Event Notification Report for August 23, 2002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING OVEREXPOSURE OF TWO RADIOGRAPHERS DURING 2001

"Event Report ID No.: LA020009

"Event Date and Time: January 2002

"Event Location: Gonzales Industrial X-ray in Prairieville, LA

"Event Type: Overexposure
"Notifications: The LDEQ received a letter from the facility on August 23, 2002.

"Event Description: Two industrial radiographers received an excessive exposure for the year 2001. [One Radiographer] received a dose of 5181 mrem and [the other] received a dose of 5408 mrem. These two employees utilize Ir-192 for radiography jobs. The procedures have been changed to prevent this type of occurrence. The facility has started a computerized database that will track the exposure levels daily and monthly for each employee."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING OVEREXPOSURE OF RADIOGRAPHY COMPANY EMPLOYEE

"Event Report ID No.: LA020010

"Event Date and Time: June 10, 2002 to July 9, 2002

"Event Location: Gonzales Industrial X-ray in Prairieville, LA

"Event type: Overexposure
"Notifications: The LDEQ received a letter from the facility on August 23, 2002.

"Event description: [An employee] received an overexposure of 20864 mrem from June 10, 2002 to July 9, 2002. In the letter received from Ronald Williams, Sr. (RSO), it was stated that [the employee] had constantly misplaced his Landauer badge and would later find it in the area where they were performing radiography. In another instance [the employee] left his Landauer badge in equipment bag while it was adjacent to the camera. The facility requested an investigation by Landauer to see if the exposure was accurate. Landauer stated that the badge was assessed again and judged to be accurate. [The employee's] daily dosimeter readings were recorded, but never went off scale."

10 CFR 21 REPORT: MAIN STEAM LINE OUT-OF-SERVICE

The following is taken from a facsimile report:

"This letter provides notification of a Reportable Condition under 10CFR 21.21(d) and as an interim report per §21.21.(a)(2) for other plants that may be determined to be affected. The basis for this conclusion is that a 1988 GE Nuclear Energy (GE) analysis for Brunswick Units 1 and 2 full power operation with one Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) Out of Service (OOS) provided to Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) did not adequately address the increased flow induced vibratory loads on the MSIVs to assure they would be able to perform their required safety function which could result in potential offsite exposures in excess of those in 10CFR100.11.

"The GE MSIV OOS analysis evaluated plant operation at 100% power with three active steamlines and one set of MSIVs closed (OOS). The GE analysis did not address the increased steam flow hardware effect of potential long-term flow induced vibration degradation on the MSIVs, including the effect on the MSIV air operated controls. During three steamline operation the steam flow in each line would increase to approximately 133% of normal flow. No vibration measurements (empirical or experimental data) exist for either Brunswick Units during operation up to this increased steam flow level.

"If it is postulated that the plant operated for an extended period in the MSIV OOS condition and then a main steam line break is postulated to occur in one of the three operational steam lines, then there is the potential that neither MSIV would close to terminate the release from a steamline break. Because GE has no analytical or experience basis (no available empirical or experimental data) to support higher main steam line flow rates greater than previously tested, it could be postulated that a common mode failure of both MSIVs, in the broken line, could occur. Alternatively, failure of one MSIV due to the high flow induced vibration and the other MSIV as the design basis single failure, would result in an un-terminated release, which would exceed the existing 10 CFR 100 radiation release limits.

"GE has verbally communicated to CP&L the need for the 75% power limitation when exercising the MSIV OOS flexibility and will follow-up with a written communication.

"GE is reviewing all other MSIV OOS analyses performed by GE for other BWRs and will communicate to any similarly affected utilities, similar corrective actions. GE will notify all affected utilities that GE recommends operation at the 75% power level when operating with one MSIV 005, unless there is sufficient test data to support operation at a higher power level. This effort will be completed by September 30, 2002."