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Event Notification Report for August 20, 2002


                        
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/19/2002 - 08/20/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39135  39136  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39135       |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM WILSON                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE 1MS-5959 MAY NOT CLOSE AGAINST FULL STEAM     |
| GENERATOR PRESSURE.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "A draft calculation (01109-C-015) and a review of this calculation          |
| concluded that 1MS-5959 would not shut against the maximum differential      |
| pressure (dp) assumed within the calculation.  The actual dp used for the    |
| calculation review is based on the SG atmospheric dump valve set point of    |
| 1085 psig.  This is the SG pressure assumed for aux feed flow requirements   |
| to the SGs.  At this dp (1085 psig), 1MS-5959 blow down isolation valve      |
| would not shut (1MS-5959 HX-1A SG-Blow down isolation ).  All other (3)      |
| steam generator blowdown valves would shut against this d/p.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The blowdown isolation valves are required to isolate to support two        |
| functions; 1) containment isolation and , 2) steam generator pressure        |
| boundary isolation.  The containment isolation function is a class 4         |
| containment penetration (FSAR page 5.2-3), which is a normally operating     |
| line connected to a closed system inside of containment, provided with at    |
| least one manual valve located outside of containment, and missile protected |
| throughout its length.  FSAR Figure 5.2-51-2 lists manual valve 1MS-265 as   |
| the containment isolation valve, but also lists 1MS-5959 as an isolation     |
| valve inside of containment.  Although 1MS-5959 may not be able to close at  |
| full SG pressure, it is expected to be able to close at the maximum          |
| containment design pressure (60 psig), which may occur if a SG is faulted.   |
| Since the requirement for class 4 penetration is still met by using 1MS-265, |
| and 1MS-5959 would still function under the conditions of a faulted SG, the  |
| containment isolation function of 1MS-5959  is considered to be operable.    |
|                                                                              |
| "The function to establish the SG pressure boundary is based on the          |
| requirements of the Chapter 14 accident analysis for the Loss of Normal      |
| Feedwater (LONF, Section 14.1.10) and the Loss of All AC Power to the        |
| Station Auxiliaries (LOAC, Section 14.1.11).  The accident analyses credit   |
| 200 gpm AFW flow delivered to the SGs after a five minute delay.  The        |
| acceptance criteria for both accidents is that the pressurizer does not      |
| overfill.  Overfilling of the pressurizer could result in a small break LOCA |
| due to the assumed failure of a pressurizer safety valve or PORV when        |
| passing liquid.  If the SG blowdown valve cannot perform its isolation, then |
| an undetermined (although significant) portion of the AFW will be diverted   |
| from flowing around the u-tube region.  Heat removal assumed in the analysis |
| will not meet the minimum credited in the accident analysis based on a full  |
| 200 gpm AFW flow.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "1MS-5959 was shut based on engineering judgement and declared inoperable at |
| 1415, 08/16/02.  The valve operator on 1MS-5959 was adjusted per routine     |
| maintenance procedure (RMP) 9141, Air operated valve testing and adjustment, |
| such that the valve would shut under the analyzed conditions.  1MS-5959 was  |
| declared operable at 1925 08/16/02."                                         |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| **UPDATE CHUCK KRAUSE TO MIKE NORRIS 1409 EDT 8/19/02**                      |
|                                                                              |
| Update to make corrections to initial report.  Referenced FSAR figure        |
| 5.2-51-2 should be FSAR figure 5.2-50-1, and manual valve 1MS-265 should be  |
| 1MS-266.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (Lanksbury).                                                   |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39136       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/19/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:36[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        08/19/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:32[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ELI DRAGOMER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CLIFFORD ANDERSON    R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| REACTOR BUILDING EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION UNIT COOLER ANOMALY IDENTIFIED      |
| DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "On August 19, 2002 at 0232, Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit   |
| Cooler, 2HVR*413A, was declared inoperable due to Reactor Building Emergency |
| Recirculation Unit Cooler Inlet Damper, 2HVR*AOD6A, not reaching its full    |
| open position during testing. Failure of 2HVR*AOD6A to fully open may affect |
| the flow-rate through the Reactor Building Emergency Recirculation Unit      |
| Cooler and may prevent the Standby Gas Treatment System from performing its  |
| Post-LOCA Secondary Containment drawdown function. The manual operating      |
| mechanism was returned to its withdrawn position and 2HVR*AOD6A was verified |
| to be capable of being fully opened. Opposite train components were          |
| inspected to confirm that a similar condition does not exist on Train "B".   |
| This notification is being made as a conservative measure. Evaluation        |
| coritinues into the actual affect on Post-LOCA drawdown function."           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
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