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Event Notification Report for February 22, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/21/2002 - 02/22/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38428  38617  38663  38667  38704  38713  38714  38715  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38428       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  T. E. WHITE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit  |
| of fissile material.  There is no NCSE/A which covers operation,             |
| maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has    |
| been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U).  Assay       |
| smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately     |
| 1.6%.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS:                                           |
|                                                                              |
| For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not   |
| sufficient to support a criticality.  However, no NCSA controls have been    |
| established to address this fissile material operation.                      |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a       |
| criticality to occur in the pipe.  Additionally, the pipe located            |
| approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have   |
| spacing violations.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled    |
| parameter.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| 61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot   |
| stack was placed into service in the early 1980s.  The 70-foot stack was     |
| last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe.  The 70-foot stack has not been     |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has    |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety.  Therefore, double        |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system.  Control    |
| the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031.              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The following information is provided as an update:                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Further walk downs identified exhaust oil filters (located near the C-335   |
| Seal Exhaust/Wet Air Station) as potentially fissile material operation      |
| without an approved NCS evaluation.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS:  The oil filters are of favorable        |
| geometry for the plant maximum assay at the time the filters were cut from   |
| the seal exhaust system.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:  The oil filters are separated from the seal        |
| exhaust system by air gaps.  The use of the filters had been discontinued,   |
| therefore there is no potential for fissile material to be added to the      |
| filters.  In order for a criticality to be possible, a spacing violation     |
| would have to occur.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  The amount of material in the oil    |
| filters is unknown at this time but activity levels in the filters indicates |
| less than a safe mass.  Further analysis will be performed in accordance     |
| with the approved remediation plan.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The seal exhaust oil filters have not been |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation.  This operation has   |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety.  Therefore, double        |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| The filters will be characterized in accordance with NCS guidance, which     |
| will be provided in a remediation guide."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.  Notified R3DO(Jorgensen and NMSS(Brach).                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38617       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2002|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:47[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        01/08/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:05[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID COSEO                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SLOW RESPONSE TIME DURING A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI)
PUMP TIME |
| RESPONSE SURVEILLANCE                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 01/08/02 at 1305 hrs, while performing a HPCI pump time response         |
| surveillance, the HPCI pump achieved rated pressure and flow in 31.5         |
| seconds.  This exceeded the acceptance criteria of <29 seconds.  HPCI was    |
| declared inoperable due to this surveillance failure.  Plant personnel are   |
| evaluating the data to determine the cause of the failure.  All other        |
| [emergency core cooling system (ECCS)] equipment and [reactor core isolation |
| cooling (RCIC)] are operable.  This is being reported under                  |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1235EST ON 2/21/02 FROM PATRICK FALLON TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:               |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the apparent slow HPCI |
| response time obtained on 1/8/02 is not reportable. No specific equipment    |
| degradations or system malfunctions were identified that could have led to   |
| the delay in the system response time obtained on 1/8/02. Following          |
| additional testing and discussions with an outside equipment expert it was   |
| concluded that the HPCI system response time is a function of the time that  |
| the HPCI combined hydraulic and lubricating oil system has been in standby.  |
| Specifically, the time for the ramp generator to start, allowing steam       |
| admission to the turbine, is dependent on oil system pressurization, and is  |
| a function of the time that the oil system has been in standby. This is due  |
| to oil system drain down during system inactivity,  the bulk of which occurs |
| in the first few days.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The response time of 31.5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 followed approximately |
| 41 days of oil system inactivity. Subsequent runs on 1/10/02 and 1/12/02     |
| resulted in response times of 25.7 and 24.7 seconds, respectively. The       |
| period of oil system inactivity prior to these two runs was very short,      |
| resulting in quicker oil system pressurization, and thus a shorter delay in  |
| the start of the ramp generator.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Although the acceptance criteria for this test specified in the Technical   |
| Requirements Manual (TRM) and in plant procedures was 29 seconds, the        |
| analyzed limit for HPCI injection to the vessel is actually 60 seconds.      |
| Thus, the response time of 31 .5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 was well within  |
| the analyzed limit (60 seconds), less an allowance for instrument and sensor |
| response time (5 second). Therefore, the high pressure injection safety      |
| function was maintained and this event is not reportable. Consequently, this |
| notification is being retracted. "                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO(Jorgensen). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38663       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/31/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:30[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        01/30/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |RONALD GARDNER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DOUG BROADDUS        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. C. PITTMAN                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEGACY ISSUE                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "AT 1313 CST, on 1-30-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified   |
| of uncharacterized legacy process equipment which was not stored in          |
| accordance with an approved Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA).  The |
| mass of fissile material was less than a safe mass and at an assay of less   |
| than 2.0 Wt. %.  This is in violation of the NCS program requirements of     |
| SAR, Section 5.2 which requires fissile material operations to be controlled |
| by approved NCSA's.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "The PSS determined that this event is a 24 Hour Event Report due to the     |
| failure to maintain double contingency controls.                             |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE  OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This material is in a stable condition and double contingency has been      |
| established using approved procedures.  Once the material was characterized, |
| it was determined that proper spacing had been maintained.                   |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for criticality to be possible more than a critical mass would     |
| need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.  The storage containers are    |
| safe by geometry and the fissile material is less than a safe mass.          |
| Therefore, it is not possible for this barrier material to result in a       |
| criticality accident.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):     |
| "Mass                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Less than 10 pounds at an enrichment of less than 2.0 Wt. %                 |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Since no NCS controls were applied to the material, double contingency      |
| cannot be demonstrated.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "The material is controlled in accordance with procedure CP-2-TS-TS2030.     |
| The material has been characterized."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1845EST ON 2/21/02 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The following information is provided as an update:                          |
|                                                                              |
| "After discovery, further characterization of the material was performed.    |
| Independent assay smears and direct surveys by health physics personnel      |
| confirmed that several pieces of the material were <1% assay and not         |
| fissile.  The remaining material was weighed, on a NMC&A balance, and found  |
| to have a total mass of <15 grams U-235.  Therefore, this material stored in |
| this room of C-710 does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.      |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE  OF EVENTS:  Further analysis revealed this material    |
| does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation; therefore, no further   |
| actions are required.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  Further analysis revealed that less  |
| than 15 grams of total mass of U-235 were involved.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  Further analysis revealed this material    |
| does not meet the conditions of a fissile operation.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| Further analysis revealed this material does not meet the conditions of a    |
| fissile operation; therefore, no further actions are required."              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
| Notified R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS(Brach).                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38667       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL  |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/04/2002|
|LICENSEE:  KCCS, INC.                           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EST]|
|    CITY:  LAUDERDALE LAKES         REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        02/03/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        09:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  3087-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MIKE ERNSTES         R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHARLES ADAMS (fax)          |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING GAUGES STOLEN FROM KCCS, INC., IN         
 |
| KISSIMMEE, FLORIDA                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the state:      |
|                                                                              |
| "Abnormal Occurrence:  No"                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Followup Report:  No"                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Allegation:  No"                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Incident Date:  03-Feb-02"                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Licensee or Owner:  KCCS, Inc."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "[...]"                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "City, State, and Zip Code:  Lauderdale Lakes, FL  33319"                    |
|                                                                              |
| "License #:  3087-1"                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "License Type, Category:  Specific, 3L(1)"                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "[...]"                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Isotope(s):  Cs-137, Am-241"                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Activity(s):  CPN 10/50 each, Troxler 9/44"                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Material Form; Chemical Form; physical Form:  Solid, Special Form,          |
| By-product"                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Probable Disposition of Material:  Unknown"                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Exposure?  No"                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Number:  N/A"                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Type of Individual(s):  N/A"                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Exposure Source:  N/A"                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Dose Delivered to:  N/A"                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Maximum Dose Received:  N/A"                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Incident Category:  Loss of Control - Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen            |
| Materials"                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Incident Location:  [...], Kissimmee FL  34744"                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Location Classification:  Temporary Work Site"                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Incident Description:  [The] licensee discovered at 0920 hours on 2-3-02    |
| that a trailer and shed had been vandalized.  This occurred sometime between |
| the evening of 2-1 and the morning of 2-3.  The locks were cut, and          |
| everything of value [was] taken.  The locks on the gauge cases had also been |
| cut.  The keys were locked in a desk drawer with other keys, [and] all were  |
| taken.  [The] City of Kissimmee PD and the Florida Bureau of Radiation       |
| Control are investigating.  The licensee has been strongly urged to post a   |
| reward and is considering it.  This office was notified of this event on     |
| 2-4-02."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Device Type (Quantity):  1 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)"                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Manufacturer:  CPN"                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Model Number:  MC-3"                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Serial Number(s):  M3707771"                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Device Type (Quantity):  2 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)"                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Manufacturer:  CPN"                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Model Number:  MC-3"                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Serial Number(s):  M34002262"                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Device Type (Quantity):  3 - Moisture/Density Gauge (1)"                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Manufacturer:  Troxler"                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Model Number:  3450"                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Serial Number(s):  278"                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Emergency Groups at Scene:  City of Kissimmee PD (Report # 01-02-000928)"   |
|                                                                              |
| "Organizations Notified:  NRC, SWP"                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Media Contacted:  None"                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "[...]"                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Date; Time Investigated:  04-Feb-02; (//)"                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Region II, Dick Woodruff, has been notified.  If you have any questions,    |
| contact [the] Florida BRC."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC Operations Center for licensee contact information, the        |
| incident location, and state contact information.)                           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ***UPDATE 1229EST 2/21/02***                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following was received by facsimile from State of Florida, Bureau of     |
| Radiation Control                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Items were discovered by construction workers in the woods adjacent to new  |
| road construction on McCoy Road near SR 528, about 0.25 miles west of SR 15  |
| in SE Orange County.  Area is about 2 miles NE of the Orlando International  |
| Airport.  Items were abandoned along with other items which had been stolen  |
| and vandalized. Gauges were undamaged, intact in the transportation boxes    |
| with the gauges in the stowed position.  Survey readings were normal and     |
| sources appeared intact with no removable contamination.  Gauges were        |
| released to the FBI who will release them to the owners when the crime scene |
| investigation is finished.   Numerous news organizations were on the scene   |
| and flights were even diverted to different runways at the airport to avoid  |
| over flight of the area before investigators were notified and arrived at    |
| the scene. No further action will be taken on this incident."                |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R2DO (Modes) and NMSS (Fred Brown)                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38704       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:11[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/15/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        22:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/22/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |ANTON VEGEL          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)        SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE - PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION FAILURE                |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2200 CST, on 02-15-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| of a failure of the Process Gas Leak Detector (PGLD) system in the C-333     |
| building.  During above atmospheric operation a PGLD alarm was received in   |
| the Area Control Room [ACR] on C-333 Unit 4 Cell 4.  An operator responded   |
| to the local cell panel to investigate according to the alarm response       |
| procedure.  Upon arriving at the cell panel the operator discovered that the |
| Ready light was not Illuminated on the PGLD panel.  At this time the         |
| operator attempted to test fire the PGLD system, however the system would    |
| not respond. The Front Line Mgr. and the PSS were immediately notified of    |
| the system failure.  At this time, required TSR 2.4.4.1 LCO continuous smoke |
| watches were put in place in the affected areas until repair of the system   |
| was completed.  Following replacement of the power supply by Instrument      |
| Maintenance and testing by Operations, ten Unit 4 Cell 4 PGLD system was     |
| declared operable by the PSS at 2340 CST. At this time the TSR required      |
| smoke watches were discontinued.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The PGLD system is designed to detect the leakage of process gas from the   |
| process system and is required to be operable while operating in Cascade     |
| Mode 2 (Above Atmospheric Pressure).  Due to the failure of this TSR         |
| required system; the PSS has determined that this is reportable as a 24 hour |
| Event Report.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Resident inspector has been notified of this event."                |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 0346 EST ON 02/22/02 BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This event has been retracted. Even though the power loss causes the system |
| to be incapable of annunciating additional alarms from this system in the    |
| ACR, the same is true when a PGLD head actuates in response to smoke. The    |
| system Is designed to alert operators of a release or loss of system power.  |
| Operator response and the initiation of a smoke watch provide the safety     |
| function after the initial alarm is annunciated. The NRC resident inspector  |
| has been notified of this update."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (E. William Brach) have been          |
| notified.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38713       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH                 REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:34[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL HOWARD               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)   POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IMPACTED BY NON-CONSERVATIVE SG NR SETPOINT    
    |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on the review of [Operating Experience (OE)] 13294 from Diablo Canyon |
| regarding unexpected response of Steam Generator [(SG)] Narrow Range level   |
| trip not responding as expected, an assessment was performed of the narrow   |
| range (NR) Steam Generator level channels at Sequoyah 1 and 2. This          |
| assessment determined that the current 10.7% lo-lo level trip setpoint did   |
| not account for the uncertainties associated with the differential pressure  |
| (dP) created by the steam flow past the mid-deck plate in the moisture       |
| separator section of the steam generator. This dP phenomena will cause the   |
| SG NR level channels to read higher than actual water level at high steam    |
| flows. Thus, the lo-lo level trip setpoint is non-conservative.              |
|                                                                              |
| "In the unlikely event of a Loss of Normal Feedwater or a Loss of Offsite    |
| Power, the potential exists that a required reactor trip on lo-lo steam      |
| generator level may be delayed or may not be received at all. In this        |
| scenario, other trip functions such as overtemperature delta-T would be      |
| expected to actuate in response to the initiating event. However, these      |
| would arrive in a different sequence, and the net effect on the UFSAR        |
| Chapter 15 accident analysis results is unknown. Thus, a condition exists in |
| that a safety function could have been prevented.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "As a conservative measure, upon identification of this condition by         |
| Westinghouse via NSAL 02-3, the environmental allowance monitor (EAM) was    |
| actuated on U-1 and U-2 on Friday, February 15, 2002. This feature changes   |
| the S/G Lo-Lo Level Rx Trip setpoint from 10.7% to 15%. Since the known S/G  |
| channel uncertainty is 8.3% with a narrow range span uncertainty of 5.3%, it |
| was determined that operating with the EAMs continuously actuated will allow |
| continued operation.  After further evaluation of this condition, it has     |
| been determined that 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) applies as a condition that at |
| the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety     |
| function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor    |
| and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.                                |
|                                                                              |
| "EAMs actuated on U-1 at time of discovery (vent in progress).  EAMs         |
| actuated at 1814 on 2/20/02."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATED AT 0800 EST BY MICHAEL HOWARD TO FANGIE JONES * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| Correction to statement above ".. EAMs actuated at 1814 on 2/20/02," should  |
| have said EAMs actuated at 1814 on 2/15/02 on U-2.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  The  R2DO (Leonard Wert)  |
| has been informed.                                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38714       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM    |NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/21/2002|
|LICENSEE:  GEOSOILS, INC.                       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:20[EST]|
|    CITY:  CARLSBAD                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        02/20/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:        12:40[PST]|
|LICENSE#:  6762-37               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
|                                                |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROB GREGOR                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE                |
|                                                                              |
| "Area office received notification that a CPN [Campbell Pacific Nuclear]     |
| moisture density gauge, MC3-S/N, M38088381 was stolen from a storage         |
| container between the evening of 2/19/02 to the morning of 2/20/02 from a    |
| job site at Pine and Butterfield Ranch in Chino Hills, CA.                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Local sheriff contacted and report filed.  Licensee to run an add in local  |
| paper describing device and offering reward for return of gauge."            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38715       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:18[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        08:15[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY          IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M.C. PITTMAN                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF ADDITIONAL
MATERIAL  |
| DURING WALKDOWN                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0815, on 02-21-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified     |
| that a fissile material operation was identified without  an approved NCS    |
| evaluation.  As a result of the event reported in NRC Event Report           |
| PAD-2001-045, event worksheet number 38428, walk downs are being performed   |
| to determine if other fissile material operations exist that are not covered |
| by NCSAs. The C-310 East and West MgF2 traps between cells 7 and 9 on the    |
| cell floor have been identified as a fissile material operation without an   |
| approved NCS evaluation.  At 1200 CST the PSS was notified by the            |
| Non-Destructive Analysis Group that the West trap contains a Planned         |
| Expeditious Handling (PEH) mass of material.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The MgF2 traps are separated from the purge |
| cascade by air gaps. The traps have not been previously identified as a      |
| fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for        |
| nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not            |
| maintained. The traps are located more than two feet inside the cell housing |
| and fissile material is not stored inside the cell housing. Therefore, it is |
| not feasible to have spacing violations.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  The traps are of favorable geometry for the plant |
| maximum assay at the time the traps were cut from the cascade.               |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):    |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled    |
| parameter.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  West Trap - <446 lbs U with an       |
| enrichment of 2.0% U-235.  East Trap - <250 lbs U with an enrichment of 2.0% |
| U-235.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The MgF2 traps are separated from the      |
| purge cascade by air gaps. The traps have not  been previously identified as |
| a fissile material operation. This operation has not been evaluated for      |
| nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was not            |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| The area is being controlled per CP2-EG-NS1031.  No fissile or potentially   |
| fissile material will be moved into or within the area without NCS and PSS   |
| approval."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident has been notified of this event.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+