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Event Notification Report for December 5, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/04/2003 - 12/05/2003

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40318 40363 40365 40369 40375

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40318
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: P. DUBROUILLET
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 11/13/2003
Notification Time: 05:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2003
Event Time: 22:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM ISOLATION DURING TESTING

"During quarterly surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System the HPCI system isolated. The cause of the isolation is believed to be high turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure. HPCI is currently inoperable. The outboard steam line isolation valve closed automatically and the inboard steam line isolation valve was manually closed. The HPCI room carbon dioxide fire protection system actuated due to the high temperature spike. No fire was present. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System, Auto Depressurization System (ADS), Low Pressure Core Spray System and Low Pressure Coolant Injection System are operable.

"Initial Safety Evaluation - Low initial safety significance due to availability of alternate high and low pressure injection systems.

"Corrective Actions - HPCI will remain inoperable pending investigation. Determine and correct the cause of HPCI isolation. Determine if the inboard steam isolation valve should have automatically closed."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE ON 12/04/03 @ 0945 BY STEVE TABOR TO C GOULD * * *

Upon further investigation of this event, it has been determined that the malfunction of the HPCI system was due to a condition which was introduced by the maintenance/testing activities while the system was declared inoperable. During the valve restoration/clearance cancellation process performed in support of HPCI system return to service, the 2-E41-F021, HPCI Exhaust Line Check Valve was inadvertently left in the locked closed position. In this configuration turbine exhaust over pressurization occurred resulting in actuation of the turbine exhaust diaphragm high pressure trip, subsequent generation of a Primary Containment Isolation system Division 1 Group 4 isolation signal, closure of the HPCI system outboard steam isolation valve 2-E41-F003, and rupture of the HPCI turbine exhaust rupture disc assembly. An evaluation of the impact of this event was performed and the necessary corrective actions and additional post-maintenance testing completed satisfactorily prior to declaring the HPCI system operable on November 16, 2003, at 2015 EST.

After further review of the event and event reporting guidance, this event is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. NUREG-1022, Revision 2 provides clarification of the reporting requirements contained within 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Specifically, in discussions associated with events that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function, NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Section 3.2.7, provides the following example of a condition that is not reportable under these criteria:

removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function)

In this case, HPCI was properly removed from service for planned maintenance/testing under TS Limiting Condition for Operation, A2-03-1190, and was not returned to service until HPCI system operability was restored. The intent of the qualifying statement in NUREC-1022 (i.e., unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function) is to ensure that pre-existing operability concerns that are discovered during maintenance activities are reported. It is not intended to require reporting of conditions, introduced by the maintenance/testing activity that are identified and corrected prior to returning the system to service. In this case, post-maintenance testing performed prior to declaring the HPCI system operable, identified a problem that had been introduced by activities implemented in support of the maintenance activity prior to returning the HPCI system to service and which did not exist at any time when the HPCI system had been relied upon to fulfill its intended safety function.

Therefore the licensee is retracting this event.


The licensee notified the Resident Inspector

The Reg 2 RDO(Brian Bonser) was notified

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40363
Rep Org: NEVADA RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: Henderson State: NV
County:
License #: 00-14-0404-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2003
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN AND RECOVERED

The State of Nevada provided the following information via facsimile:

"Date notified of event by licensee or non-licensee: November 17, 2003
"Radionuclide, activity Cesium 137.8 millicuries
"Any exposures (indicate short and long-term effects): Unknown
"Sealed source, device, etc. (make, model #, serial #): Troxler 46408, S/N 2361
"Leak test information, if applicable: Unknown
"Persons involved, consequences: Unknown
"Cause and contributing factors: Gauge was secured, according to procedures, in the licensee's field lab trailer. Thief defeated locks and barriers to break into storage closet and remove gauge. Gauge case and source rod were padlocked at the time of gauge theft.
"Licensee corrective actions: None, source was properly secured at the time of theft
"Provide status through resolution (update record when found): Gauge recovered on November 26, 2003 by a person wanting to remain anonymous. Gauge delivered to State regulatory agency and will be returned to licensee.
"Notifications, local police, FBI and other States; as needed: Henderson, NV Police Dept., Nevada Highway Patrol, Nevada Division of Emergency Management, and lastly, Nevada Radiological Health Section
"Identify any possible generic safety concerns: None
"Potential for others to experience the same event: Slight"

Note: This EN is actually an update to EN 40334.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40365
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L00446-060
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/01/2003
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING WELL LOGGING SOURCE ABANDONMENT

"Texas Incident No.: I-8079
"Event Report ID No.: 40365

"Event location: Newfield Exploration Company
"Well: Cotton Whitehead 2501
"Valverde County, Texas

"Notifications: Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control; Texas Railroad Commission, NRC Operations Center; NMED; NRC Region IV

"Event description: Late Friday evening, November 28, 2003, a logging source string became stuck in the customer's well. After several fishing attempts without success, it was decided to abandon the sources downhole. The sources will be cemented in place with the top most point covered by a minimum of 100 feet of red dyed cement. A deflection device will be place above the source string. A plaque has been ordered for installation on the wellhead. The source string held three sources: one Am-241/Be source manufactured by NSSI, Model DA-5, Serial No 27942, with an activity of 4.5 curies; one Cs-137 source manufactured by AEA, Model CDC.CY4, Serial No. 2907GW, with an activity of 2 curies; and a second Cs-137 source, manufactured by Gammatron, Model GT-GHP, Serial No. Z-194, with an activity of 0.8 curie."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40369
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: APPLIED MATERIALS, INC
Region: 4
City: Santa Clara State: CA
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 12/02/2003
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2003
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

During major construction, five out of eight exit signs were discovered missing in September 2003. Each exit sign contained 20 Curies Tritium as of 12 years ago. As of today each sign contains about 10 Curies Tritium. These exit signs are Generally Licensed devices and were manufactured by Fisher. The owner investigated and interviewed several employees within the last 30 days and advised them that if they find the signs they should bring them to him. As of today, the signs have not been recovered. The owner also reported that the facility brought about 100 dumpsters to the facility for inspection of debris and that the exit signs were not picked-up with the debris.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40375
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CALVIN WARD
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 12/04/2003
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2003
Event Time: 16:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSATE PUMP

"On December 4, 2003, at 1605 hours, a down power was initiated due to a failing bearing on the 2A Condensate Pump. The pump bearing was hot and smoking. The plant fire team was deployed as a precautionary action. Due to continued degradation of the Pump bearing, a Manual Reactor Trip was initiated at approximately 60% power. Feed to the 2A and 2B Steam Generators was maintained via the 2B Main Feedwater Pump. All plant safety systems responded normally and plant safety functions were maintained throughout the event. The Plant was stabilized In Mode 3. Plant post trip anomalies include Steam Generator Blowdown isolation valves closed, Control Room ventilation system swapped to recirculation mode, the Fuel Handling Building ventilation system swapped to the Shield Building, and it was necessary to take Steam Bypass Control System to manual. An Emergency Response Team was formed to review these conditions prior to plant restart. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the manual initiation of the RPS Reactor Trip."

All control rods fully inserted into the reactor on the trip. The emergency diesel generators are available and the offsite electrical grid is in a normal configuration. No safety relief valves or power operated relief valves were known to have actuated during this event. St. Lucie Unit 1 was not affected and continues to operate in mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012