Event Notification Report for October 11, 2002

PART 21 DEFECT/NONCOMPLIANCE IDENTIFIED IN NOT-YET-INSTALLED BATTERY RACKS AT PRAIRIE ISLAND

"In accordance with NSP's purchase order requirements and 10CFR21, I am notifying you that C&D Technologies, Inc. has identified what it believes to be a reportable event.

"On purchase order #534, line item 4, an order was placed for two (2) Single Tier racks Part No RD00-900-16EP3. Subsequent to the fabrication of these racks it was observed that a series of welds which join the horizontal cross beam to the vertical member of the frame were not welded correctly. This may affect the seismic qualification of the rack. Our understanding is that these racks have not been installed. C&D is making arrangements to replace the nonconforming frames prior to the facility's scheduled outage.

"Copies of each of the following referenced drawings were supplied to [the licensee] on 10/10/02; the single tier racks (RD00900- 16 EP3) are covered by the following drawings;

"M121 14 (1) and (2) are page one and two of the same drawing. These are the outline drawings for the rack. Page 1 covers the Bill of Material and shows the RD02008E frame is used in rack assembly.

"Ml 104 is the frame drawing for part number RD02008E. The critical part of the drawing in our discussion is the gusset support labeled Part No. RE-263 1 (Dwg K-7406).

"Drawing M6228 (1) and (2) reflect the welding details for the racks.

"Detail A on page 1 shows the flare bevel groove weld that is carried across the length of the horizontal cross bar as it is welded to the vertical member of the frame. This should be carried the full distance of the intersection.

"Detail J on page 2 shows the addition of the gusset to reinforce the joint. This is placed over the flare bevel groove weld above and then fillet welded in place.

"We have been advised that when our sub-tier supplier, Kim Manufacturing, manufactured the frames, they preassembled and clamped the vertical member, horizontal cross member and gusset in place. They performed a flare bevel groove weld on the exposed portion of the horizontal cross member, and fillet welded the remaining sections of the cross member and the gusset. The portion of the cross member which was hidden behind the gusset was not welded with the flare bevel groove weld as it should have been.

"These racks represented the first two racks manufactured by Kim Manufacturing after transfer of this manufacturing function to Kim from C&D's Conshohocken facility. To ensure that the problem did not predate C&D's relationship with Kim we have interviewed the welder responsible for this function within Conshohocken and determined that he was aware of the requirement for a full flare bevel groove weld prior to the assembly of the gusset plate. The welder reports that this was standard practice in Conshohocken. No other racks will be affected by this defect.

"Kim Manufacturing first notified C&D of the defect in the welds on the afternoon of 10/8/02. After analysis by C&D's engineering department on Wednesday (10/9/02) we determined that we no longer had design traceability to the original seismic qualification of this rack and that this event should be reported. Initial contact was made with NMC Quality Assurance through [a licensee representative] on (10/10/02)."

The affected facility is the NMC Prairie Island Station.

NOTIFICATION TO OFFSITE AGENCIES DUE TO SULFURIC ACID RELEASE IN EXCESS OF LIMITS

"This notification is being made under 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) for an event reportable to another government agency. The EPA National Response Center was notified at 1635, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources at 1645 and the Local Emergency Planning Commission at 1650 on 10/11/2002 of a release of sulfuric acid in excess of the 40CFR302.6 and 40CFR355.40 reportable quantities outside the plant boundary. At 0045 on 10/11/2002 a failure of the sulfuric acid feed system to the cooling tower basin was detected. The failure resulted in the release of 19,000 pounds (1300 gallons) of sulfuric acid outside the plant boundary. At 0050 on 10/11/2002 cooling tower blowdown was isolated and the release terminated, The total duration of the release was 7 hours, 27 minutes."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the event.

FOR-CAUSE TEST FOR ALCOHOL

Contract supervisor while entering the site was given an initial for cause test for alcohol followed by a confirmatory test. Person tested positive for alcohol on the confirmatory test. The person's access was revoked.

Call the Headquarters Operation Officer for further details.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

CHLORINE RELEASE IN TURBINE GENERATOR BUILDING

"At 0925 EDT, a release of chlorine gas was noted from the hypochlorite area, and smell of chlorine gas was noted in the Turbine Generator Building. All personnel were evacuated from the Turbine Generator Building as a precautionary measure, and personnel were dispatched to determine the concentration of chlorine gas.

"All the site of the source, chlorine gas concentration was 3ppm. Per the MSDS, the IDLH limit is 30 ppm. No Emergency Action Levels were entered. Additional samples are being taken in the Turbine Generator building prior to allowing unrestricted access into the area. Both Unit's Control Rooms were placed in the recirculation mode as a precautionary measure as well.

"There were no injuries from this event.

"The leak has been stopped."

The chlorine gas was generated while acid cleaning the hypochlorite lines with muriatic acid. The acid caused the chlorine to come out as a gas. The lines are cleaned periodically to remove the calcium buildup on the lines. The licensee is investigating why chlorine gas was released this time when it was not released when the lines were cleaned in the past. The licensee surmised that they may have used a stronger concentration of muriatic acid this time.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this information call by the licensee.

NOTIFICATION OF MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING DIAGNOSTIC OVERDOSE OF IODINE-131

Research Medical Center reported that they had a diagnostic misadministration that occurred on 10/11/02. The event was reported after it was discovered by an auditor.

The patient was administered 3.6 millicuries of I-131 instead of the prescribed dose of 3.0 millicuries. The iodine was being administered for a whole body scan for thyroid carcinoma.

The patient and referring physician will be notified by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTION ON 11/20/02 AT 1427 EST FROM STEPHEN SLACK TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

Licensee retracted event based on conversation with Region 3 NMSS. Basis for retraction is that patient does not have a thyroid.