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Event Notification Report for March 13, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/12/2002 - 03/13/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38761  38762  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38761       |
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| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CECIL WILLIAMS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANALYZED CONDITION - SI MINIFLOW LINE VALVE INTERLOCK MIS-WIRED            |
|                                                                              |
| "In the analysis for certain design bases accidents, credit is taken for a   |
| recirculation mode of operation that ensures continued cooling to the        |
| reactor core following an injection mode. During the current Unit 1          |
| refueling outage, it was found that a safety injection (SI) miniflow line    |
| valve (1HV-8813) interlock was mis-wired. The interlock wiring should have   |
| allowed a second valve (1HV-8804B) to be opened during switchover from       |
| injection mode to recirculation mode once 1HV-8813 has been closed but would |
| not. This wiring error was subsequently corrected. 1HV-8804B is opened to    |
| provide a suction source from the discharge of the Train B residual heat     |
| removal (RHR) pump to the suction of the SI pumps. 1HV-8804B must open for   |
| recirculation to begin if the opposite train is unavailable. A review has    |
| found that this mis-wiring has existed since at least 1996.                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on preliminary evaluation, on 3-12-2002, at 0830 EST, we concluded    |
| that this may represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades  |
| plant safety and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). Further       |
| evaluation is being performed to determine the significance of the           |
| mis-wiring."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident was notified by the licensee.                               |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38762       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:51[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS JESSESSKY             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANALYZED CONDITION, APPENDIX R VALVE UNABLE TO SATISFY DESIGN
FUNCTION     |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1430 on 3/12/02, an Appendix R credited valve was determined to be       |
| unable to satisfy its design function of providing a flow path from the      |
| Charging System to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The credited flow path  |
| is necessary to control RCS inventory and maintain the plant in Mode 3 (Hot  |
| Standby) during an Appendix R fire. The flow path is also utilized           |
| procedurally in controlling RCS inventory while the RCS is cooled down and   |
| depressurized from Mode 3 (Hot Standby) to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).           |
|                                                                              |
| "This issue places the plant in an unanalyzed condition and thus is          |
| reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The specific valve is 1/2CV-1296 Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve.   |
| The valve's design function is to open on a differential pressure of 200     |
| psid (with or without instrument air) between the discharge of the charging  |
| pumps and the RCS. This line is not utilized during normal operations but is |
| an available charging path to the RCS and utilized during plant shutdown in  |
| the event of an Appendix R fire. The valve is an air operated valve that is  |
| assumed to have failed close due to a loss of instrument air. It has been    |
| found that the valve will not open until a much higher differential pressure |
| is reached. If the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psig), and the  |
| actual lift pressure of the valve is greater than 500 psid, charging flow    |
| will be unavailable to the RCS. A relief on the discharge of the outlet of   |
| the charging pump will lift at 2735 and prevent flow to the RCS. The         |
| charging pump maximum discharge pressure is 3000 psig.                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Compensatory actions have been undertaken that establish plantwide fire     |
| rounds. Fire rounds will be continued until the condition is corrected or a  |
| suitable evaluation is completed that establishes other actions."            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident.                                      |
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