Event Notification Report for November 22, 2002

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT


Hydraulic oil spill from a Sky Lift resulted in 5 gallons of hydraulic fluid deposited on the gravel and pavement below the Sky Lift. The spill was from a separated oil line. No water ways or storm drains were involved. ERPIP 3.0 Hazardous Material Spill and Spill Plan were implemented. Maryland Department of Environment was notified of the hydraulic oil spill (quantity >26 gallons). The event was terminated and the spill was cleaned up at 1300 hours.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

GENERAL ELECTRIC IDENTIFIED THE STABILITY OPTION III PERIOD BASED DETECTION ALGORITHM Tmin SPECIFICATION HAS A DEFECT

"Stability solution Option III is implemented in the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM). Each OPRM channel contains 18 to 33 OPRM cells (depending upon plant size). Each OPRM cell signal is summed from three to four closely spaced Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) signals. Each OPRM cell signal is processed through the Option Ill detection algorithms to determine when a trip is required. Trip of one OPRM cell causes its OPRM channel to trip, and when sufficient OPRM channels trip (one-out-of-two taken twice, or two-out-of-four), a reactor scram is initiated to terminate the oscillation.

"An OPRM trip is enabled for plant operation within the OPRM Armed Region as defined on the power/flow map. The Armed Region extends from natural circulation to 60% of rated core flow. The licensing basis for the OPRM is to detect all expected oscillations within the OPRM Armed Region, and initiate a reactor trip to suppress the oscillation and provide Minimum Critical Power Limit (MCPR) safety limit protection.

"GE LTR NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, 'BWR Owners' Group Long - Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology (Supplement 1),' November 1995, describes the Option III detection algorithms. The Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) provides licensing basis MCPR safety limit protection. Other algorithms provide defense-in-depth protection. The PBDA includes two parameters called Tmin and Tmax. The PBDA will not evaluate oscillations if the period is less than Tmin or greater than Tmax because these would not be indicative of an expected coupled neutronic/thermal - hydraulic instability. The LTR specifies that 'typical' Tmin values are in the range of 1.0 to 1.4 seconds and 'typical' Tmax values are in the range of 3.0 to 3.5 seconds.

"The expected period of a coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instability depends upon the fluid transit time through the core, and therefore depends upon core flow rate. This has been demonstrated in reactor operation and is predicted by GE computer models. At high core flow, the expected oscillation period is shorter. At low core flow rate, the expected oscillation period is longer. The intent of the OPRM is that Tmin and Tmax provide a wide range with adequate margin to the expected oscillation period for operation within the OPRM Armed Region so that all expected coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities will be detected by the PBDA."

* * * * POTENTIALLY AFFECTED PLANTS ADDED TO REPORT BY RIPLEY 11/25/02 * * * *

The notification identified the following potentially affected plants:

Clinton, Brunswick 1, Brunswick 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2, Dresden 3, LaSalle 1, LaSalle 2, Limerick 1, Limerick 2, Peach Bottom 2, Peach Bottom 3, Quad Cities 1, Quad Cities 2, Perry 1, Susquehanna 1, Susquehanna 2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1, Hatch 2, Browns Ferry 2, Browns Ferry 3

SECURITY REPORT

Unattended security weapon, compensatory measures put in place upon discovery.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified

Contact HOO for additional details.

THE "POWERPLEX" MONITORING SOFTWARE CONTAINS AN ERROR

"The MCPR calculation using the SPCB correlation in the MICROBURN-B2 and MICROBURN-B codes and associated POWERPLEX monitoring software contains an error. The error is in the determination of the axial adjustment factor for use in the SPCB CPR [Critical Power Ratio] correlation. This can lead to non-conservative CPR calculations when using the SPCB CPR correlation and potentially a violation of the MCPR [Minimum Critical Power Ratio] Technical Specification operating limit since the POWERPLEX incore monitoring code may under predict the MCPR for comparison to the operating limit. This error in MICROBURN-B2 and MICROBURN-B had no impact on the operating limit itself. The POWERPLEX incore monitoring software in use at River Bend, Grand Gulf, and LaSalle Unit 1 is impacted by this error."

INADVERTENT START OF "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"The cause of the inadvertent actuation was human error by an Auxiliary Operator. The Auxiliary Operator mistakenly placed the "A" diesel generator Engineering Safeguards Test Switch in the "Test" position, instead of placing the "B" EDG Engineering Safeguards Test Switch in the "Test" position. During the "B" ESAS [Emergency Safeguards Actuation System] testing, a portion of the test sends a simulated start signal to the "B" EDG. With the "B" EDG Engineering Safeguards test switch in the "Test" position, a light actuates when the simulated ESAS start signal is received, indicating that the ESAS start signal had been received. However, the "B" EDG Engineering Safeguards Test Switch was not in the "Test" position. Therefore the "B" EDG started in accordance with the plant design.

"A review of this event has determined that the event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2. The signal to start the "B" EDG is not considered a "valid" signal because it was not a signal initiated by any actual plant condition or parameter. Therefore, this event is considered to be an inadvertent actuation that was caused by an invalid signal and has been determined to be reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"There was no effect on the TMl-1 plant due to the inadvertent start, beyond the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator, The "B" EDG did not initiate block loading or any other sequence of events. The "B" EDG was immediately shutdown and an event investigation was initiated. The "A" EDG remained operable throughout the event. Throughout the event, the "A" EDG was capable of providing emergency alternating current including performing the required "fast start" and block loading in response to an ESAS auto-start signal, an undervoltage condition or loss of offsite power event.

"As an immediate action, a test run of the "B" EDG is being performed for approximately 1 hour to confirm that the inadvertent "fast" start did not have any impact on its ability to provide emergency alternating current in the event of an ESAS auto-start signal, an undervoltage condition or loss of offsite power.

"As stated above, an event investigation has been initiated. The event will be documented in the site corrective action program. When the cause of the human error is identified, appropriate corrective action will be taken and documented in the applicable corrective action report."

The Sr. Resident Inspector has been informed.

NON-CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR PERIOD SETPOINT

"On November 22, 2002, Brunswick Unit 1 received notification from General Electric of a Part 21 Non-Conservative Analysis of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Period Setpoint. The non-conservative analysis affects the OPRM Reactor Protection System setpoint which may result in inoperability of the OPRM Technical Specification function. Unit 2 does not have the OPRM system installed and is not affected by this condition. Due to the implementation of Technical Specification required compensatory actions, there is minimal safety significance.

"All Unit 1 OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action I requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. The alternate methods of detection and suppression are currently in place. Activities are in progress to make the necessary adjustments to return the OPRM channels to an operable status."

MISSING 5 MILLICURIE STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE.

The Radiation Safety Officer for Brian LGH Medical Center located at 1300 South 16th Street in Lincoln, NE, noticed at 1030 CST on 11/22/02 that a source was missing from a Novoste Beta Cath System source holder. The source holder holds 16 sources of strontium-90, each source is 5 millicuries, and one of the sources was found missing. A search of the device and of the lab did not find the missing source. The RSO contacted the manufacturer. The last time the Novoste Beta Cath System was used was November 13, 2002.

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During inspection of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) 2VY02A area cooler, missing sheet metal screws were discovered. This could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), a single train safety system, from performing its design function during a seismic event. This also made the Division 3 Diesel Generator inoperable. This is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.

"The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 11/22/02 at 1650 when the system was made inoperable. TS 3.8.1 does not require Division 3 Diesel Generator operability if HPCS is declared inoperable. Preparations to replace the missing sheet metal screws are in progress. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are operable at this time. An extent of condition review will be performed on all divisions for both units."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


* * * UPDATE ON 11/23/02 @ 1333 BY CLARK TO GOULD * * *

"Subsequent to ENS notification EN #39399, repairs were affected to the HPCS area cooler (2VY02A) and the system was returned to operable. An extent of condition inspection was performed on the remaining Unit 1 and Unit 2 divisional area coolers. During these inspections it was discovered that the Unit 1, Division 2 area cooler (1VY03A) was also missing several sheet metal screws. The system was removed from service, repaired and returned to operable. No problems were discovered on either of the two remaining Unit 1 divisional area coolers.

During inspection on Unit 2, the Division 2 area cooler (2VY03A) was missing all of its sheet metal screws. At the time of discovery of the Division 2 inoperability, the HPCS (Division 3) area cooler had already been repaired and declared operable. It was determined however, that at some point both the HPCS (Division 3) and Division 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection subsystems were under these conditions simultaneously. Per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 Bases when this combination of ECCS subsystems are inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside of the design basis.

Investigation of equipment and maintenance history will be performed to determine if any additional periods existed with multiple divisions under these conditions simultaneously. At this time all divisional area coolers on both Units have been inspected. Those with deficiencies have been repaired and declared operable."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Reg 3 RDO (Clayton) was informed.

* * * RETRACTION ON 08/10/03 AT 1556 FROM LARRY R. BLUNK TO ARLON COSTA * * *

"THIS REPORT CONCERNED THE DISCOVERY THAT THE COOLING COIL MOUNTING SCREWS FOR A NUMBER OF DIVISIONAL AREA COOLERS ON BOTH UNITS 1 AND 2 WERE NOT INSTALLED, WHICH COULD HAVE RENDERED THE ASSOCIATED ECCS SYSTEMS INOPERABLE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT.

"STRUCTURAL ANALYSES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED THAT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SUBJECT DIVISIONAL COOLERS WERE OPERABLE WITH THE COOLING COIL MOUNTING SCREWS NOT INSTALLED.

"THIS EVENT IS THEREFORE NOT REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR 50.72 (B)(3)(II) 'DEGRADED OR UNANALYZED CONDITION,' OR 10 CFR 50.72 (B)(3)(V)(D), 'EVENT OR CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT.'

"THE SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED."

Notified the R3DO (Christine Lipa).

NON-CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR PERIOD SETPOINT

"On November 22, 2002, Nine-Mile Point Unit 2 received confirmation from General Electric of a Non-Conservative Analysis of the OPRM Period Setpoint.

"The Non-Conservative Analysis affected the OPRM Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram setpoint. The RPS setpoint could have resulted in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limits during a thermal - hydraulic instability.

"At the time of the notification Nine-Mile Point Unit 2 was in Mode 4 cold shutdown. Upon notification, the OPRM's were immediately declared inoperable.

"On November 22, 2002, the OPRM's were adjusted to satisfy the vendor recommendations and the OPRM's have since been declared operable.

"This report is being made in accordance with Nine-Mile Point Unit 2's Operating License 2.C.2 Technical Specification and Environmental Protection Plan. Nine-Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with Technical Specifications."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN/RECOVERED TROXLER GAUGE

A Troxler Model 3440, S/N 26331, containing 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241:Be, was recovered from an abandoned stolen vehicle in Queens, NY at approximately 1300 EST on 11/27/02 after a police cruiser's radiological pager alerted. The vehicle was stolen from a location on 120th Street between 20th and 21st Ave in Queens and reported to the NY City Police Department on 11/22/02. The NY City Health Department Bureau of Rad Health is storing the gauge in their lab currently and will return it to the licensee after confirming proper ownership. The gauge was found intact with normal radiation readings.

Materials Testing Lab, Inc. is a NY State DOL licensee.

60 - DAY OPTIONAL 10 CFR 50.73 REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF THE RPS SYSTEM

"The following notification is provided by [Entergy Nuclear Operations] ENO regarding Indian Point Unit 2 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip.' This notification is provided in lieu of submitting a written LER for a RPS actuation that was invalid and occurred while the reactor was subcritical.

"On November 22, 2002, at approximately 0943 hours, a reactor trip signal occurred and the reactor trip breakers opened. The plant was in Hot Shutdown Condition following the completion of 2R15 refueling activities with the reactor subcritical (100 cps), and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and pressure at 548 F and 2195 psig, respectively. Control rod testing was in progress with Control Rod Shutdown Bank 'A' withdrawn at two steps. All other control rods were at zero steps.

"An invalid RPS actuation was initiated while in this condition due to ongoing work. At approximately 0930 hours, in preparation for control rod drop testing the reactor trip breakers were closed. At approximately the same time, technicians were in the process of re-terminating previously de-termed RCS narrow range [Resistance Temperature Detector] RTD's. At approximately 0940 hours, Control Rod Shutdown Bank 'A' was withdrawn at two steps to support control rod drop testing. At approximately 0943 hours, technicians landed a lead on loop 1 cold leg RTD, generating an Over Temperature Delta Temperature (OTDT) signal. This resulted in a reactor trip due to a 2/4 channel OTDT trip logic. OTDT channel 2 was previously placed in trip due to nuclear flux power range channel N-42 connected to the reactivity computer in support of low power physics testing. The reactor trip breakers opened, inserting Shutdown Bank 'A' rods. All other rods were already fully inserted. Plant response was as expected. This trip did not cause a primary or secondary transient. Plant recovery was achieved in accordance with existing operating procedures."

Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.