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Event Notification Report for March 8, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/05/2004 - 03/08/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40563 40565 40567 40570 40571 40572 40573 40574

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40563
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: NORTECH GEOTECHNICAL/CIVIL CONSULTANTS, LTD
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0309-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/02/2004
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2004
Event Time: 13:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)

Event Text

NEVADA - AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATION OF STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"Between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 pm on March 2, 2004, at Vista & McCarran in Reno, Nevada, a Humboldt Scientific Model 5001 moisture density gauge containing 11 millicuries of Cs-137 and 44 millicuries of Am-241:Be, s/n 1854, was stolen from the transport vehicle. The employee indicated the chain securing the gauge to the pickup bed was cut.

" The Reno, Nevada Police Department was notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40565
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/03/2004
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2004
Event Time: 13:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

SWING DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO STARTED FROM A BUS UNDERVOLTAGE VALID SIGNAL

"At the time of this occurrence Unit 1 is in a scheduled Refueling Outage and Unit 2 is at 100% Maximum Operating Power. Also note, the 1 B Diesel Generator is a Swing Diesel Generator which is capable of supplying Unit 1 1F 4160 Volt bus and also when required 2F 4160 Volt bus.

"At 13:45 EST on 03/03/04, the 1B Diesel Generator auto started due to a momentary Bus Undervoltage sensed on the 1F 4160 volt bus.

"At the time of the occurrence the 1F 4160 Volt bus was energized with the Normal Supply Breaker racked out and the Alternate Supply Breaker closed in and supplying the 1F 4160 Volt bus. The Normal Supply Breaker was racked out for a scheduled breaker replacement. At the time of the occurrence 2 electricians were removing the Racked Out Normal Supply breaker from the cubicle. The breaker shutter mechanism (a component of the breaker) fell off of the breaker inside the cubicle causing the 1F 4160 Volt bus to sense a momentary bus undervoltage, the Alternate Supply breaker momentarily cycled open and re-closed causing the 1B Diesel Generator to auto start. Since the 1 B Diesel Generator auto started from a valid signal (Bus Undervoltage) an 8 hour report is being made.

"At the time of this report the 1B Diesel Generator has been Shutdown and restored to a standby Lineup. The 1B Diesel Generator remains Operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*****UPDATE FROM JOHNSON TO LAURA ON 3/5/04 AT 1050 EST*****

"Subsequent investigation revealed the most probable cause of this event was the trip of the alternate supply breaker to the emergency bus, resulting in its momentary de-energization and an automatic start of the diesel generator on an actual bus undervoltage signal. The alternate supply breaker apparently tripped as a result of the shutter in the formal supply breaker cubicle falling against the fingers of the breaker when as the breaker was being removed from the breaker cubicle. The affected breaker was already n the racked out position. When the breaker was moved to allow its removal from the cubicle, the shutter was apparently forced upward by the movement of the breaker musing the shutter to move upward and the shutter actuating lever to pivot downward until the moc switch mechanism actuated the logic causing the alternate supply breaker to -rip and the diesel generator to start. The shutter actuating lever became separated from the shutter allowing the moc switch to return to its expected open position thereby allowing the alternate supply breaker to recluse and provide power to the bus before the swing diesel generator had sufficient permissives to tie to the bus.
Even with the condition found in this breaker cubicle the breaker can be safely racked out. It is when the breaker is removed from the cubicle that there is an increased potential for the shutter and its connected lever arm to cause a logic actuation similar to that experienced in this event. The condition does not create an operability concern for the bus and at most could cause a logic actuation in the conservative direction and does not present any known operability issues for the associated 4160 volt buses. Additional inspections have been performed on 6 balance of plant 4160 volt breakers that are identical in design with acceptable clearances observed in the locations where problems were noted in the subject breaker cubicle. The normal supply breaker for the 1F 4160V bus has been inspected with no problems noted. The associated shutter and lever mechanisms for this breaker have been inspected, components replaced and the breaker returned to service. The alternate supply breaker on the safety related 4160 volt switchgear that was involved in this event was also checked and found to have acceptable clearances and no problems noted with the shutter mechanism. At this point this condition is limited to the breaker cubicle that is the subject of this notification based on extent of condition review performed up this point. There are currently no operability concerns for the affected 4160 volt switchgear or associated diesel generator."

Notified R2DO (R. HAAG).

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 40567
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/05/2004
Notification Time: 12:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2004
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)

Event Text

24-HOUR NOTIFICATION - BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL

"A review of incinerator data indicated higher than expected accumulations and concentrations of uranium bearing material in the incinerator off-gas system. Criticality was not possible because the mass corresponding to each concentration was below the minimum critical mass.

"Controlled Parameters: The safety basis for the incinerator off gas-system states that criticality is not credible. This was based on minimal expected carryover and low concentrations of uranium from the incinerator to the off -gas system. The uranium concentrations in the off-gas system were expected to be well below the [deleted] concentration criticality limit for an infinite mass.

"A criticality would be possible in the off-gas system only if a minimum critical mass for a corresponding uranium concentration accumulated in a critical configuration with sufficient moderator.

"Because higher than expected accumulation and concentration of uranium bearing material was detected in the incinerator off gas system, this 24-hour notification is being made.

"Summary of Activity: 1) Incinerator was shut down; 2) The off-gas system is being inspected; 3) Samples from the off-gas system are being obtained for analysis.

"Conclusions: 1). The bounding assumptions for concentration and carryover were exceeded; 2). At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved & 3). The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal causal analysis will be performed.

The licensee will be notifying NRC Region III.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40570
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JANET NOVAK
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/06/2004
Notification Time: 02:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2004
Event Time: 00:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AT MILLSTONE 2 DUE TO SPURIOUS TRIP OF THE "B" FEED PUMP

The licensee reported that the "B" Steam Generator Feed Pump tripped unexpectedly and would not reset causing lowering steam generator water levels. Operators manually tripped the reactor and all control rods properly inserted. The auxiliary feed water (AFW) system automatically initiated to restore steam generator water levels. The lowest steam generator water level observed during the event was 55% level as opposed to the normal level of 70%. No primary relief valves lifted. Operators established decay heat removal capability using AFW system and the atmospheric steam dump valves. The licensee initiated a post trip review to determine the cause of the feed pump trip.

The NRC Resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40571
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSIER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 03/06/2004
Notification Time: 08:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2004
Event Time: 05:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION AT SUSQUEHANNA INVOLVING A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT

"On 3/06/04 at 0528 Plant Security was notified of an accident at the entrance to the site involving an employee leaving work and a south bound vehicle on PA Route 11. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours. Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40572
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK HUBBARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/07/2004
Notification Time: 00:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2004
Event Time: 21:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANT HAD A LOSS OF POWER TO THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER AND THE "B" TRAIN 4.16KV ESFAS BUS.

On 03/06/2004 at 2147 CDT Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced a loss of the west bus in the switchyard causing a loss of power to the Startup Transformer and the "B" Train 4.16 KV ESFAS bus, NB02. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator started and loaded, as expected, upon the loss of power from the Startup Transformer. All systems and equipment operated as expected for a loss of power to NB02. Reactor power was lowered by the control room staff following the expected start of the steam driven aux. feedwater pump to maintain reactor thermal power below license limits. The cause of the loss of power appears to be the failure of one of the 13.8 KV output bushings on the Startup Transformer. System Operations has dispatched a line crew to the Wolf Creek switchyard to investigate and initiate repair activities. System Operations has reported that all three (3) lines to Wolf Creek are energized and have proper voltage. The plant also entered a 72 hour LCO action statement due to the loss of the power source.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** Update on 03/07/04 at 1820 EST by Steve Gifford taken by MacKinnon ****

Licensee will have a contractor perform Doble Testing of Startup Transformer windings and also determine if the bushing has been damaged. Testing results should be known by midnight CST. Repair time will depend on test results. R4DO (Greg Peck) notified.

NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the update by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40573
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/07/2004
Notification Time: 04:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2004
Event Time: 22:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

SPDS WILL BE DE-ENERGIZED FOR MORE THAN 8 HOURS DUE TO REFUELING OUTAGE ACTIVITIES

"At 22:10 on March 6, 2004 the Unit 1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was deenergized during planned refuel outage activities. It has been determined that it will not be restored within the required eight hours. Currently, restoration is scheduled for March 7, 2004 at 17:00. All required instrumentation is available in the control room.
Since the Unit 1 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(xiii). Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 for the planned 13th Refuel and Inspection Outage."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

**** Update at 2219 EST on 03/07/04 by Gordon Robinson taken by MacKinnon ****

SPDS is still out of service and it will be restored to service by 0600 EST on 03/08/04. R1DO (M. Shanbaky) notified.

NRC Resident has be notified of the update by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40574
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 03/07/2004
Notification Time: 09:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2004
Event Time: 02:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

START OF THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DURING EMERGENCY SERVICE SUPPLY BUS OUTAGE

At 0201 on 03/07/2004, with Susquehanna Unit 1 in its 13th Refueling and Inspection Outage, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator auto started during preparations for a scheduled 1A ESS(Emergency Service Supply) Bus outage. While performing the procedure for removal of the ESS Bus from service, two incorrect fuses were removed. This caused the normal supply breaker to open on sensed undervoltage deenergizing the 1'A' ESS Bus. The alternate breaker also attempted to close as designed, but tripped open immediately due to the sensed undervoltage. With all breakers open, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator auto started and loaded onto the bus. All leads had previously been removed from the bus per the procedure.

The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator is operating as designed and is available to supply Unit 2 'A' ESS Bus if required.

The auto start of a Emergency Diesel Generator is reportable as an event that results in the valid actuation of a system designed to mitigate the consequences of significant events per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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