Event Notification Report for December 20, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/19/2002 - 12/20/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39465
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39465
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SHARON DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SHARON DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 12/20/2002
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2002
Event Time: 19:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2002
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2002
Event Time: 19:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
"Inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) in Case of Fire identified that for postulated fires in three fire areas, the design and compensatory actions assumed by the Safe Shutdown Analysis would not ensure a protected train of equipment would remain available. This condition constitutes noncompliance with the HNP FSAR and is reportable as an unanalyzed condition as described in 10CFR50.72.
"The inspection identified that postulated fires could cause spurious actuation of components potentially resulting in loss of the Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) assumed to be protected by the Safe Shutdown Analysis. The fires were postulated to cause spurious closure of valves in the suction and/or discharge flowpaths for the protected CSIP prior to implementation of the preplanned actions designed to preserve these flowpaths. The protected CSIP could be lost if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire.
"The plant is instituting several interim compensatory measures to minimize the impact of the postulated fires. These measures include aligning the Charging System and de-energizing certain valves to minimize susceptibility to mal-operation of components, and posting a fire watch in fire areas of concern."
The three areas of concern for the postulated fires are in the 261 RAB elevation north-south hallway. The cable spreaders in this area constitute the susceptible equipment.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"Inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) in Case of Fire identified that for postulated fires in three fire areas, the design and compensatory actions assumed by the Safe Shutdown Analysis would not ensure a protected train of equipment would remain available. This condition constitutes noncompliance with the HNP FSAR and is reportable as an unanalyzed condition as described in 10CFR50.72.
"The inspection identified that postulated fires could cause spurious actuation of components potentially resulting in loss of the Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) assumed to be protected by the Safe Shutdown Analysis. The fires were postulated to cause spurious closure of valves in the suction and/or discharge flowpaths for the protected CSIP prior to implementation of the preplanned actions designed to preserve these flowpaths. The protected CSIP could be lost if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire.
"The plant is instituting several interim compensatory measures to minimize the impact of the postulated fires. These measures include aligning the Charging System and de-energizing certain valves to minimize susceptibility to mal-operation of components, and posting a fire watch in fire areas of concern."
The three areas of concern for the postulated fires are in the 261 RAB elevation north-south hallway. The cable spreaders in this area constitute the susceptible equipment.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.