Event Notification Report for January 13, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/12/2004 - 01/13/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
404474044340444404414044240501
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 40447
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/14/2004
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION FOR BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVING WASTE DRUM
"At 1300 on 01/13/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a waste drum was not characterized and handled properly as fissile waste. During the investigation of ATRC-03-4095, container RFD# 213439-01, which had been characterized as NCS spacing exempt based on the drum being heterogeneous material, it was identified that this waste drum contained solid uranium deposit material violating NCSA WMO-001. The purpose of this NCSA requirement is to determine if the waste drum requires two independent characterization results. Two independent characterization methods were not utilized for the characterization of this drum.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Safety significance of event Is low due to the fact that Nondestructive Assay characterization results of drum contents indicate a total U235 content of less than the safe mass limit for NCS Spacing Exempt waste.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD
OCCUR: More than two drums, all exceeding the safe mass limit, spaced less than minimum spacing requirements.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementation of two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The material in the drum is in a solid state. Uranium mass is less than 120g U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Controls relied upon for maintaining double contingency are two Independent measurements to determine the U235 mass of the drum. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained since only one measurement was performed. Even though mass control was maintained, double contingency Is based on two controls on mass. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Access to the area has been controlled and the drum has been spaced from other fissile material.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-0111; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-003, Responsible Division: Production Support"
"At 1300 on 01/13/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a waste drum was not characterized and handled properly as fissile waste. During the investigation of ATRC-03-4095, container RFD# 213439-01, which had been characterized as NCS spacing exempt based on the drum being heterogeneous material, it was identified that this waste drum contained solid uranium deposit material violating NCSA WMO-001. The purpose of this NCSA requirement is to determine if the waste drum requires two independent characterization results. Two independent characterization methods were not utilized for the characterization of this drum.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Safety significance of event Is low due to the fact that Nondestructive Assay characterization results of drum contents indicate a total U235 content of less than the safe mass limit for NCS Spacing Exempt waste.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD
OCCUR: More than two drums, all exceeding the safe mass limit, spaced less than minimum spacing requirements.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementation of two controls on mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The material in the drum is in a solid state. Uranium mass is less than 120g U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Controls relied upon for maintaining double contingency are two Independent measurements to determine the U235 mass of the drum. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained since only one measurement was performed. Even though mass control was maintained, double contingency Is based on two controls on mass. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Access to the area has been controlled and the drum has been spaced from other fissile material.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-0111; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-003, Responsible Division: Production Support"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40443
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISS THORNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISS THORNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
"General FTS Failure recognized by abnormal ring (long drawn out ring) coming from ENS. System operation verification performed after ring noted. At this time it was realized all lines had no dial tones and were inoperable. In addition to the ENS other FTS phones/lines inoperable noted were the MCL, HPN, PMCL, RSCL, and possibly the LAN line, ERDS 1 and 2. (ERDS, and LAN line not operability tested)."
"ENS Failure- Discovered at 12:55 CST it was inoperable and reportable per FNP-0-EIP-8.0 (non emergency report) para. 12.6.2 at 13:55 CST. Plant Commercial lines not effected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"General FTS Failure recognized by abnormal ring (long drawn out ring) coming from ENS. System operation verification performed after ring noted. At this time it was realized all lines had no dial tones and were inoperable. In addition to the ENS other FTS phones/lines inoperable noted were the MCL, HPN, PMCL, RSCL, and possibly the LAN line, ERDS 1 and 2. (ERDS, and LAN line not operability tested)."
"ENS Failure- Discovered at 12:55 CST it was inoperable and reportable per FNP-0-EIP-8.0 (non emergency report) para. 12.6.2 at 13:55 CST. Plant Commercial lines not effected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40444
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 20:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 19:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Notification Time: 20:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 19:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO)
ED MCDONALD (DHS)
TED SULLIVAN (FEMA)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO)
ED MCDONALD (DHS)
TED SULLIVAN (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO EXPLOSION WITHIN PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY
Explosion occurred in a non-safety related transformer at 1908 EST 0n 01/13/04. The transformer became deenergized as a result of the explosion. Licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1921 EST on 01/13/04 due to an explosion resulting in visible damage to a non-safety related transformer in the Turbine Enclosure building. There was no fire or injured personnel, and the site did not require any off site assistance. The transformer explosion resulted in the loss of power to some 480 VAC non-safety related loads (most significant was a non-safeguard DC battery charger). The explosion has not severely impacted Unit 1 operations. The transformer has been inspected, and it appears that the explosion was internal to the transformer and due to an electrical malfunction. Security personnel conducted thorough walk downs of all areas and had no concerns.
NRC Management determined that this event did not require entry into the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode of Incident Response at 2040 on 01/13/04.
The licensee notified the state and local emergency management agencies and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM PETE ORPHANOS (VIA FACSIMILE) TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0221 EST ON 1/14/04 * * *
"Notification of reduction in classification status from Unusual Event.
"Failure of non-safeguards electrical supply determined to be due to cable fault. Plant remains stable at 100% power. No additional equipment damage identified. Blocking and repair planning in progress."
The unusual event was terminated by the licensee at 2151 hrs. EST on 1/13/04.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and County authorities. A media press release will be issued in the morning.
Notified DHS (Beal) and FEMA (Caldwell).
Explosion occurred in a non-safety related transformer at 1908 EST 0n 01/13/04. The transformer became deenergized as a result of the explosion. Licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1921 EST on 01/13/04 due to an explosion resulting in visible damage to a non-safety related transformer in the Turbine Enclosure building. There was no fire or injured personnel, and the site did not require any off site assistance. The transformer explosion resulted in the loss of power to some 480 VAC non-safety related loads (most significant was a non-safeguard DC battery charger). The explosion has not severely impacted Unit 1 operations. The transformer has been inspected, and it appears that the explosion was internal to the transformer and due to an electrical malfunction. Security personnel conducted thorough walk downs of all areas and had no concerns.
NRC Management determined that this event did not require entry into the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode of Incident Response at 2040 on 01/13/04.
The licensee notified the state and local emergency management agencies and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM PETE ORPHANOS (VIA FACSIMILE) TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0221 EST ON 1/14/04 * * *
"Notification of reduction in classification status from Unusual Event.
"Failure of non-safeguards electrical supply determined to be due to cable fault. Plant remains stable at 100% power. No additional equipment damage identified. Blocking and repair planning in progress."
The unusual event was terminated by the licensee at 2151 hrs. EST on 1/13/04.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and County authorities. A media press release will be issued in the morning.
Notified DHS (Beal) and FEMA (Caldwell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40441
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FITNESS FOR DUTY
A contract employee tested positive for illegal drugs during Pre-Access testing for unescorted access. The employee's access to the plant was denied. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A contract employee tested positive for illegal drugs during Pre-Access testing for unescorted access. The employee's access to the plant was denied. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40442
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY BRINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY BRINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
The ENS phones in the control room were discovered inoperable at 1312 EST on 01/13/04. Control room staff then notified EP personnel of a possible problem with the ENS phone lines. EP personnel investigated and determined that the ENS phone system as well as other Federal Telecommunication System lines were not operating on site. Information Resources (IR) is investigating.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0530 hrs EST ON 1/14/03 FROM LICENSEE TO CROUCH * * *
All FTS phone services have been restored to the plant and tested satisfactorily from the Operations Center to the ENS phone.
The ENS phones in the control room were discovered inoperable at 1312 EST on 01/13/04. Control room staff then notified EP personnel of a possible problem with the ENS phone lines. EP personnel investigated and determined that the ENS phone system as well as other Federal Telecommunication System lines were not operating on site. Information Resources (IR) is investigating.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0530 hrs EST ON 1/14/03 FROM LICENSEE TO CROUCH * * *
All FTS phone services have been restored to the plant and tested satisfactorily from the Operations Center to the ENS phone.
Hospital
Event Number: 40501
Rep Org: ST. JOSEPHS WAYNE HOSPITAL
Licensee: ST. JOSEPHS WAYNE HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WAYNE State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18334-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DR. MARSDEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ST. JOSEPHS WAYNE HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WAYNE State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18334-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DR. MARSDEN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/03/2004
Notification Time: 11:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2004
Notification Time: 11:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
TWO I-125 SEEDS UNACCOUNTED FOR FOLLOWING SURGERY
On 1/13/04 a male patient received I-125 implants. Following the operation, the physician did not properly inventory the residual I-125 seeds. Two (2) seeds were missing (0.36 millicuries/ea). St. Josephs Wayne Hospital was informed of the discrepancy by the physician performing the operation and conducted extensive surveys with negative results. Corrective action includes an administrative requirement to have either a dosimetrist or physicist present during all future implant operations to ensure adequate inventory control.
On 1/13/04 a male patient received I-125 implants. Following the operation, the physician did not properly inventory the residual I-125 seeds. Two (2) seeds were missing (0.36 millicuries/ea). St. Josephs Wayne Hospital was informed of the discrepancy by the physician performing the operation and conducted extensive surveys with negative results. Corrective action includes an administrative requirement to have either a dosimetrist or physicist present during all future implant operations to ensure adequate inventory control.