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Event Notification Report for November 20, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/19/2003 - 11/20/2003

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40225 40323 40338 40340

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40225
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 10/05/2003
Notification Time: 06:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2003
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

INOPERABLE TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION AT HOPE CREEK

"While performing common mode failure testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), the 'C' EDG was declared INOPERABLE for planned installation of required test equipment. Concurrent with the inoperability of the 'C' EDG, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System has been INOPERABLE for emergent corrective maintenance since 10/2/03 at 0502. Because the 'C' EDG is the emergency power supply for the 'A' CREF train, 'A' CREF was also declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered as of 0300 hrs on 10/05/03. At 0430 hrs on 10/05/03, the test equipment was removed from 'C' EDG, thereby restoring it and 'A' CREF to an operable status, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. Testing did verify the absence of a common mode failure and all EDG's are operable. The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, CREF ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The plant is currently in HOT SHUTDOWN for repair of an emergent turbine hydraulic fluid leak, with decay heat removal to the main condenser via turbine bypass valves."

The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.


* * * * UPDATE ON 11/19/03 @ 1640 BY RITA BRADDICK TO C. GOULD * * * *

"At the time of the original notification, both trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) were declared inoperable impacting the ability of CREF to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The "B" train was inoperable for emergent corrective maintenance and the "A" train was declared inoperable when test equipment was connected to the "C" emergency diesel generator (EDG). The "C" EDG provides emergency power to the "A" train of CREF. Subsequent to this event, an evaluation of the test equipment impact to the "C" EDG was performed and determined that the "C" EDG would still be capable of providing emergency power to the "A" CREF train in the event offsite power is lost. Therefore, the "A" CREF train remained available to respond to a design basis accident. Thus, the safety function would have been fulfilled." R1DO (Brain McDermott) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the licensee.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40323
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: NO FRILLS SUPERMARKET
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0189
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/14/2003
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/14/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)

Event Text

LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The State of Nebraska reported that one of their licensees could not account for 12 tritium exit signs during their annual inventory check. The signs were manufactured in 05/87 and 11 contained 25 curries each of tritium and 1 contained 50 curies. All activities were measured at date of manufacture. Remodeling of the store occurred during the period between the previous inventory check and the current inventory. The licensee has contacted the general contractor, but the location of the exit lights is still unknown. They may have ended up in the landfill.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 40338
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RULAND SAWYER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/19/2003
Notification Time: 08:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

MISSING CESIUM-137 CHECK SOURCE

During an inventory on 10/31/03, it was discovered that a sealed Cs-137 instrument check source was missing from its storage location. The source strength is 232.5 microcuries as of 11/18/03. The source was last seen during the previous inventory on 05/08/03.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40340
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK BAUCOM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/19/2003
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2003
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TWO FAILURE MODES NOT PREVIOUSLY POSTULATED COULD BE INTRODUCED BY A FIRE IN EITHER FIRE ZONE 19 OR FIRE ZONE 20.

"At approximately 1330 hours (EDT) on November 19, 2003, during reviews being conducted on H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit 2 No. 2, Appendix R fire scenario safe shutdown circuit analysis, it was concluded that two failure modes not previously postulated could be introduced by a fire in either Fire Zone 19, Cable Spreading Room, or Fire Zone 20, Emergency Switchgear Room. The suction source to the charging pump could spuriously close during a fire in one of these zones, which could cause a loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) make-up capability of the "A" Charging Pump were operating at the time if the event. The other failure mode involves spurious operation of both pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs), which could cause a loss of RCS inventory. Each of these failure modes could result in loss of safe shutdown capability. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in safe shutdown condition.

"Short term corrective actions for this situation include procedure changes to establish preemptive actions that will provide reasonable assurance that safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained. The procedure changes will include rapid verification at the onset of a fire scenario that the "A" Charging Pump is not operating, and will direct closure of the pressurizer PORV block valves. Additionally, the Fire Protection Program (FPP) requirements for loss of detection or suppression in these zones were reviewed. The FPP requires establishment of a continuous fire watch in these areas for loss of detection or suppression capability. Additional administrative controls will be implemented or transient combustibles to further reduce the probability of these failure modes occurring.

"Long term corrective actions are being developed via the Corrective Action Program and will be implemented to further reduce the likelihood of these failure modes"

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012