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Event Notification Report for December 15, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/12/2003 - 12/15/2003

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40272 40383 40388 40389 40391

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40272
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/23/2003
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2003
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

NONEMERGENCY NOTIFICATION DUE TO FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL STRUCTURE HABITABILITY ENVELOPE

"During routine monitoring, Control Room personnel noted control structure pressure differential was below the 1/8" [inches of water pressure] required to maintain the Control Structure Habitability Envelope. A walkdown of the Control Structure and initial investigation has revealed no obvious problems that would cause the low positive pressure condition. Due to the inability of the Control Structure HVAC to maintain a positive pressure, both trains of Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply system were declared inoperable. This is considered a Loss of Safety Function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * * RETRACTION FROM A. FITCH TO M. RIPLEY 1343 ET 12/12/03 * * * *

"At the time of the original 8-hour ENS notification was made, both trains of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) system were declared inoperable due to the failure of the Control Structure HVAC system to maintain the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. [water gauge] with respect to outside atmosphere.

"Subsequent to this event, an evaluation was performed which determined that the requirement to maintain the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. is only applicable during emergency operating conditions. Under emergency conditions, the CREOAS system, in conjunction with the Control Structure HVAC system, is required to maintain control structure pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.3. However, during normal plant operation, the design function of the Control Structure HVAC system is to maintain the habitability envelope at a positive pressure above atmospheric. No specific value is required. Differential pressure readings for the control structure indicated that pressure was maintained above atmospheric at the time of this event.

"On October 24, 2003, surveillance testing successfully demonstrated that the Control Structure HVAC and CREOAS systems were capable of maintaining the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. As such, there was no loss of safety function."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (A. Della Greca)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40383
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NDC INFRARED ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: IRWINDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 1451-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C. J. SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/10/2003
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2003
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SEALED SOURCES DAMAGED IN FIRE

"Licensee reported that several months ago, four (4) 'sensor units' on fixed GL [General License] gauges it manufactures were involved in a fire at one of their customer sites in Painesville, Ohio. The RSO did not know the exact date of the fire. The sealed source used in these units is the AEA, AMC, P1, 150 milliCurie Am-241. Two of the units appeared burned and the other two appeared undamaged. The licensee had the customer do wipes on these which were negative. Then the units were shipped back to the licensee where they are now. On 12-08-03 the RSO was disassembling the worst-looking one in preparation for shipment back to the source manufacturer, AEA Technology. Wipes were done. The RSO detected elevated readings up to 200 cpm (background is 2-3 cpm) from the burned area of source S/N 4382LX mounted on probe sensor S/N 2851 using a Ludlum Model 12 alpha meter.

"Per the RSO, sources have been secured and contained pending further instructions. RSO indicated surveys were done of work area and personnel and no contamination was detected. The State is initiating an investigation and will send an inspector to the licensee for surveys."

The State reported that the gauge is a model # 103.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40388
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID CARLSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 01:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2003
Event Time: 23:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 96 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO UNEXPECTED STATOR WATER COOLING RUNBACK

Manual scram was inserted during a Stator Cooling Runback that was not expected. Cause of the Stator Cooling Runback is under investigation.

Group 2 & 3 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolations occurred as expected due to reactor level drop during the scram. All other systems operated as expected.

All controls rods were fully inserted during the manual scram. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel water level. Current Reactor Pressure is 880 psig and Reactor Level +30 inches. The electrical plant lineup is stable and in a normal lineup for this condition. The manual scram of this unit had no affect on the other unit onsite which is in a refueling outage.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40389
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 11:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY FEEWATER WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR ONE HOUR AND 22 MINUTES.

Surry Power Station has determined that an unanalyzed condition related to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) isolation during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event exists. The existing accident analysis for a SGTR requires that AFW to the ruptured steam generator (SG) be isolated prior to the water level in that SG rising into the main steam pipe. Failing to take these actions could result in a radioactive release or failure of equipment important to safety, which has not been previously analyzed.

The current configuration of the AFW system has six motor operated valves (MOVs), two for each SG, which are used to control flow from one of two AFW headers. Three MOVs are powered from "H" emergency bus and three MOVs are powered from "J" emergency bus. The MOVs are maintained normally open. With a loss of emergency power to either train of AFW MOVs, the control room operators are not able to close the three MOVs from the de-energized emergency bus without manual action inside containment. A review of the plant safety analysis design basis indicates that with this AFW configuration, isolation of AFW to a ruptured SG would not be possible within the time frame specified in the analysis.

Unit One and Unit Two entered a TS 3.0.1 clock at 1119 hours on December 12, 2003 due to the AFW systems being declared inoperable. The station took immediate actions to address the configuration control issue in order to meet the assumptions made in the SGTR accident analysis and both Unit One and Unit Two exited the TS 3.0.1 clock at 13:41 hours on December 12, 2003.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40391
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/12/2003
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2003
Event Time: 12:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE.

"On 12/12/2003 , at 1224 both trains of Component Cooling System were declared inoperable. The governance by the KNPP Technical Specification (3.3.d) requires that actions commence within an hour to place the plant in Hot Standby within 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and to achieve the RCS Tavg less than 350 degrees F by use of alternate heat removal methods within an additional 36 hours. The issue stemmed from the discovery of liquid on R-17 (Component Cooling Radiation Detector) detector housing at the location of a air port. Liquid from this port was chemically tested to contain chemicals (molybdates and sulfites) currently found in the Component Cooling system. It was determined that this leak violated guidance in Generic Letter 90-05 and thus rendered both trains of component cooling inoperable due to this being in a common header. A Technical Specifications guided background has commenced at 1315 on 12/12/2003."

At the time of the call, reactor power was 84% and decreasing. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if need. The electrical grid is stable.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012