| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/26/2004 - 03/29/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40606 | Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 03/23/2004
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2004
Event Time: 12:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
| Event Text THE US ARMY REPORTED A MISSING BEAM SPLITTER FOR A M1A1 TANK.
On 03/03/04 the Texas National Guard discovered that one of their M1A1 tanks which was stored in a outside fenced area at their Army training facility in Wylie, Texas was missing a tritium beam splitter from its muzzle reference sensor. A thorough search was made of the entire area with negative results and a wipe of the tank also tested negative. The beam splitter contained a sealed 10 curie tritium source. All of the other tanks stored in the same fenced area with the one having the missing source were inspected and found to be intact.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1030 ON 2/26/04 GIZICKI TO RIPLEY * * *
Following reinspection, it was determined that the tritium beam splitter was not missing from the muzzle reference sensor. The individual who conducted the initial inspection could not see the illumination in the day light. When it was reinspected in a dark area, appropriate illumination was noted. Therefore the source was still in the beam splitter.
Notified NMSS (Psyk), R3DO (Madera) and R4DO (Graves). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40612 | Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN KASPAR
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE | Notification Date: 03/27/2004
Notification Time: 02:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2004
Event Time: 22:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION REGARDING HHSI FLUSH LINE ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE -
While performing a High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Train-B inservice test, a Plant Operator noted leakage coming through HHSI Flush Line Isolation Valve #SI-0120B. This valve is located on a flush line coming from the discharge of the HHSI pump and directs water to the Safety Injection Pump room sump located within the Fuel Handling Building. The operator investigated and determined that the leakage was due to the valve not being fully seated. The Licensee has come to the conclusion that the estimated leakage through the valve exceeded the allowable value to remain in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 limits for Control Room Envelope during the post LOCA Containment recirc phase of a large break LOCA. This condition resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety requiring a notification to the NRC within eight hours per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) ii. Subsequently, flush line valve #SI-0120B has been fully seated, and the leakage stopped. The licensee considers this valve to be operable.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40614 | Rep Org: CONNETICUT DEPT. OF RAD. PROTECTION
Licensee: CONNETICUT DEPT. OF RAD. PROT.
Region: 1
City: EAST LYME State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE FIRSICK
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 03/27/2004
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2004
Event Time: 20:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AARAN DANIS (NSIR)
| Event Text STATE OF CONNETICUT REPORTED THE DISCOVERY OF A STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE
The item was found adjacent to a house in a wooded area in East Lyme, CT. It was a cylinder measuring 6 inches in length and 2 inches in diameter. The bottom of the cylinder had the following serial number: M2477. It was a general licensed strontium-90 source. The source was contained inside a metal box with a radioactive material symbol on the outside. The State response personnel conducted a radiological survey. The source read 250 millirem per hour on contact for gamma. The source read 3.2 rem per hour on contact for beta. At 12 inches, the source measured 5 millirem per hour. At one meter the source measured less than 1 millirem per hour. The State took the source to a secure locked location for followup on Monday to try to determine the owner. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40615 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 00:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2004
Event Time: 22:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 35 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED CONTROL
"On 3/27/2004, the Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped when the 1B Main Feedwater Pump speed could not be controlled in automatic or manual. An unexpected increase in Main Feedwater Pump speed was observed which increased the Main Feedwater header pressure to higher than expected values. An attempt was made to manually control the speed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump from the various controllers in the Main Control Room. Preparations to start the 1A Main Feedwater Pump were initiated. The speed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump continued to increase to a point where level control of the Steam Generators and overspeed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump became a concern. At this point the Reactor was manually tripped and the 1B Main Feedwater Pump was tripped. An Auxiliary Feedwater System automatic actuation occurred on the trip a the 1B Main Feedwater Pump as expected because the 1A Main Feedwater Pump was also tripped at the time due to being at a low power level. All systems responded as expected on the Reactor Trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. An Event Review Team will be performing a review of the event and making recommendations related to restarting the Reactor."
All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed using the steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater. Plant pressure is 2235 psig and temperature is 557 degrees F.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40616 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 08:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 06:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO THREE CAR ACCIDENT
"On 3/28/04 at 0637, Plant Security was notified of a three car accident at the entrance to the site involving 1) an employee leaving the site, 2) a south bound vehicle on US Route 11, and 3) an employee entering the site. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement (LLEA) was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours.
"Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40617 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 10:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE FOR 25 MINUTES
"At approximately 1343 hours on March 27, 2004, during a routine hand - rotation check of the "C" high pressure safety injection pump (HPSI), it was discovered the pump shaft was exhibiting some binding. At the time, the "C" HPSI pump was in service as the "B" Train HPSI pump. The "C" HPSI pump was declared inoperable and Condition A of LCO 3.5.2 was entered. This LCO condition requires restoration of the inoperable safety injection train within 72 hours. At that time, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. The "A" HPSI pump was out of service due to a previously discovered condition of minor leakage observed near two of the casing bolts. The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, HPSI system has three safety injection pumps. The "A" HPSI pump is the normal Train "A" pump, the "C" pump is the normal Train "B" pump, and the "B" pump is capable of serving as either the Train "A" or the Train "B" pump in the place of the "A" or "C" HPSI pump. At the time of discovery of the binding in the "C" HPSI pump, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. It was determined that the "A" pump could be restored to operable status and placed back in service to restore two Trains of HPSI. In order to do so, the "B" HPSI pump was removed from service as the Train "A" pump and placed in service as the Train "B" pump. Therefore, at 1026 hours on March 28, 2004, for approximately 25 minutes, during the process of placing the "B" HPSI pump in service on Train "B," which was necessary to allow the "A" HPSI pump to be returned to service, there was no HPSI pump automatically available to provide HPSI to the Reactor Coolant System, if an accident were to occur. Therefore, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional 8-hour reporting criterion associated with the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) has also been identified due to the inoperability of the HPSI system. It was known prior to the switching the "B" HPSI pump to Train "B" that this would cause inoperability of both trains of HPSI. It was also known that LCO 3.0.3 would be entered due to this circumstance. This situation was not avoidable, based on the sequence of events. The time in this condition was minimized, the operators were fully aware of plant conditions, and no other system inoperabilities were known of that would have complicated the situation. Both trains of HPSI are operable, although the "C" HPSI pump remains inoperable and out-of-service, pending investigation and repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40618 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER DONAHUE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO CLOSED FUEL OIL TRANSFER CROSS-TIE VALVE
"CNS was operating at 100% power in Mode 1 with Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #1 inoperable due to increased levels of particulates in the EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank and supply piping. EDG #2 was determined to be operable with compensatory measures in place, including maintaining the two diesel fuel oil storage tanks tied together. With the crosstie valves open and the storage tank levels equalized, evaluation has shown that flow rates between the #2 EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks is low enough during EDG #2 operation to preclude excessive contamination of the EDG #2 Fuel Oil Storage Tank.
"At 13:03 hours CST one of the two valves that cross-tie the two Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks together was found in the closed position, which was in conflict with the Operability Evaluation such that EDG #2 was determined to be inoperable. The valve was opened immediately and EDG #2 was declared operable. The cause of the event is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40619 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 03/28/2004
Notification Time: 21:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2004
Event Time: 13:49 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AT SAN OFRE 2 AND 3 DUE TO INADVERTENT WEAPON DISCHARGE
"At about 1349 (PST) on March 28, 2004, while a Security Offer was receiving his weapon in the armory, the weapon accidentally discharged as it was being holstered. The discharge grazed the officer's leg and the officer was treated for the resulting abrasion. At about 1425 PST, Southern California Edison notified the FBI (SONGS LLEA). SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |