United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2004 > February 3

Event Notification Report for February 3, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/02/2004 - 02/03/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40373 40488 40495 40496 40497 40498 40499

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40373
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2003
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY CAUSES UNANALYZED CONDITION

"While reviewing operator emergency response times contained in Callaway Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), it was determined that emergency procedure E-0 did not contain specific guidance for actions to be taken when one train of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) failed to properly operate. In FSAR Chapter 15A, the limiting single failure analyzed for the CREVS is the failure of a filtration fan within one train of CREVS. In this accident analysis scenario, a Control Room Filtration Unit fan fails and the train must be secured to prevent inadequately filtered Control Building air from being introduced into the Control Room. If the train is not isolated within 30 minutes, postulated dose to Control Room staff could potentially exceed GDC 19 limits.

"While procedure E-0 addressed identifying faulted CREVS equipment and an attempted restoration of the faulted equipment, it did not contain sufficient guidance to ensure the Control Room staff would isolate the faulted train of CREVS if the equipment restoration attempt failed.

"A revision to procedure E-0 has been issued to correct this procedural deficiency."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * * RETRACTION FROM E. HENSON TO M. RIPLEY 1425 ET 2/2/04 * * * *

"This notification is being retracted. Further evaluations concluded that a local area radiation monitor would have alerted the Control Room staff to a developing adverse condition in sufficient time for operators to have identified and isolated the faulted CREVS train prior to exceeding regulatory dose limits. This event does not represent an unanalyzed condition reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

Notified R4 DO (A. Gody)

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 40488
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: J.K. DISPLAY INC.
Region: 3
City: MILWAUKEE State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL CALEB
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/29/2004
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2004
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/29/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

MISSING NDR, INC. STATIC ELIMINATOR GUN DEVICE.

On January 28, 2004 a letter was received by Wisconsin's Radioactive Materials Program, dated January 26, 2004 from state licensee J.K. Display, Inc., 8300 W. Parkland Court, Milwaukee, WI 53223. The letter informed the department that the company could not locate one of the two NDR, Inc., P-2021 Nuclecel-Ionizer air gun devices that it had in its possession..

The missing/loss P-2021 device, serial # A2CL456 was leased from NDR, November 2002 with an activity of 10.0 mCi of Po-210. The static eliminator gun was last used in July of 2003 because it was broken and unusable. Apparently, the connections between the air-hose and device leaked, reducing the gun's ability to produce ionized air. The device was placed in the shop on a shelf for return to NDR, Inc. at termination of the lease.

Polonium-210 has a half-life of 138 days, therefore, if the assay date of November 2003 is accurate, the source has gone through approximately three (3) half-lives. The Po-210 source at this point should have an activity of approximately 1.275 mCi.

The licensee has done an exhaustive search of the shop and offices for the device, but it cannot be located. The most likely possibility, according to the company, is an employee threw out the device.

Corrective actions taken by the company are to instruct their six employees to identify the device(s) and their location at all times and to isolate and store unused device(s) in a secure location.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 40495
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DEAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 02:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2004
Event Time: 22:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ONE HALF SCRAM SIGNAL DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE "B" REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BUS.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), system actuation not including Reactor Protection System; due to a trip of the "D" Electric Power Monitoring Assembly on the "B" Reactor Protection System Motor Generator set resulting in a trip of the "B" Reactor Protection System bus. The loss of "B" Reactor Protection System bus caused the actuation of multiple Primary Containment Isolation Systems. Station abnormal procedures have been entered and the plant stabilized. The system actuations that occurred have been verified and restorations of these systems are in progress. Troubleshooting plans are being developed to determine cause of the trip and to correct the deficient condition.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the Licensee.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 40496
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELBERFELD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2003
Event Time: 22:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE KUZO (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 94 Power Operation 94 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST RADIATION MONITOR SIGNAL RESULTING IN PCIS ISOLATIONS

"This report is being made in accordance with 50.73 (a)(1), which states, in part, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event Instead of submitting a written LER.' These invalid actuations are being reported under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, states that the report should provide the following information:

- The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated
- Whether each train actuation was complete or partial
- Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"On December 21, 2003, at 2204 hours, the Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (i.e., 1-D12-RM-K609B) signal input spiked resulting in the invalid actuation of the logic associated with the instrument channel. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, 1-D12-RM-K609B was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions. A radiological survey of the monitored area was completed with no abnormal conditions noted.

"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request (i.e., AR) 114005. The resident inspector has been notified."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 40497
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM CROSSMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2004
Event Time: 08:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
GEORGE KUZO (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY

A licensed operator was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random test. However, it was below the 10CFR26 cut-off level but could have resulted in the individual being unfit for scheduled work activities. The employee's access to the plant has been put on fitness-for-duty hold pending resolution. Contact the HOO for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 40498
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GRANT FERNSLER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/02/2004
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2004
Event Time: 09:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 87 Power Operation 87 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY

A contractor foreman/supervisor was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a pre-access FFD test as part of processing for unescorted access. The supervisor was denied unescorted access to the protected area. Contact the HOO for additional details

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 40499
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/03/2004
Notification Time: 03:06 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2004
Event Time: 04:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GEORGE KUZO (R2)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)

Event Text

FAILURE OF C-360 #1 AUTOCLAVE HIGH PRESSURE ISOLATION SYSTEM.

At 0415 on 02-02-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-130 # 1 Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System. Water was observed leaking from the autoclave head-to-shell interface near the six o'clock position shortly after initiating a cylinder heat cycle. At the time of discovery, the autoclave was in TSR Mode 5 (heating) and the High Pressure Isolation System was required to be operable while in this mode. This system is designed to provide containment of the autoclave and prevent an external release of UF6 during a system breach while heating a UF6 cylinder. The PSS declared the system inoperable and TSR LCO 2.1.3.1.C.1 actions were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in Mode 2, "Out of Service". The event is reportable as a 24 hour event, as required by 10 CFR76.120(c)(2)(i); An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specific limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a preestablished safe condition after an accident. The equipment was required by TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function.

The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012