Event Notification Report for August 20, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/19/2002 - 08/20/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39139
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN A. HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN A. HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 08/20/2002
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2002
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN
"On August 20, 2002, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could cause the loss of both Centrifugal Charging Pumps (CCP) capability to successfully inject borated water to the reactor and to keep the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals cool. Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100% power.
"During reviews associated with post fire safe shutdown reanalysis work, Wolf Creek personnel discovered that power and control cables for both CCP train minimum flow valves, both train CCP discharge valves to the RCP seals, and both train CCP suction valves from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) are routed in electrical raceways in the same fire area with intervening combustibles between the two redundant trains. This does not meet our commitments to 10CFR50 Appendix R.lll.G as reflected in our approved Fire Protection Plan.
"Following a fire In the plant that requires a plant shutdown, the function of the CCP is to inject borated water into the reactor to maintain reactor water inventory, maintain shutdown reactivity margin, and to maintain a cooling water flow to the RCP seals to prevent damage to the seals. A fire in this fire area has the potential to cause the above-mentioned valves to not function properly and cause a loss of the capability to borate, maintain inventory, and to cool the RCP seals.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.
"The licensee has previously implemented a 1-hour fire watch in this fire area."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On August 20, 2002, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could cause the loss of both Centrifugal Charging Pumps (CCP) capability to successfully inject borated water to the reactor and to keep the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals cool. Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100% power.
"During reviews associated with post fire safe shutdown reanalysis work, Wolf Creek personnel discovered that power and control cables for both CCP train minimum flow valves, both train CCP discharge valves to the RCP seals, and both train CCP suction valves from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) are routed in electrical raceways in the same fire area with intervening combustibles between the two redundant trains. This does not meet our commitments to 10CFR50 Appendix R.lll.G as reflected in our approved Fire Protection Plan.
"Following a fire In the plant that requires a plant shutdown, the function of the CCP is to inject borated water into the reactor to maintain reactor water inventory, maintain shutdown reactivity margin, and to maintain a cooling water flow to the RCP seals to prevent damage to the seals. A fire in this fire area has the potential to cause the above-mentioned valves to not function properly and cause a loss of the capability to borate, maintain inventory, and to cool the RCP seals.
"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.
"The licensee has previously implemented a 1-hour fire watch in this fire area."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Hospital
Event Number: 39143
Rep Org: VA NATIONAL HEALTH PHYSICS PRGM
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: NORTH PORT State: NY
County:
License #: 31-13511-05
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: NORTH PORT State: NY
County:
License #: 31-13511-05
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/22/2002
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2002
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION 30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION 30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
REPORT OF POSSIBLE MISADMINISTRATION AND/OR SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
On 8/20/02 a patient was being prepared for treatment in a Co-60 teletherapy unit by two technicians when the beam turned on with no operator action. The beam was on for about 50 seconds. The event is being investigated and the unit has been placed out-of-service. It is unknown at this time whether the patient was in position or not and received an exposure to the right or wrong site. The investigation will determine if there was an actual misadministration, exposure to the wrong area. The two technicians' dosimeters were processed and the results showed no exposure in excess of limits, actual reading was 20 millirem for both badges.
The licensee will update this report when more information is determined.
On 8/20/02 a patient was being prepared for treatment in a Co-60 teletherapy unit by two technicians when the beam turned on with no operator action. The beam was on for about 50 seconds. The event is being investigated and the unit has been placed out-of-service. It is unknown at this time whether the patient was in position or not and received an exposure to the right or wrong site. The investigation will determine if there was an actual misadministration, exposure to the wrong area. The two technicians' dosimeters were processed and the results showed no exposure in excess of limits, actual reading was 20 millirem for both badges.
The licensee will update this report when more information is determined.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39158
Rep Org: LANCASTER LABS
Licensee: LANCASTER LABS
Region: 1
City: LANCASTER State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARA PILON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: LANCASTER LABS
Region: 1
City: LANCASTER State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARA PILON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/29/2002
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2002
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
LOSS OF FOUR (4) GENERALLY LICENSED ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTORS EACH CONTAINING 15 MILLICURIES OF NICKEL-63.
On August 20, 2002 Lancaster Labs discovered that they were missing four (4) Electron Capture Detectors. Each detector contained 15 millicuries of Nickel-63. These electron capture detectors are used in gas chromatograph to measure environmental samples. Three of the electron capture detectors were manufactured by Varian and the fourth on was manufactured by Agilent Technologies. The serial number of the three electron capture detectors manufactured by Varian are A4076, A6796, & A4789. The serial number for the electron capture detector manufactured by Agilent Technologies is F2355. F2355, A4076 and A6796 were last accounted for in the year 1999. A4789 was last accounted for in the year 2000. Lancaster Labs believes that they may have accidentally sold them. Lancaster Labs occasionally sells their used equipment. NRC Region 1, Kathy Modes, was notified of this event by Lancaster Labs.
On August 20, 2002 Lancaster Labs discovered that they were missing four (4) Electron Capture Detectors. Each detector contained 15 millicuries of Nickel-63. These electron capture detectors are used in gas chromatograph to measure environmental samples. Three of the electron capture detectors were manufactured by Varian and the fourth on was manufactured by Agilent Technologies. The serial number of the three electron capture detectors manufactured by Varian are A4076, A6796, & A4789. The serial number for the electron capture detector manufactured by Agilent Technologies is F2355. F2355, A4076 and A6796 were last accounted for in the year 1999. A4789 was last accounted for in the year 2000. Lancaster Labs believes that they may have accidentally sold them. Lancaster Labs occasionally sells their used equipment. NRC Region 1, Kathy Modes, was notified of this event by Lancaster Labs.