREACS was actuated as a result of an invalid safety injection signal initiated on April 12, 2004 at 1033 hours, during solid state protection system testing on Salem Unit-1. Salem Unit-1 is currently defueled. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. Unit 2 has two shutdown LCOs in effect. The first is for the CREACS system, which is shared between Unit 1 & 2, being aligned for single train operation with the Unit 1 CREACS train out of service per LCO 3.7.6a. The second shutdown LCO is for two outside air intake dampers being inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
"With Unit 1 having an invalid Safety Injection signal, the CREACS system actuates in accident pressurized mode. This mode of actuation starts the CREACS fans, isolates the Control Room Envelope from the normal control room ventilation system and aligns the two sets of CREACS outside air intake dampers. With a Unit 1 Sl signal, the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers close and the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers open. These damper positions are locked in until manually reset. With only one train of CREACS operable, the dose analysis indicates that the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 can only be met during a the worst case design basis accident if the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers are closed and the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers open. Therefore, until the CREACS intake dampers were reset and realigned, Salem Unit 2 would not have been able to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The CREACS system actuation was reset and the dampers were re-aligned to their pre-actuation alignment at 1232 hours, restoring Salem Unit 2 to within the assumptions of the dose analysis.
"As a result of the Unit 1 Safety Injection signal, all available equipment started as designed. Since the SI signal has been determined to be invalid the start of this equipment is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The Unit-1 Safety Injection signal has been cleared and an investigation of the cause is in progress.
"The only piece of major equipment out of service on Salem Unit 2 is the 25 Service water pump which is out of service for scheduled maintenance."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40671
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 04/13/2004
Notification Time: 00:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 18:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2004
Notification Time: 00:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 18:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE
"High Pressure Coolant Injection System Incapable of Performing its intended Safety Function.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due the High Pressure Coolant Injection System being incapable of performing its intended safety function.
"At 1810 hours (CDT) during performance of the functional test of the level instrumentation for the automatic realignment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) suction sources, plant maintenance person identified that logic circuitry leads had been lifted. The leads not being connected would prevent the automatic realignment of the HPCI suction from its non-safety related source, the Condensate Storage Tank (CST), to its safety related source, the Suppression Pool.
"Based on preliminary information, the leads were lifted during scheduled maintenance activities on the HPCI system in March.
"The applicable Technical Specification specified that HPCI be declared inoperable within an hour. Actions were immediately taken to restore the automatic function. The leads were re-landed and the TS condition exited at 1853 hours.
"The inability of the system to automatically realign due to a CST low level or a Suppression Pool high level is considered to be a condition that would prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCI system."
The licensee is still investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"High Pressure Coolant Injection System Incapable of Performing its intended Safety Function.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due the High Pressure Coolant Injection System being incapable of performing its intended safety function.
"At 1810 hours (CDT) during performance of the functional test of the level instrumentation for the automatic realignment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) suction sources, plant maintenance person identified that logic circuitry leads had been lifted. The leads not being connected would prevent the automatic realignment of the HPCI suction from its non-safety related source, the Condensate Storage Tank (CST), to its safety related source, the Suppression Pool.
"Based on preliminary information, the leads were lifted during scheduled maintenance activities on the HPCI system in March.
"The applicable Technical Specification specified that HPCI be declared inoperable within an hour. Actions were immediately taken to restore the automatic function. The leads were re-landed and the TS condition exited at 1853 hours.
"The inability of the system to automatically realign due to a CST low level or a Suppression Pool high level is considered to be a condition that would prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCI system."
The licensee is still investigating the cause.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40806
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DeSANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DeSANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 15:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2004
Event Time: 15:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ACTUATION OF SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL
"On April 12, 2004, Salem station made an 8 hr report titled ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (Event number 40670). This report was the result of an invalid Unit 1 Safety Injection signal during troubleshooting/testing of Train 'B' of Solid State Protection. During the troubleshooting a card was moved from one slot to another, when the card was inserted into the new slot a safety injection signal was generated. The failed part of the card (a malfunctioning isolator card) was not used in its prior position, thus the failed circuit remained undetected.
"Further investigation determined that the safety injection signal was invalid; it was not the result of a plant condition requiring the protective action. Therefore this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event is reportable as it 60-day phone call in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(1) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid..'
"Licensee event report 311/04-003 is being submitted to report the loss of accident mitigation capability for Unit 2. Event number for reference 40670."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 12, 2004, Salem station made an 8 hr report titled ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (Event number 40670). This report was the result of an invalid Unit 1 Safety Injection signal during troubleshooting/testing of Train 'B' of Solid State Protection. During the troubleshooting a card was moved from one slot to another, when the card was inserted into the new slot a safety injection signal was generated. The failed part of the card (a malfunctioning isolator card) was not used in its prior position, thus the failed circuit remained undetected.
"Further investigation determined that the safety injection signal was invalid; it was not the result of a plant condition requiring the protective action. Therefore this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event is reportable as it 60-day phone call in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(1) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid..'
"Licensee event report 311/04-003 is being submitted to report the loss of accident mitigation capability for Unit 2. Event number for reference 40670."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.