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Event Notification Report for August 28, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/27/2003 - 08/28/2003

** EVENT NUMBERS **


39970 40008 40102 40106 40107 40108 40109

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 39970
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID BARNETT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/01/2003
Notification Time: 00:04 [EST]
Event Date: 06/30/2003
Event Time: 15:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB) DOOR NOT LATCHED

"On June 30, 2003 at approximately 1545 [CDT] it was identified that a High Energy Line Break (HELB) door separating Divisional Motor Control Centers was not latched as required. It was determined that this condition existed for a maximum of 15 minutes. This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State Emergency Management Agency.

* * *RETRACTION on 08/27/03 at 1215 EDT from R. Sand to John MacKinnon * * *

Because plant safety was not significantly degraded, this event is not reportable under the unanalyzed condition criteria based on: (1) the door in either event was in an uncontrolled condition for less than one minute, (2) the door was not materially affected, only operated improperly, (3) the PRA significance of the event was low, and (4) the HELB Barrier door was not open for a period than is allowed by station procedural guidance. R3DO (C. Miller) notified.

The station continues to review the events in the station's corrective action program.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 40008
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GERRY STOCKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/22/2003
Notification Time: 16:10 [EST]
Event Date: 07/22/2003
Event Time: 09:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HELB DOOR NOT LATCHED AS REQUIRED DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

"A High Energy Line Break (HELB) door was not latched as required. This condition is being reported as an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The door is currently closed."

The HELB door which separates two critical Motor Control Center [MCC] areas was unlatched for less than two (2) minutes. The licensee will inform the state representative and has informed the NRC resident inspector.

* * * RETRACTION on 08/27/03 at 1216 EDT by R. Sand to John MacKinnon * * *

Because plant safety was not significantly degraded, this event is not reportable under the unanalyzed condition criteria based on: (1) the door in either event was in an uncontrolled condition for less than one minute, (2) the door was not materially affected, only operated improperly, (3) the PRA significance of the event was low, and (4) the HELB Barrier door was not open for a period longer than is allowed by station procedural guidance. R3DO (C. Miller) notified.

The station continues to review the event in the station's corrective action program.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40102
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: PHELPS-DODGE, INC.
Region: 4
City: BAGHDAD State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ-13-005
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/25/2003
Notification Time: 18:22 [EST]
Event Date: 08/25/2003
Event Time: 09:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)

Event Text

3 CURIE COBALT-60 SOURCE DISCOVERED DISCONNECTED

"At approximately 9:30 AM MST August 25, 2003, the Agency was informed by the Licensee that they had discovered a source had disconnected from a rod in the Process Leaching Vessel. The source contains 3 Curies of Cobalt 60 as of October 2001. The licensee has made measurements and determined the radiation levels outside the vessel are not excessive. The device is a ThermoMeasure Tech Model 5031 L SN B43. Even though the source is disconnected, because it is trapped within a sealed source guide tube, it is still secure from inadvertent removal. The estimated date for full repair is October 21, 2003. Repair will be made by the device manufacturer. The Licensee has agreed not to drain the vessel without Agency notice and approval.

"The Agency continues to investigate this incident."

The Agency is: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY.

First Notice: 03-13

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 40106
Rep Org: US AIR FORCE
Licensee: US AIR FORCE
Region: 4
City: Vance AFB State: OK
County:
License #: 42-23539-09AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MAJOR CRAIG REFOSCO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/27/2003
Notification Time: 11:10 [EST]
Event Date: 08/22/2003
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)

Event Text

MISSING EXIT SIGN CONTAINING TRITIUM

On 08/22/03, while reviewing documentation following construction, personnel at Vance Air Force Base discovered that an exit sign containing 20 Curies of Tritium was misplaced. The sign was to be replaced with an electric sign. The construction occurred in late June 03. Personnel are conducting a search for the sign. It may have been disposed of in the regular trash.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40107
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE NEVELOS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/27/2003
Notification Time: 15:22 [EST]
Event Date: 08/27/2003
Event Time: 09:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM ACCESS DOOR LATCH WAS DETERMIEND TO BE NOT FULLY ENGAGING.

At 09:24 am on 08/27/03, a Control Room access door latch was determined to be not fully engaging. The door and latch provide the following functions:

maintain the integrity of the Control Room boundary which is a design feature to maintain Control Room habitability following a design bases accident, and

provide a security barrier to restrict access into the Control Rom complex to only those personnel with preapproved security clearance.

With the latch not engaged, the door was not capable of performing these functions. The appropriate security contingencies were implemented, requiring posting of a Security Force Member at the door controlling access to the Control Room Complex. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the inability of either Control Room ventilation system to maintain Control Room habitability, as required by TS 3.7.2.

At 10:20, the door latch was replaced to re-establish the integrity of the Control Room habitability boundary and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The ability of the latch to properly operate for access and egress was not established; access through the affected door remained restricted until repairs can be completed (there are additional doors to the Control Room that remain fully functional).

At 14:00, the door was again impaired for repair of the door latch. Full functionality of the door was restored at 14:41.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40108
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY INGRAM
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 08/27/2003
Notification Time: 15:41 [EST]
Event Date: 08/22/2003
Event Time: 02:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL RUNYAN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE "A" STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

"On August 22,2003, at 0201 Central Time, while operating at 100 percent power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced an invalid actuation of the 'A' Standby Service Water (SSW) System. A failed DC/DC converter power supply in Panel 1H22P400 for the Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG) resulted in a faulty DG speed monitor signal indicating DG speed greater than 450 revolutions per minute (RPM). The DG was not running since it was already inoperable due to a planned outage. The event occurred during restoration activities to prepare the DG for retest. The invalid DG start signal caused the outside air fan and SSW 'A' to auto start as designed to support DG operation. SSW 'A' started and functioned as designed. No other actuations occurred and all support systems functioned properly."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 40109
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 3
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: STEVEN SHAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/27/2003
Notification Time: 22:53 [EST]
Event Date: 08/27/2003
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2003
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
CHRIS MILLER (R3)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)

Event Text

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY OMISSION

NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION

At 0900 on 8/27/03, it was discovered that the procedure for operation of the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System did not adequately address flowdown requirements specified in NCSA 409-001. NCSA 409-001 control 3.2.39 prevents introduction of organic material to the precipitation system by requiring verification that the solution originated from either the C-710 Laboratory, the C-409 Cylinder Wash, or the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System and that the solution does not contain organic material, as indicated by sampling. The control had been flowed down for solutions originating from the C-710 Laboratory and the C-409 Cylinder Wash, however was not flowed down for solutions originating from the C-409 Uranium Precipitating System.

PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 03-2767, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2003-017.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

Double contingency was not maintained because the independent verification of the origination of solutions from the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System and the independent verification that the solution did not contain organic material had not been performed. However, no oil has been introduced to the operation.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:

In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than a safe mass of uranium must be accumulated within the Uranium Precipitation System, facilitated by the presence of organic material and accumulate in the rotary drum filter.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)

Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL:

This system has a process limit of (xx) wt.% U235.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OF DEFICIENCIES:

The first leg of double contingency is based on controlling the mass of uranium in the tanks. NCSA 409-001 requires that prior to placing solution in the Uranium Precipitation Operation the solution must be verified to be uranium salvage from C-710 laboratory, C-409 cylinder wash, or the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System and that the solution does not contain organic material. This control prevents the build-up of organic material at the top of the Uranium Precipitation System tanks. If organic material were to get in the tanks it would create a floating uranium/oil layer and result in non-representative sampling of the concentration, since sampling is conducted near the bottom of the tank. This may lead to an unsafe mass reaching the rotary drum filter. The C-710 solution currently in the system was independently verified to be free of organic material prior to initial introduction. However, since no verification was documented for the C-409 Uranium Precipitation system solution, this control was lost. Chemical Operations personnel have subsequently verified that no events have occurred to introduce organic material into the solution from the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System. The control was violated; however the parameter was maintained.

The second leg of double contingency is based on mass. NCSA 409-001 requires that prior to placing solution in the Uranium Precipitation Operation, the solution be independently verified to be uranium salvage from C-710 Laboratory, C-409 Cylinder Wash or the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System and that the solution does not contain organic material. However, since no independent verification was documented for the C-409 Uranium Precipitation system solution, this control was lost. Chemical Operations personnel have subsequently independently verified that no events have occurred to introduce organic material into the solution from the C-409 Uranium Precipitation System. Therefore, this control was violated. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.

Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, and the controls were violated, double contingency was not maintained.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO REESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

Chemical Operations revise procedure CP4-CU-CH2137 to include verification requirements specified in NCSA 409-001. Procedure change was initiated on 8-27-03.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event by the licensee.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012