Event Notification Report for April 06, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/05/2004 - 04/06/2004
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40649
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 06:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 00:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2004
Notification Time: 06:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 00:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOMENTARY LOSS OF NOAA WEATHER RADIO SYSTEM
"The Plant Site detected a momentary loss of the NOAA Weather Radio System from 00:10 am on 04/06/04 to 00:14 am on 04/06/04. During this time interval of inoperability for this system, a major loss of off site notification capability is considered. Site Emergency Planning personnel were notified and will investigate this momentary loss of system capability. The NOAA Weather Radio System is currently in service and functioning properly."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1700 ON 4/9/04 RUSSELL TO GOTT * * *
"After further investigation, a determination has been made that there was no major loss of offsite notification capability of the Hatch Prompt Notification System (NOAA Weather Radio System). The momentary losses reported were caused by testing of the primary audio feed line utilizing a tone generator while investigating the loss of this feed. The secondary audio feed from Jacksonville NWS remained operable during the time of testing."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Decker)
"The Plant Site detected a momentary loss of the NOAA Weather Radio System from 00:10 am on 04/06/04 to 00:14 am on 04/06/04. During this time interval of inoperability for this system, a major loss of off site notification capability is considered. Site Emergency Planning personnel were notified and will investigate this momentary loss of system capability. The NOAA Weather Radio System is currently in service and functioning properly."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1700 ON 4/9/04 RUSSELL TO GOTT * * *
"After further investigation, a determination has been made that there was no major loss of offsite notification capability of the Hatch Prompt Notification System (NOAA Weather Radio System). The momentary losses reported were caused by testing of the primary audio feed line utilizing a tone generator while investigating the loss of this feed. The secondary audio feed from Jacksonville NWS remained operable during the time of testing."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Decker)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40651
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS DUNNY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS DUNNY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 11:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 11:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(1) - DEVIATION FROM T SPEC
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(1) - DEVIATION FROM T SPEC
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
FRANK GRIGGS (DHS)
BUTCH STINEDRUF (FEMA)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
FRANK GRIGGS (DHS)
BUTCH STINEDRUF (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TORNADO WARNINGS
"The South Texas Project has invoked 10 CFR 50.54(x). Due to weather conditions associated with Tornado Warning, security personnel have been pulled from outside areas into hardened buildings. This condition does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 (d) (3). When conditions have improved normal security measures will be reestablished.
"At 1151 06 April 2004 due to the above information South Texas Project has a "Security Alert as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan" and is therefore in an Unusual Event per plant procedure OERP01-ZV-IN01 Emergency Classification rev. 6, Initiating condition HU1, Emergency Action Level -1. Class 'UE.'"
At 1319, NRC management determined that an NRC response was not required.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1418 EST ON 04/06/04 DUNNY TO GOTT * * *
South Texas Project reported that the security forces have been reposted and they have secured from the Unusual Event.
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg), NRR (Reis), DIRO (Wessman), TAS (Perez), DHS (Griggs), and FEMA (Caldwell).
"The South Texas Project has invoked 10 CFR 50.54(x). Due to weather conditions associated with Tornado Warning, security personnel have been pulled from outside areas into hardened buildings. This condition does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 (d) (3). When conditions have improved normal security measures will be reestablished.
"At 1151 06 April 2004 due to the above information South Texas Project has a "Security Alert as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan" and is therefore in an Unusual Event per plant procedure OERP01-ZV-IN01 Emergency Classification rev. 6, Initiating condition HU1, Emergency Action Level -1. Class 'UE.'"
At 1319, NRC management determined that an NRC response was not required.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1418 EST ON 04/06/04 DUNNY TO GOTT * * *
South Texas Project reported that the security forces have been reposted and they have secured from the Unusual Event.
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg), NRR (Reis), DIRO (Wessman), TAS (Perez), DHS (Griggs), and FEMA (Caldwell).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40652
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CARSKY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CARSKY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 04/06/2004
Notification Time: 19:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2004
Notification Time: 19:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2004
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
AIR VALVE MISALIGNMENT REDUCES STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL CAPABILITY
"On April 6, 2004, at 1400 CDT, Clinton Power Station discovered an air valve open for the Standby Liquid Control tank sparger. The open air sparger valve caused both Standby Liquid Control pumps to be inoperable due to the potential of air binding the pumps. The valve was closed, and the Standby Liquid Control is now operable. A Prompt Investigation is being commenced to determine circumstances of this open air sparger. The condition existed for approximately five weeks."
The system was restored at approximately 1500 on 4/6/04.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1840 EDT ON 6/3/04 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TO S. SANDIN * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"During further investigation, a calculation was performed to detail the air entrainment into the SLC pumps and the results show that air entrainment from the air sparger would not reduce system flow below that required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, it was determined that the system design is such that whenever the air sparge valve to the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) tank is open, the pumps remain operable and capable of performing their safety function. Thus, this occurrence (EN #40652 dated 4/6/04) was not reportable under 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(V)(A) and 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(V)(D).
"The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lanksbury).
"On April 6, 2004, at 1400 CDT, Clinton Power Station discovered an air valve open for the Standby Liquid Control tank sparger. The open air sparger valve caused both Standby Liquid Control pumps to be inoperable due to the potential of air binding the pumps. The valve was closed, and the Standby Liquid Control is now operable. A Prompt Investigation is being commenced to determine circumstances of this open air sparger. The condition existed for approximately five weeks."
The system was restored at approximately 1500 on 4/6/04.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1840 EDT ON 6/3/04 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TO S. SANDIN * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"During further investigation, a calculation was performed to detail the air entrainment into the SLC pumps and the results show that air entrainment from the air sparger would not reduce system flow below that required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, it was determined that the system design is such that whenever the air sparge valve to the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) tank is open, the pumps remain operable and capable of performing their safety function. Thus, this occurrence (EN #40652 dated 4/6/04) was not reportable under 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(V)(A) and 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(V)(D).
"The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lanksbury).