Event Notification Report for February 22, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/21/2002 - 02/22/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38428 38617 38663 38667 38704 38713 38714 38715
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38428 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: T. E. WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit |
| of fissile material. There is no NCSE/A which covers operation, |
| maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment. |
| |
| The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has |
| been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U). Assay |
| smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately |
| 1.6%. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: |
| |
| For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not |
| sufficient to support a criticality. However, no NCSA controls have been |
| established to address this fissile material operation. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a |
| criticality to occur in the pipe. Additionally, the pipe located |
| approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have |
| spacing violations. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled |
| parameter. |
| |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| 61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot |
| stack was placed into service in the early 1980s. The 70-foot stack was |
| last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe. The 70-foot stack has not been |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system. Control |
| the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information is provided as an update: |
| |
| "Further walk downs identified exhaust oil filters (located near the C-335 |
| Seal Exhaust/Wet Air Station) as potentially fissile material operation |
| without an approved NCS evaluation. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: The oil filters are of favorable |
| geometry for the plant maximum assay at the time the filters were cut from |
| the seal exhaust system. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: The oil filters are separated from the seal |
| exhaust system by air gaps. The use of the filters had been discontinued, |
| therefore there is no potential for fissile material to be added to the |
| filters. In order for a criticality to be possible, a spacing violation |
| would have to occur. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The amount of material in the oil |
| filters is unknown at this time but activity levels in the filters indicates |
| less than a safe mass. Further analysis will be performed in accordance |
| with the approved remediation plan. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The seal exhaust oil filters have not been |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| The filters will be characterized in accordance with NCS guidance, which |
| will be provided in a remediation guide." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen and NMSS(Brach). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38617 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2002|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/08/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:05[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID COSEO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SLOW RESPONSE TIME DURING A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI)
PUMP TIME |
| RESPONSE SURVEILLANCE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 01/08/02 at 1305 hrs, while performing a HPCI pump time response |
| surveillance, the HPCI pump achieved rated pressure and flow in 31.5 |
| seconds. This exceeded the acceptance criteria of <29 seconds. HPCI was |
| declared inoperable due to this surveillance failure. Plant personnel are |
| evaluating the data to determine the cause of the failure. All other |
| [emergency core cooling system (ECCS)] equipment and [reactor core isolation |
| cooling (RCIC)] are operable. This is being reported under |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1235EST ON 2/21/02 FROM PATRICK FALLON TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: |
| |
| "Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the apparent slow HPCI |
| response time obtained on 1/8/02 is not reportable. No specific equipment |
| degradations or system malfunctions were identified that could have led to |
| the delay in the system response time obtained on 1/8/02. Following |
| additional testing and discussions with an outside equipment expert it was |
| concluded that the HPCI system response time is a function of the time that |
| the HPCI combined hydraulic and lubricating oil system has been in standby. |
| Specifically, the time for the ramp generator to start, allowing steam |
| admission to the turbine, is dependent on oil system pressurization, and is |
| a function of the time that the oil system has been in standby. This is due |
| to oil system drain down during system inactivity, the bulk of which occurs |
| in the first few days. |
| |
| "The response time of 31.5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 followed approximately |
| 41 days of oil system inactivity. Subsequent runs on 1/10/02 and 1/12/02 |
| resulted in response times of 25.7 and 24.7 seconds, respectively. The |
| period of oil system inactivity prior to these two runs was very short, |
| resulting in quicker oil system pressurization, and thus a shorter delay in |
| the start of the ramp generator. |
| |
| "Although the acceptance criteria for this test specified in the Technical |
| Requirements Manual (TRM) and in plant procedures was 29 seconds, the |
| analyzed limit for HPCI injection to the vessel is actually 60 seconds. |
| Thus, the response time of 31 .5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 was well within |
| the analyzed limit (60 seconds), less an allowance for instrument and sensor |
| response time (5 second). Therefore, the high pressure injection safety |
| function was maintained and this event is not reportable. Consequently, this |
| notification is being retracted. " |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38663 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/31/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:30[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/30/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEGACY ISSUE |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| "AT 1313 CST, on 1-30-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| of uncharacterized legacy process equipment which was not stored in |
| accordance with an approved Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA). The |
| mass of fissile material was less than a safe mass and at an assay of less |
| than 2.0 Wt. %. This is in violation of the NCS program requirements of |
| SAR, Section 5.2 which requires fissile material operations to be controlled |
| by approved NCSA's. |
| |
| "The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the |
| failure to maintain double contingency controls. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "This material is in a stable condition and double contingency has been |
| established using approved procedures. Once the material was characterized, |
| it was determined that proper spacing had been maintained. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "In order for criticality to be possible more than a critical mass would |
| need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. The storage containers are |
| safe by geometry and the fissile material is less than a safe mass. |
| Therefore, it is not possible for this barrier material to result in a |
| criticality accident. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| "Mass |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "Less than 10 pounds at an enrichment of less than 2.0 Wt. % |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "Since no NCS controls were applied to the material, double contingency |
| cannot be demonstrated. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "The material is controlled in accordance with procedure CP-2-TS-TS2030. |
| The material has been characterized." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information is provided as an update: |
| |
| "After discovery, further characterization of the material was performed. |
| Independent assay smears and direct surveys by health physics personnel |
| confirmed that several pieces of the material were <1% assay and not |
| fissile. The remaining material was weighed, on a NMC&A balance, and found |
| to have a total mass of <15 grams U-235. Therefore, this material stored in |
| this room of C-710 does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Further analysis revealed this material |
| does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further |
| actions are required. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Further analysis revealed that less |
| than 15 grams of total mass of U-235 were involved. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Further analysis revealed this material |
| does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a |
| fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Notified R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS(Brach). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38667 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/04/2002|
|LICENSEE: KCCS, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EST]|
| CITY: LAUDERDALE LAKES REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 02/03/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 09:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 3087-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLES ADAMS (fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING GAUGES STOLEN FROM KCCS, INC., IN
|
| KISSIMMEE, FLORIDA |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the state: |
| |
| "Abnormal Occurrence: No" |
| |
| "Followup Report: No" |
| |
| "Allegation: No" |
| |
| "Incident Date: 03-Feb-02" |
| |
| "Licensee or Owner: KCCS, Inc." |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "City, State, and Zip Code: Lauderdale Lakes, FL 33319" |
| |
| "License #: 3087-1" |
| |
| "License Type, Category: Specific, 3L(1)" |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "Isotope(s): Cs-137, Am-241" |
| |
| "Activity(s): CPN 10/50 each, Troxler 9/44" |
| |
| "Material Form; Chemical Form; physical Form: Solid, Special Form, |
| By-product" |
| |
| "Probable Disposition of Material: Unknown" |
| |
| "Exposure? No" |
| |
| "Number: N/A" |
| |
| "Type of Individual(s): N/A" |
| |
| "Exposure Source: N/A" |
| |
| "Dose Delivered to: N/A" |
| |
| "Maximum Dose Received: N/A" |
| |
| "Incident Category: Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen |
| Materials" |
| |
| "Incident Location: [...], Kissimmee FL 34744" |
| |
| "Location Classification: Temporary Work Site" |
| |
| "Incident Description: [The] licensee discovered at 0920 hours on 2-3-02 |
| that a trailer and shed had been vandalized. This occurred sometime between |
| the evening of 2-1 and the morning of 2-3. The locks were cut, and |
| everything of value [was] taken. The locks on the gauge cases had also been |
| cut. The keys were locked in a desk drawer with other keys, [and] all were |
| taken. [The] City of Kissimmee PD and the Florida Bureau of Radiation |
| Control are investigating. The licensee has been strongly urged to post a |
| reward and is considering it. This office was notified of this event on |
| 2-4-02." |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 1 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: CPN" |
| |
| "Model Number: MC-3" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): M3707771" |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 2 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: CPN" |
| |
| "Model Number: MC-3" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): M34002262" |
| |
| "Device Type (Quantity): 3 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)" |
| |
| "Manufacturer: Troxler" |
| |
| "Model Number: 3450" |
| |
| "Serial Number(s): 278" |
| |
| "Emergency Groups at Scene: City of Kissimmee PD (Report # 01-02-000928)" |
| |
| "Organizations Notified: NRC, SWP" |
| |
| "Media Contacted: None" |
| |
| "[...]" |
| |
| "Date; Time Investigated: 04-Feb-02; (//)" |
| |
| "Region II, Dick Woodruff, has been notified. If you have any questions, |
| contact [the] Florida BRC." |
| |
| (Call the NRC Operations Center for licensee contact information, the |
| incident location, and state contact information.) |
| |
| |
| ***UPDATE 1229EST 2/21/02*** |
| |
| The following was received by facsimile from State of Florida, Bureau of |
| Radiation Control |
| |
| "Items were discovered by construction workers in the woods adjacent to new |
| road construction on McCoy Road near SR 528, about 0.25 miles west of SR 15 |
| in SE Orange County. Area is about 2 miles NE of the Orlando International |
| Airport. Items were abandoned along with other items which had been stolen |
| and vandalized. Gauges were undamaged, intact in the transportation boxes |
| with the gauges in the stowed position. Survey readings were normal and |
| sources appeared intact with no removable contamination. Gauges were |
| released to the FBI who will release them to the owners when the crime scene |
| investigation is finished. Numerous news organizations were on the scene |
| and flights were even diverted to different runways at the airport to avoid |
| over flight of the area before investigators were notified and arrived at |
| the scene. No further action will be taken on this incident." |
| |
| Notified R2DO (Modes) and NMSS (Fred Brown) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38704 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:11[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/15/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 22:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/22/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE - PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION FAILURE |
| |
| "At 2200 CST, on 02-15-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| of a failure of the Process Gas Leak Detector (PGLD) system in the C-333 |
| building. During above atmospheric operation a PGLD alarm was received in |
| the Area Control Room [ACR] on C-333 Unit 4 Cell 4. An operator responded |
| to the local cell panel to investigate according to the alarm response |
| procedure. Upon arriving at the cell panel the operator discovered that the |
| Ready light was not Illuminated on the PGLD panel. At this time the |
| operator attempted to test fire the PGLD system, however the system would |
| not respond. The Front Line Mgr. and the PSS were immediately notified of |
| the system failure. At this time, required TSR 2.4.4.1 LCO continuous smoke |
| watches were put in place in the affected areas until repair of the system |
| was completed. Following replacement of the power supply by Instrument |
| Maintenance and testing by Operations, ten Unit 4 Cell 4 PGLD system was |
| declared operable by the PSS at 2340 CST. At this time the TSR required |
| smoke watches were discontinued. |
| |
| "The PGLD system is designed to detect the leakage of process gas from the |
| process system and is required to be operable while operating in Cascade |
| Mode 2 (Above Atmospheric Pressure). Due to the failure of this TSR |
| required system; the PSS has determined that this is reportable as a 24 hour |
| Event Report. |
| |
| "The NRC Resident inspector has been notified of this event." |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 0346 EST ON 02/22/02 BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| |
| "This event has been retracted. Even though the power loss causes the system |
| to be incapable of annunciating additional alarms from this system in the |
| ACR, the same is true when a PGLD head actuates in response to smoke. The |
| system Is designed to alert operators of a release or loss of system power. |
| Operator response and the initiation of a smoke watch provide the safety |
| function after the initial alarm is annunciated. The NRC resident inspector |
| has been notified of this update." |
| |
| The R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (E. William Brach) have been |
| notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38713 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:34[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL HOWARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LEONARD WERT R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IMPACTED BY NON-CONSERVATIVE SG NR SETPOINT
|
| |
| "Based on the review of [Operating Experience (OE)] 13294 from Diablo Canyon |
| regarding unexpected response of Steam Generator [(SG)] Narrow Range level |
| trip not responding as expected, an assessment was performed of the narrow |
| range (NR) Steam Generator level channels at Sequoyah 1 and 2. This |
| assessment determined that the current 10.7% lo-lo level trip setpoint did |
| not account for the uncertainties associated with the differential pressure |
| (dP) created by the steam flow past the mid-deck plate in the moisture |
| separator section of the steam generator. This dP phenomena will cause the |
| SG NR level channels to read higher than actual water level at high steam |
| flows. Thus, the lo-lo level trip setpoint is non-conservative. |
| |
| "In the unlikely event of a Loss of Normal Feedwater or a Loss of Offsite |
| Power, the potential exists that a required reactor trip on lo-lo steam |
| generator level may be delayed or may not be received at all. In this |
| scenario, other trip functions such as overtemperature delta-T would be |
| expected to actuate in response to the initiating event. However, these |
| would arrive in a different sequence, and the net effect on the UFSAR |
| Chapter 15 accident analysis results is unknown. Thus, a condition exists in |
| that a safety function could have been prevented. |
| |
| "As a conservative measure, upon identification of this condition by |
| Westinghouse via NSAL 02-3, the environmental allowance monitor (EAM) was |
| actuated on U-1 and U-2 on Friday, February 15, 2002. This feature changes |
| the S/G Lo-Lo Level Rx Trip setpoint from 10.7% to 15%. Since the known S/G |
| channel uncertainty is 8.3% with a narrow range span uncertainty of 5.3%, it |
| was determined that operating with the EAMs continuously actuated will allow |
| continued operation. After further evaluation of this condition, it has |
| been determined that 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) applies as a condition that at |
| the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety |
| function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor |
| and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. |
| |
| "EAMs actuated on U-1 at time of discovery (vent in progress). EAMs |
| actuated at 1814 on 2/20/02." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATED AT 0800 EST BY MICHAEL HOWARD TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Correction to statement above ".. EAMs actuated at 1814 on 2/20/02," should |
| have said EAMs actuated at 1814 on 2/15/02 on U-2. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Leonard Wert) |
| has been informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38714 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/21/2002|
|LICENSEE: GEOSOILS, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:20[EST]|
| CITY: CARLSBAD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 02/20/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 12:40[PST]|
|LICENSE#: 6762-37 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROB GREGOR | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| "Area office received notification that a CPN [Campbell Pacific Nuclear] |
| moisture density gauge, MC3-S/N, M38088381 was stolen from a storage |
| container between the evening of 2/19/02 to the morning of 2/20/02 from a |
| job site at Pine and Butterfield Ranch in Chino Hills, CA. |
| |
| "Local sheriff contacted and report filed. Licensee to run an add in local |
| paper describing device and offering reward for return of gauge." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38715 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:18[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:15[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M.C. PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF ADDITIONAL
MATERIAL |
| DURING WALKDOWN |
| |
| "At 0815, on 02-21-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that a fissile material operation was identified without an approved NCS |
| evaluation. As a result of the event reported in NRC Event Report |
| PAD-2001-045, event worksheet number 38428, walk downs are being performed |
| to determine if other fissile material operations exist that are not covered |
| by NCSAs. The C-310 East and West MgF2 traps between cells 7 and 9 on the |
| cell floor have been identified as a fissile material operation without an |
| approved NCS evaluation. At 1200 CST the PSS was notified by the |
| Non-Destructive Analysis Group that the West trap contains a Planned |
| Expeditious Handling (PEH) mass of material. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The MgF2 traps are separated from the purge |
| cascade by air gaps. The traps have not been previously identified as a |
| fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for |
| nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not |
| maintained. The traps are located more than two feet inside the cell housing |
| and fissile material is not stored inside the cell housing. Therefore, it is |
| not feasible to have spacing violations. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): The traps are of favorable geometry for the plant |
| maximum assay at the time the traps were cut from the cascade. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled |
| parameter. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): West Trap - <446 lbs U with an |
| enrichment of 2.0% U-235. East Trap - <250 lbs U with an enrichment of 2.0% |
| U-235. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The MgF2 traps are separated from the |
| purge cascade by air gaps. The traps have not been previously identified as |
| a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for |
| nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not |
| maintained. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| The area is being controlled per CP2-EG-NS1031. No fissile or potentially |
| fissile material will be moved into or within the area without NCS and PSS |
| approval." |
| |
| The NRC Resident has been notified of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021