| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/29/2003 - 09/02/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40112 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: LONGVIEW INSPECTIONS, INC.
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-506
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: NATHAN SANFILIPPO | Notification Date: 08/28/2003
Notification Time: 13:29 [EST]
Event Date: 08/25/2003
Event Time: 17:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE UNINTENTIONALLY DISCONNECTED FROM DRIVE CABLE
The following report was received via fax from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency:
"On August 25, 2003, at approximately 5:30 PM, while making an exposure at valve #14 (Iverton Rd. and Contractors Way in Tucson, Arizona) the source assembly unintentionally disconnected from the drive cable in the end of the six foot collimating guide tube. The exposure device being used was an INC - IR100, SN-4015, containing a 61 Curie IR-192 source, Model #87703, capsule #08809B. A 35 foot set of NDT [Non Destructive Testing] drive cables and a NDT guide tube were being used. The source was removed from the guide tube and collimator, reattached to the drive cable and cranked back into the exposure device, plugged, locked, and the drive cables removed. Pocket dosimeters indicated that whole body exposures were approximately 30 mR [millirem] and a hand exposure to the individual recovering the source was calculated to be 200 mR. The exposure device and drive cables are being sent back to AEA in Baton Rouge, LA to determine the cause of the disconnect." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40114 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE LEE
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 05:27 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 02:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text CATAWBA UNIT 1 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION
Unit 1 tripped on Over Temperature - Delta Temperature (OTDT) protection. Channel 1 OTDT was in a trip condition due to a reactor coolant hot leg temperature problem. Per Technical Specifications, this required Channel 1 OTDT to be placed in the tripped condition. Channel 2 Pressurizer pressure failed low at 0203 EDT. This input (Channel 2 Pressurizer Low Pressure) caused Channel 2 OTDT to enter a trip condition. With 2 of 4 OTDT Channels in the trip condition, a reactor trip signal was generated by the reactor protection system resulting in an automatic reactor trip. After the reactor trip occurred, RCS (Reactor Coolant System) letdown was lost on the chemical and volume control system due to low Pressurizer level. 1NV-1A (Reactor Coolant Letdown Isolation Valve) did not close as required. This necessitated the alignment of the excess letdown flowpath to maintain the desired Pressurizer level. ESF (Engineered Safety Features) operated as designed. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started and main feedwater isolated as designed.
All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Station service electrical systems, emergency diesel generators, and ESF equipment are available. Catawba Unit 2 was unaffected by the trip of Unit 1.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying state and local officials. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40115 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DeSANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 10:22 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 07:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCHARGE OF WASTE WATER CONTAINING HYDRAZINE
"A 2-hour notification was made to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection due to a discharge of 100,000 gallons of industrial waste water to the Delaware River. The water contained a concentration of 300 ppb [parts per billion] hydrazine. The discharge was immediately terminated upon discovery. This is a common water treatment system for both Salem Units, however, there is no impact on plant operations."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the LAC (Lower Alloways Creek) Township. The New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering will also be notified by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40117 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT FRUIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 14:55 [EST]
Event Date: 08/28/2003
Event Time: 17:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL
"This 24-hour report is being made as required by Byron Unit 1 License Condition 2.F and Byron Unit 2 License Condition 2.G as a potential violation of the maximum power level (3586.6 MWt) as stated in Unit 1 and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C(1).
"On August 28, 2003 at 17:43 CST Byron Station was notified by the ultrasonic flow measurement vendor via letter that there were discrepancies in the ultrasonic flow measurements used in the calorimetric calculation for reactor power. As part of an ongoing testing plan, ultrasonic flow measurements were being taken on the main feedwater system piping header on Byron Unit 1 and were compared to the results from the ultrasonic flow measurement devices on the four individual feedwater lines. Based on the results of the data analysis, and noted signal abnormalities, it was determined that Byron Unit 1 has potentially exceeded its licensed thermal power limit by approximately 1.5%.
"Based on the results of the testing on Unit 1, the ultrasonic flow measurements on Byron Unit 2 were also investigated. Similar signal abnormalities were identified on one of the four ultrasonic flow measurement devices installed on the individual feedwater lines on Unit 2. Subsequent evaluation indicates that Byron Unit 2 also has potentially exceeded its licensed thermal power limit by approximately 0.6%.
"The power level on both units was reduced to less than 100% power consistent with feedwater flow as measured directly by the venturis without using the correction factors from the ultrasonic flowmeters.
"Additional actions regarding investigation of the condition, determination of root cause and corrective action, and determination of the potential actual overpower will be included in the 30-day license event report."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40118 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: NATHAN SANFILIPPO | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 16:08 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 13:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"During performance of routine operability testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System [HPCI] tripped and restarted due to an as yet undetermined cause. The trip and restart sequence occurred twice in close succession approximately 20 minutes into a normal run before the operator took action to manually trip the turbine. Investigation into the cause of the malfunction is on-going. The HPCI system has been declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications."
The operability of all other Emergency Core Cooling System components has been verified. There was never any actual coolant injection by the HPCI system during this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. The State of Massachusetts will also be notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40119 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN HATHCOTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 16:59 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 14:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE
"Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip at approximately 14:28 CDT as a result of a turbine trip. Initial indications are that the trip was associated with a lightning strike on site. Plant is stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and there are no offsite radiation releases. Anomalies noted are 'C' Main Phase Transformer Sudden Pressure Trip Alarm, Main Generator Output Breakers failed to automatically open and were subsequently manually opened, and 'B' Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) main feedwater block valve failed to indicate closed which resulted in a low level condition on 'B' OTSG and subsequent automatic actuation of Emergency Feedwater (EFW). EFW is controlling both OTSG levels at low level limits."
A normal fast transfer to the Startup Transformer occurred following the trip and offsite power remains available. All EDGs are in standby, if needed. There is no safety related equipment out of service at this time. Decay heat is currently being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. The licensee will conduct an investigation into the equipment failures and determine if any plant equipment was damaged by the lightning strike.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0144 EDT FROM HOGUE TO CROUCH * * *
"This message is intended to provide clarifying information for Event Notification #40119. Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip at approximately 14:28 CDT as a result of a turbine trip. Initial indications are that the trip was associated with a lightning strike on site. Plant is stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and there are no offsite radiation releases. The following anomalies were noted in conjunction with plant trip. A 'C' Main Phase Transformer Sudden Pressure Trip Alarm occurred as a result of an indication problem only. The Main Generator Output Breakers failed to automatically open and were subsequently manually opened. The 'B' Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) main feedwater (MFW) block valve failed to fully close. Complications associated with manual control of feedwater flow when the MFW block valve failed to fully close resulted in a momentary low level in the 'B' OTSG and Emergency Feedwater (EFW) automatic actuation. EFW flow quickly restored the 'B' OTSG level to normal. Both MFW pumps remained operating throughout the transient, and MFW flow was never lost. The EFW System was allowed to recirc for approximately 2 hours. After the MFW block valve was manually closed, the auxiliary feedwater pump was placed in service and EFW and the MFW pumps were secured."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 2017 EDT ON 8/30/03 FROM RICHARD SCHEIDE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"This message is intended to update the information provided in previous notifications concerning Event Notification #40119. Based on subsequent investigation the automatic reactor trip which occurred at approximately 14:28 CDT on August 29, 2003, was a result of high reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure. The high RCS pressure resulted from the inadvertent closure of the main turbine governor valves. Although not conclusively determined, the closure of these valves is most likely due to a lightning strike on site. This automatic reactor trip also resulted in a main turbine trip. Anomalies associated with this event remain as previously reported."
The primary PORV (2450 psia) and Safeties (2500 psia) did not lift during the pressure excursion. The High RCS Pressure setpoint for RPS actuation is 2355 psia.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Runyan). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40121 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: NATHAN SANFILIPPO | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 18:37 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
"At 1505 hrs. on Friday August 29, 2003, TMI Unit 1 determined that there had been a degradation of the emergency preparedness response capabilities when there was a loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS), the Health Physics Network (HPN) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). In addition most site telephone lines were inoperable. The loss of these communications systems was most probably caused by a lightning strike. Limited telephonic communications remains with the TMI 1 control room, i.e., one commercial phone exchange, a satellite phone and the emergency management phone circuit remain operable.
"TMI 1 has verified operability of the ERO notification system (pagers), and the communication circuit used to notify the state and local counties. The siren system for local counties was unaffected by loss of site telephone systems. Plant page and radio systems remain operable. Adequate communications capabilities are operable at this time to implement the emergency plan.
"Repairs to restore the inoperable telephone systems are in progress at this time. A return to service time for all systems is to be determined. However, at the time of this report, the ENS line has been restored to an operable
status.
"TMI 1 has determined that this event is reportable to the NRC as an 8-hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Pennsylvania, and local authorities have been notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 8/30/03 AT 0448 BY DAVID WILSON TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee reported that the Emergency Notification System (ENS) was restored to service on 8/29/03 at approximately 2100 hours EDT and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was returned to service on 8/29/03 at 2212 hours EDT.
Notified R1DO (James Trapp). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40122 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GARY DETHERAGE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/29/2003
Notification Time: 23:00 [EST]
Event Date: 08/29/2003
Event Time: 17:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | | 2 | N | Y | 77 | Power Operation | 77 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIREN ACTUATION CAPABILITY
"At 1750 today (8/29/03), the Duty Emergency Planner was notified by the Arkansas Department of Health's Nuclear Planning and Response Program (NP&RP) staff that, due to the loss of the ANO microwave system, the capability to sound the offsite Siren Warning System was lost. The NP&RP staff discovered the loss of the Siren Warning System at 1730. The Siren Warning System is used to notify the public in ANO's 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of an emergency at ANO. This system covers approximately 85% of the 10-mile EPZ population.
"The Siren Warning System was restored at 1930 CDT on 8/29/03. The backup means for alerting the population in the EPZ remained available."
The cause for the siren failure is unknown and under investigation.
The licensee informed both the State of Arkansas and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40123 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK EHRHARDT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/31/2003
Notification Time: 14:43 [EST]
Event Date: 08/31/2003
Event Time: 01:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL
"This 24-hour report is being made as required by Braidwood Unit 2 License Condition 2.G as a potential violation of the maximum power level (3586.6 MWt) as stated in Unit 2 License Condition 2.C(1).
"As a result of issues at Byron Unit 1 and Unit 2 concerning potential discrepancies in the ultrasonic flow measurements for the main feedwater system, Braidwood investigated both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to determine if similar issues existed. These flow measurements are used in the calorimetric calculation for reactor power. Ultrasonic flow measurements were taken on the four individual main feedwater lines on Braidwood Unit 2. These measurements identified the presence of flow signal noise in the data signals for two of the four ultrasonic flow measurement devices installed on the individual feedwater lines, which may adversely affect the integrity of these measurements. In response to identifying this flow signal noise, Braidwood removed corrections based on ultrasonic flow measurement from these two loops. Based on removing credit for these ultrasonic flow measurements, it was determined at 0132 on August 31, 2003, that Braidwood Unit 2 could have potentially exceeded its licensed thermal power limit by up to 0.8%.
"Ultrasonic flow measurements were taken on the main feedwater system piping header on Braidwood Unit 1 and were compared to the results from the ultrasonic flow measurement devices on the four individual feedwater lines. Based on the results of the data analysis, Unit 1 was determined to be acceptable.
"The power level on Unit 2 was reduced to less than 100% power consistent with the feedwater flow as measured directly by the venturis without using the correction factor on two of the four ultrasonic flow meters.
"Additional actions regarding the investigation of the condition, determination of the root cause and corrective actions, and the determination of the potential actual overpower will be included in the 30-day license event report."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO NOTE: See Byron Event Notification #40117. | |