Event Notification Report for June 6, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/05/2002 - 06/06/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38956 38965 38966 38967
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38956 |
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| REP ORG: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE:
05/31/2002|
|LICENSEE: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:28[EDT]|
| CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/30/2002|
| COUNTY: HOOD RIVER STATE: OR |EVENT TIME: 14:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SANBORN R4 |
| |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN SIEBERT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF LICENSED NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN HELICOPTER ACCIDENT |
| |
| An Air Force Pave Hawk Helicopter crashed approximately 800 feet from the |
| summit of Mount Hood. Each of the 4 rotors contains a 500 microcurie Sr-90 |
| source. More information will follow as it becomes available. |
| |
| The State will be contacting R4. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38965 |
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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE:
06/05/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:10[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2002|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 10:45[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2002|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: B. W. WALLACE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE -- FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
|
| INVOLVING MATERIAL TRANSFER INTO THE ERBIA MODCON AREA WITHOUT
MOISTURE |
| RESULTS (24-Hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Facility |
| Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, |
| Columbia SC, low enriched ([<=]5.0 wt. % U-235) PWR fuel fabricator for |
| commercial light water reactors. |
| License: SNM-1107." |
| |
| "Time and Date of Event |
| Approximately 10:45 hours, Wednesday, June 5, 2002." |
| |
| "Reason for Notification |
| Thirteen packs of oxidized U3O8 were improperly transferred into the Erbia |
| Modcon area without proper moisture analysis results." |
| |
| "Summary of Process |
| UO2 powder is oxidized to U3O8 to be used as addback in powder blends. |
| After staying in an oven at a high temperature for over one hour, the |
| material is screened and put into polypaks. Each pack is sampled for |
| moisture and stored pending results of the moisture analysis. Then the |
| material is bar code scanned and transferred into the Modcon area using a |
| polypak elevator interlocked with the moisture analysis results." |
| |
| "As-Found Condition |
| A summary of the as-found conditions is as follows: |
| * Thirteen packs of material were found to have been taken into the Modcon |
| area via a freight elevator, bypassing the bar code scanning interlock. The |
| packs did not have moisture analysis results completed and posted. |
| * The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear |
| Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified. |
| * The material in question was oxidized U3O8, visually dry." |
| |
| "Double Contingency Protection |
| Double contingency protection for the erbia blender and bulk containers is |
| based on moderation control, that is, (1) prevent greater than 20.48 liters |
| of water equivalent from becoming available to the mixer or container, and |
| (2) prevent 20.48 liters of water equivalent from entering the mixer or |
| container. It was determined that double contingency protection was |
| bypassed because, for the 13 packs involved, there were no effective |
| controls to prevent material with undocumented moisture from being brought |
| into the Modcon area. It is also noted that at no time was greater than the |
| safety limit of moderator involved. Therefore, the incident requires |
| 24-hour notification in accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM- |
| 1107), paragraph 3.7.3(c.5)." |
| |
| "Summary of Activity |
| * The packs were immediately removed from the area, and the Nuclear |
| Criticality Safety (NCS) function was immediately notified. |
| * The Erbia Process Engineer stopped all erbia powder blending |
| operations." |
| |
| "Conclusions |
| * There was a loss of double contingency protection. |
| * At no time was greater than a safe limit of moderator involved. |
| * At no time was criticality possible. |
| * At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or |
| member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| * The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety |
| significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal |
| analysis will be performed." |
| |
| The licensee reported that the information provided via facsimile (and |
| quoted above) does NOT contain sensitive information. |
| |
| The licensee notified an onsite NRC Region 2 inspector (Bill Gloersen) and |
| plans to notify the NRC Region 2 office (Manuel Crespo) and NMSS (Dennis |
| Morey). |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38966 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:18[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/04/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:20[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: B. W. WALLACE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE -- FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
|
| INVOLVING TWO CONTROLS ON THE MASS PARAMETER (24-Hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "A container of improperly exempted uranium hexafluoride compressor parts |
| was discovered in the C-333 process building which had not been |
| characterized for storage as a group, in violation of the governing Nuclear |
| Criticality Safety Approval NCSA GEN-010. NCSA GEN-010 requires individual |
| items to be either spaced or grouped. Grouping is allowed if mass |
| requirements are met. These items were not identified as GEN-010 items and |
| had been stored as an unanalyzed group. The purpose of the GEN-010 |
| requirement is to ensure that only safe mass items/groups are handled." |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| |
| "PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-02-2713; PGDP Event Report No. |
| PAD-2002-017, Event Worksheet 38966" |
| |
| "Responsible Division: Engineering" |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:" |
| |
| "Double contingency was not maintained because the independent determination |
| of mass had not been performed. The independent determination of mass has |
| since been performed and [was] found to be less than the maximum safe |
| mass." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:" |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would |
| need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):" |
| |
| "The controlled parameter is mass." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):" |
| |
| "A non-destructive analysis was conducted and determined the mass of U235 in |
| the parts was less than 91 grams; the always-safe mass at the assay involved |
| is [ ] grams of U235." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:" |
| |
| "Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on the mass |
| parameter." |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on determining the mass of the |
| group. The mass was not determined during the legacy characterization |
| process. Therefore, the control was violated." |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on independently determining |
| the mass of the group. The mass was not determined during the legacy |
| characterization process; therefore, the control was violated. Since there |
| are two controls on one parameter, the mass parameter was not maintained and |
| double contingency was not maintained." |
| |
| "Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double |
| contingency was not maintained." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
|
| IMPLEMENTED:" |
| |
| "Use the independent NDA results in conjunction with approved plant |
| procedures to establish and post these items as a GEN-010 group." |
| |
| Paducah personnel reported that the information provided via facsimile (and |
| quoted above) does NOT contain sensitive information. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38967 |
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| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/06/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DUANE COBB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/06/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT |JAMES CREED R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |STUART RICHARDS NRR |
|AAEC 50.72(a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |JOSEPH HOLONICH IRO |
| |DEPUY FEMA |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNIT 1 DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO RCS LEAKAGE > 25 GPM DURING
|
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING |
| |
| "D.C. Cook Unit One declares entry and exit of an Unusual Event due to |
| Reactor Coolant System leakage of greater than 25 gallons per minute. On |
| June 5 @ 23:00 while performing an 18 month surveillance [1-IHP-4030-102-017 |
| 'Pressurizer PORV/Actuation Channel Calibration with Valve Operation'] on |
| the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) an unblocked PORV |
| lifted and discharged to the Pressure Relief Tank (PRT) for approximately 15 |
| seconds. This lifting discharged approximately 100 gallons to the PRT. The |
| Initiating Condition for this Unusual Event is Reactor Coolant System |
| leakage greater than 25 gallons per minute. |
| |
| "The plant is and was in Mode 4. Conditions remain stable after manual |
| isolation of the PORV with the Control Switch of the Block Valve by the |
| assisting Reactor Operator." |
| |
| The licensee attributed this occurrence to the recently revised procedure |
| identified above which did not address blocking the other PORVs during |
| testing. The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC |
| Resident Inspector. |
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