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Event Notification Report for February 6, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 02/05/2002 - 02/06/2002 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38316 38576 38670 38671 38672 Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 38316 - FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001 RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT] COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT] BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002 CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH PERSON ORGANIZATION LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N MONTE PHILLIPS R3 DOCKET: 0707002 SUSAN FRANT NMSS NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN EVENT TEXT 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel: "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03." "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of material, which may affect this report." "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown. Measurements to quantify the material are in progress. The apparent block wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the exterior building wall." "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then a potentially critical configuration could result. Note that no spills or leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at this time. The material in question has apparently been there for some time." "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment of the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume containers that could collect a spill or leak." "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Unknown at this time. Enrichment could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations. The form is most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. Measurements for determination of mass and assay are currently in progress." "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The openings leading to the interior spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system piping. This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03." "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken to determine amounts of material and assay." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be notified. ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 ***** The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel: "Update #1 - Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16 indicates a total maximum mass of 225/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of 8.2% is present (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative values), which is less than the safe mass limit for uranium. Investigations to determine the extent of condition have identified three additional areas of potential concern in X-705 Recovery. These areas are: the wall near the A-loop overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the wall near the top of the B-38 storage columns. Each of these areas has received preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for uranium material holdup in the block walls. Preliminary results indicate that the amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow and near the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6. More detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to differentiate between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) are currently in progress and will be reported when available. Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38 storage column (near background readings). Additional NDA scans are currently in progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the Recovery Area. "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is less than the safe mass limit for uranium." Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan). ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 ***** The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel: "Update #2 - More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the A-loop overflow column indicate a total maximum mass of 92/-46 grams 235U with an enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass). Quantitative NDA scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total maximum mass of 201/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less than a safe mass). It should be noted that these results incorporate conservative assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material in the wall matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be much less upon final disposition." "Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore, quantification was not performed in this area." "[...]" Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown). (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.) ***** UPDATE FROM CURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 0408 ON 02/05/02 ***** The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth personnel: "Update #3 - To reestablish compliance, an approximately 24" X 80" section of block wall was removed in accordance with NCSA-0705_135. Following removal of the primary area, five locations around the perimeter were then subjected to additional NDA analysis. Conservative NDA analysis indicated less than 306 grams U235 total spread over the five additional locations. In a second removal operation, additional blocks were removed at four locations adjacent to the primary area where greater than 15 grams U235 was indicated. When combining all NDA estimates which make conservative assumptions about the distribution of uranium-bearing material in the wall matrix, up to 705 [grams] U235 may have been distributed in this area. If the mass were concentrated in one location, it would still be less than the maximum subcritical mass [...] given in ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983." Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak) and NMSS EO (John Hickey). (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.) !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! Power Reactor Event Number: 38576 - FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/16/2001 UNIT:    STATE: PA NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:39[EST] RXTYPE:  GE-4, GE-4 EVENT DATE: 12/16/2001 NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN McCLINTOCK LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002 EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 10 CFR SECTION: AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation EVENT TEXT BOTH HIGH FLOW INSTRUMENTATION FOR REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU) FOUND INOPERABLE. During performance of routine surveillance testing on the PBAPS Unit 3 RWCU system high flow isolation instrumentation, it was discovered that both channels of isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable. Both affected instruments were returned to operable status by 1828 hours on 12/16/01. The RWCU system is designed to automatically isolate upon detection of a high flow condition. This isolation detection system utilizes two channels of differential pressure instrumentation for high flow detection. An isolation of the RWCU system can be accomplished by actuation of either channel of the logic. A single channel trip would result in either an inboard or outboard isolation. A failure of both channels would result in a failure of the system to isolate as required. On 12/16/01 at 1111 hours, surveillance testing of the "A" channel high flow instrument (DPIS 3-12-124A) determined that this instrument failed to trip due to entrapped air in the sensing line. DPIS 3-12-124A was vented, retested, and returned to operable status at 1536 on 12/16/01. At 1645 hours, surveillance testing of the "B" channel RWCU high flow instrument (DPIS 3-12-124B) determined that this instrument failed to trip due to entrapped air in the sensing line. DPIS 3-12-124B was vented, retested, and returned to operable status at 1828 on 12/16/01. At 1645 on 12/16/01, it was determined that both channels of Unit 3 RWCU system high flow isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable since the system had been placed in service during refueling outage 3R13. Unit 3 entered Mode 2 on 10/08/01 at 2221 hours, requiring the Primary Containment Isolation (PCIS) function to be operable. Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The systems affected were the RWCU system isolation logic instruments, DPIS 3-12-124A and DPIS 3-12-124B. These instruments actuate on high system flow of 125%. No plant effects or transient occurred as a result of this event. The RWCU system isolation capability, on high system flow, was inoperable. This isolation capability is required whenever the RWCU system is in service with the reactor in Modes 1, 2, or 3. DPISs 3-12-124A and 3-12-124B were filled, vented, tested satisfactorily, and returned to operable status. A station investigation to determine the cause of the air entrapment is in progress. The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. * * * RETRACTION 1413 2/5/2002 FROM KOVALCHICK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * "This notification is a retraction of Event Number (EN) 38576 which reported a loss of safety function of thc RWCU primary containment isolation valves due to entrapped air in the instrument sensing lines for the high flow isolation for both isolation valves. "On December 16, 2001, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system high flow isolation instrumentation routine surveillance was performed. During the routine surveillance, it was discovered that both high flow isolation instruments tripped outside their Technical Specification Allowable Value due to entrapped air in the system. resulting in both instruments being declared inoperable. "An engineering evaluation determined that the test failure was caused by the testing methodology and concluded that both instruments were operable and the safety function was not impacted. Specifically, the evaluation determined that the entrapped air existed in the test lines only, which are isolated during normal plant operations. "Therefore, because the safety function of the RWCU automatic isolation on high flow was maintained, this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). "The NRC resident has been notified." Notified R1DO (Doerflein). Power Reactor Event Number: 38670 - FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002 UNIT:    STATE: NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EST] RXTYPE:  W-2-LP EVENT DATE: 02/05/2002 NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUG GOMEZ LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002 EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 10 CFR SECTION: ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby EVENT TEXT MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF A MAIN CIRCULATING WATER PUMP The licensee initiated a manual reactor trip per procedure due to the loss of a main circulating water pump for an unknown reason. All plant systems functioned properly and all rods fully inserted. The plant is stable in Hot Standby with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and the atmospheric reliefs removing excess heat. The licensee is investigating the cause of the main circulating water pump trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local authorities and the Public Service Commission. General Information or Other Event Number: 38671 - REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002 LICENSEE: RADIATION TECHNOLOGY INC. NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:45[EST] CITY: ODESSA REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 01/14/2002 COUNTY: STATE: TX EVENT TIME: [CST] LICENSE#: LO4633-000 AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002 DOCKET: PERSON ORGANIZATION JOHN PELLET R4 NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS (via fax) HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: NAGR AGREEMENT STATE EVENT TEXT AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE The following is text of a TX licensee report regarding the event: "In reviewing our quarterly dosimetry reports for the first three quarters of 2001, we find that the employee identified on the attachment has exceeded the annual TEDE for occupational]y exposed workers. The fourth quarter report will not be available from our TLD supplier until sometime in February. "However, in compliance with TRCR 289.202(yy)(1)(B)(i) we are reporting this overexposure as soon as known. "In discussing this overexposure with the individual, he indicated it was due to the quantity of work performed. No procedures or license conditions were violated. Upon receipt of our fourth quarter report, we will advise you of any addition exposure to this individual." The Quarterly doses were First Quarter - 574 mrem Second Quarter - 1868 mrem Third Quarter - 4847 mrem The State of Texas is investigating the event. General Information or Other Event Number: 38672 - REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002 LICENSEE: WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:26[EST] CITY: PULLMAN REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 01/31/2002 COUNTY: STATE: WA EVENT TIME: [PST] LICENSE#: WN-C003-1 AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002 DOCKET: PERSON ORGANIZATION JOHN PELLET R4 NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE (email) HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR SECTION: NAGR AGREEMENT STATE EVENT TEXT AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention) A sealed source was discovered to be leaking and contamination was found on one researcher and at several locations within the researcher's lab. The contamination from a custom-made sodium-22 source was discovered during a routine survey of the lab. The WSU Radiation Safety Office (RSO) continues to oversee clean-up of the lab. The WSU researcher was contaminated on the inside of a knuckle of one hand. The WSU RSO staff estimated about 2 nCi of Na-22 in a 0.5 centimeter wide spot on the contaminated finger. This was about 10,000 cpm when first measured and immediately cleaned to 3000 cpm (0.04 mR/hr) by simple washing. The researcher was taken to the Pullman Hospital for additional cleaning and an X-ray of the finger to rule out the possibility of a metal sliver or other removable contamination. RSO staff were at the hospital to oversee activities. Contamination was only found in the lab, including on a jacket and the floor. No contamination was found outside the lab. Staff and others who had access to the lab are being checked to see if any contamination was carried out of the lab on shoes or clothing. What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-265 (Special Reports...Leaking Sources) Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 18 millicuries Na-22 Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence) One individual was known to have some contamination on a finger but the dose is unknown at this time. Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number) The Na-22 source was made by Brookhaven National Labs in December 2000. Model and serial number unknown at present.