Event Notification Report for August 20, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/19/2002 - 08/20/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39135 39136
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39135 |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM WILSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/19/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE 1MS-5959 MAY NOT CLOSE AGAINST FULL STEAM |
| GENERATOR PRESSURE. |
| |
| |
| "A draft calculation (01109-C-015) and a review of this calculation |
| concluded that 1MS-5959 would not shut against the maximum differential |
| pressure (dp) assumed within the calculation. The actual dp used for the |
| calculation review is based on the SG atmospheric dump valve set point of |
| 1085 psig. This is the SG pressure assumed for aux feed flow requirements |
| to the SGs. At this dp (1085 psig), 1MS-5959 blow down isolation valve |
| would not shut (1MS-5959 HX-1A SG-Blow down isolation ). All other (3) |
| steam generator blowdown valves would shut against this d/p. |
| |
| "The blowdown isolation valves are required to isolate to support two |
| functions; 1) containment isolation and , 2) steam generator pressure |
| boundary isolation. The containment isolation function is a class 4 |
| containment penetration (FSAR page 5.2-3), which is a normally operating |
| line connected to a closed system inside of containment, provided with at |
| least one manual valve located outside of containment, and missile protected |
| throughout its length. FSAR Figure 5.2-51-2 lists manual valve 1MS-265 as |
| the containment isolation valve, but also lists 1MS-5959 as an isolation |
| valve inside of containment. Although 1MS-5959 may not be able to close at |
| full SG pressure, it is expected to be able to close at the maximum |
| containment design pressure (60 psig), which may occur if a SG is faulted. |
| Since the requirement for class 4 penetration is still met by using 1MS-265, |
| and 1MS-5959 would still function under the conditions of a faulted SG, the |
| containment isolation function of 1MS-5959 is considered to be operable. |
| |
| "The function to establish the SG pressure boundary is based on the |
| requirements of the Chapter 14 accident analysis for the Loss of Normal |
| Feedwater (LONF, Section 14.1.10) and the Loss of All AC Power to the |
| Station Auxiliaries (LOAC, Section 14.1.11). The accident analyses credit |
| 200 gpm AFW flow delivered to the SGs after a five minute delay. The |
| acceptance criteria for both accidents is that the pressurizer does not |
| overfill. Overfilling of the pressurizer could result in a small break LOCA |
| due to the assumed failure of a pressurizer safety valve or PORV when |
| passing liquid. If the SG blowdown valve cannot perform its isolation, then |
| an undetermined (although significant) portion of the AFW will be diverted |
| from flowing around the u-tube region. Heat removal assumed in the analysis |
| will not meet the minimum credited in the accident analysis based on a full |
| 200 gpm AFW flow. |
| |
| "1MS-5959 was shut based on engineering judgement and declared inoperable at |
| 1415, 08/16/02. The valve operator on 1MS-5959 was adjusted per routine |
| maintenance procedure (RMP) 9141, Air operated valve testing and adjustment, |
| such that the valve would shut under the analyzed conditions. 1MS-5959 was |
| declared operable at 1925 08/16/02." |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| **UPDATE CHUCK KRAUSE TO MIKE NORRIS 1409 EDT 8/19/02** |
| |
| Update to make corrections to initial report. Referenced FSAR figure |
| 5.2-51-2 should be FSAR figure 5.2-50-1, and manual valve 1MS-265 should be |
| 1MS-266. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (Lanksbury). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39136 |
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| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/19/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:36[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 08/19/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:32[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ELI DRAGOMER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/19/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| REACTOR BUILDING EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION UNIT COOLER ANOMALY IDENTIFIED |
| DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST |
| |
| "On August 19, 2002 at 0232, Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit |
| Cooler, 2HVR*413A, was declared inoperable due to Reactor Building Emergency |
| Recirculation Unit Cooler Inlet Damper, 2HVR*AOD6A, not reaching its full |
| open position during testing. Failure of 2HVR*AOD6A to fully open may affect |
| the flow-rate through the Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit |
| Cooler and may prevent the Standby Gas Treatment System from performing its |
| Post-LOCA Secondary Containment drawdown function. The manual operating |
| mechanism was returned to its withdrawn position and 2HVR*AOD6A was verified |
| to be capable of being fully opened. Opposite train components were |
| inspected to confirm that a similar condition does not exist on Train "B". |
| This notification is being made as a conservative measure. Evaluation |
| coritinues into the actual affect on Post-LOCA drawdown function." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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