U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/29/2003 - 09/30/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40181 | Facility: SURRY Region: 2 State: VA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: DUANE SHEPHEARD HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS | Notification Date: 09/19/2003 Notification Time: 15:45 [ET] Event Date: 09/19/2003 Event Time: 11:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): ANNE BOLAND (R2) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text LOSS OF SIRENS "A poll of the Surry EWS sirens was conducted to determine operability of the siren system (Reference Hurricane Response Plan - Nuclear, Section 5.6). The poll was conducted from the back-up status logger at Innsbrook due to the unavailability of the primary status logger in the Surry LEOF (see Plant Issue - S-2003-4152). "45 of the 67 sirens expected to respond to the siren polling are considered inoperable at this time due to power failure as a result of Hurricane Isabel (the status of 2 of these was indeterminate). 22 of the 67 sirens responded satisfactorily and are considered operational. "This is a reportable event per VPAP - 2802 Attachment 3 d. Early Warning System second bullet "More than 25 percent of all sirens are unavailable" and the third bullet "The capability to alert a large segment of the population does not exist." This discrepancy was discovered at 1130 EDT on 9/19/03. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as state and local government officials. **** Update on 09/29/03 at 1524 EDT by Larry Wheeler taken by MacKinnon **** Currently Surry Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in Cold Shutdown. "Surry EWS sirens have been returned to operable status on September 29, 2003 following repairs due to weather related effects of a Hurricane Isabel. Presently 63 of 67 sirens have been returned to service (94%). All sirens located within the 5 miles portion of the EPZ are operable. The current availability of the EWS no longer constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communication capability pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). "Information related to the return to service of these sirens is being transmitted to the State of Virginia and FEMA. This is the final report that will be issued relative to siren system restoration efforts following Hurricane Isabel. Normal siren system status monitoring practices will remain in effect going forward." R2DO (Mark Lesser) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40200 | Facility: WATTS BAR Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOHN RODEN HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 09/26/2003 Notification Time: 16:31 [ET] Event Date: 09/26/2003 Event Time: 08:50 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | Person (Organization): CAUDLE JULIAN (R2) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text GREATER THAN 1 PERCENT OF STEAM GENERATORS 1,2 & 4 TUBES INSPECTED INDICATE THAT THE INSPECTED TUBES REQUIRE PLUGGING. "At 0850 EST on September 26, 2003, with Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 defueled, steam generator inspections were being performed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2.12, 'Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program.' The results of the inspections performed on Steam Generator Numbers 1, 2, and 4 indicated that greater than 1% of the inspected tubes require repair. Based on TS 5.7.2.12, this determination results in the classification of C-3. The current inspection results do not meet the criteria specified for steam generator tube degradation in Revision 2 of NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. However, for classification C-3, WBN TS Table 5.7.2.12-1, 'SG Tube Inspection Supplemental Sampling Requirements, 'requires that the results of the inspection be reported under 10 CFR 50.72. At this time, the submittal of the Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 is not planned." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. **** Update on 09/29/03 at 1439 EDT by John Roden taken by MacKinnon **** "In addition, at 0800 on September 29, 2003 Steam Generator Number 3 has been determined to be in the classification of C-3 (48 tubes). The current inspection results do not meet the criteria specified for team generator tube degradation in Revision 2 of NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. However, for classification C-3, WBN TS Table 5.7.2.12-1, 'SG Tube Inspection Supplemental Sampling Requirements,' requires that the results of the inspection be reported under 10 CFR 50.72. At this time, the submittal of a Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 is not planned." R2DO (Mark Lesser) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40205 | Facility: COOPER Region: 4 State: NE Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GILBERT HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS | Notification Date: 09/29/2003 Notification Time: 15:22 [ET] Event Date: 09/28/2003 Event Time: 23:45 [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): CHUCK CAIN (R4) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 65 | Power Operation | 22 | Power Operation | Event Text 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY - ACCIDENT MITIGATION "This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 section (b)(3)(v)(D). "At 2345 [CDT] on 9/28/03, while performing Turbine Trip Testing, the required sequence of events failed to occur, and it was determined that a turbine trip would not occur when required by Technical Specification 3.3.2.2, Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip. Condition B of Specification 3.3.2.2 was entered, requiring restoration [of] highwater level trip capability in two hours, and Condition C requiring that thermal power be reduced to less than 25% in four hours. "The feedwater and main turbine high water level trip instrumentation is assumed to be capable of providing a turbine trip in the design basis transient analysis for a feedwater controller failure, maximum demand event. The Level 8 trip indirectly initiates a reactor scram from the main turbine trip (above 30% RTP) and trips the feedwater pumps, thereby terminating the event. The reactor scram mitigates the reduction in MCPR [Minimum Critical Power Ratio]. "Since the Turbine trip would not have occurred, the reactor scram would not have occurred. At 0530 on 9/29/03 reactor power was lowered to below 25%. "This event was determined to be reportable on 9/29/2003 at 1230 [CDT]." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |