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Event Notification Report for July 12, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/11/2002 - 07/12/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39046  39049  39051  39053  
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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39046       |
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| REP ORG:  MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/08/2002|
|LICENSEE:  PERKIT FOLDING BOX CORP              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:27[EDT]|
|    CITY:  BOSTON                   REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        06/19/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/08/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRIAN MCDERMOTT      R1      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KENATH TRAEDGE               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| MISSING THICKNESS MEASURING GAUGE                                            |
|                                                                              |
| On 07/08/02 Mayo Construction company notified  the Massachusetts Radiation  |
| Control Program that a 50 millicurie Sr-90 thickness paper measuring gauge   |
| has been missing since April/May of this year.  It is believed that it was   |
| sent out as scrap metal to the Prolerized New England scrapyard which is     |
| located in Everett, MA.   Mayo Construction company recently acquired Perkit |
| Folding Box Corp, which had the general license for the missing gauge and    |
| they were unaware of the thickness measuring gauge.  The gauge manufacturer  |
| is Fife\DMC\Radiometry of Gaithersburg, Md.  The source was manufactured by  |
| Amersham.  The source was installed in a C-ARM type gauge in 1991 by         |
| TechControl of Mountain City, Georgia.  The gauge is contained in a black    |
| box measuring 4"x11"x11" and it is labeled on the outside as containing      |
| radioactive material. The serial number on the gauge is 2412BC.   Radiation  |
| levels on the outside of the gauge with its shutter closed is 40 to 50       |
| milliRad/hr.  Prolerized New England scrapyard has been notified and the     |
| licensee is still searching for the missing gauge.                           |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39049       |
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| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:26[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        07/09/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:04[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KOTTENSTETTE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       94       Power Operation  |94       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE DILUTION NITROGEN INVENTORY NOT MEETING TS        
   |
| REQUIREMENTS                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During routine daily instrument checks on July 9, 2002, the control room     |
| operator found the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) Nitrogen inventory  |
| just above the Technical Specification required inventory line of 67,000 scf |
| (2150 psig and 90F).  The previous day instrument check had the CAD         |
| nitrogen inventory at 2250 psig and 94F (approximately 69,000 scf).         |
|                                                                              |
| An operator was dispatched to the CAD compressor building to raise nitrogen  |
| pressure by operating the CAD compressor. As the in-plant operator was       |
| starting the CAD compressor, the control room operator again checked the     |
| pressure and temperature of the CAD storage bottles and found that it fell   |
| just below the require 67,000 scf line (2110 psig and 84F).  The startup of |
| the CAD compressor requires the draining of the suction receiver and opening |
| of the suction and discharge valves.  This process consumed enough nitrogen  |
| inventory to go below the Technical Specification value of 67,000 scf.       |
|                                                                              |
| At 2304, the CAD system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification  |
| 3.6.3.1. A and a seven day LCO entered. The CAD compressor was operated to   |
| restore CAD nitrogen volume and the CAD LCO was exited at 2330 when CAD      |
| inventory was greater than the required Technical Specification of 67,000    |
| scf.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| During subsequent investigation, it had been determined that surveillance NS |
| 730301, Functional Check and Calibration of Containment Atmosphere Dilution  |
| System had been performed during the dayshift on July 9, 2002.  During this  |
| surveillance, it performs a functional check of the CAD system by performing |
| a flow of nitrogen from the CAD bottles through a test rig thus using a      |
| portion of the CAD nitrogen inventory.   At the completion of the            |
| surveillance, the check of the CAD nitrogen inventory was just above the     |
| Technical Specification line.  The surveillance was completed at 1404 and at |
| that time no action was undertaken to restore margin to the CAD nitrogen     |
| inventory Technical Specification requirement.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident Inspector was notified                                      |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39051       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:41[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MACLENNAN                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       82       Power Operation  |80       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| INITIATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM 82% AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.0.3         |
|                                                                              |
| It was determined that reasonable assurance of continued operability of      |
| Safety System Components associated with Unit 2 steam lines could not be     |
| supported.  They had noticed perturbations since the beginning of June       |
| indicating a problem with their steam separators.  They have since had an    |
| operability and loose parts evaluation for this and recently experienced     |
| another perturbation that's calling into question the loose parts            |
| evaluations.  Therefore, the licensee is assuming that there may be a loose  |
| parts problem, so they have commenced plant shutdown at 0241 and are to be   |
| in hot shutdown in 12 hrs and cold shutdown in 36 hrs.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39053       |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        07/11/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHILIP J. NORTH              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ANNE BOLAND          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| DISCOVERY THAT THE ALTERNATE POST-LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA)
BORATION   |
| DILUTION FLOW PATH FOR ALL UNITS IS OPENED IF THE PRIMARY PATH FAILS         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Event:  At 1800 hours on 7/11/02, a review of the small break LOCA          |
| mitigation section of the [emergency operating procedure (EOP)] determined   |
| that the alternate post-LOCA boron dilution flow path for all units is       |
| opened if the primary path fails.  This alternate flow path was designed to  |
| be opened during a large break LOCA.  Current analyses do not exist to       |
| support opening the flow path under elevated [reactor coolant system]        |
| pressures.  With this being the case, execution of the EOP during a [small   |
| break LOCA] could open the alternate flow path under conditions that may     |
| potentially degrade portions of the [low pressure injection (LPI)] system    |
| (e.g. [reactor building emergency sump] screen, LPI pump).  Since analyses   |
| do not exist to support operation of the flow path under elevated pressures, |
| this condition is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)v."  |
|                                                                              |
| "Initial Safety Significance:  The potential safety significance of this     |
| issue is that opening the alternate boron dilution flow path under elevated  |
| pressures could adversely impact the reactor building emergency sump.  This  |
| flow path would only be opened following a single failure of the primary     |
| path.  Oconee is conservatively reporting this condition.  Analyses are      |
| being performed to determine whether the EOP guidance related to opening     |
| this flow path could have impaired sump recirculation."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Corrective Action(s):  Guidance has been provided to the operating shifts   |
| to not open the alternate flow path.  An EOP change will be expeditiously    |
| made to resolve this procedural issue."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
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