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Event Notification Report for February 6, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/05/2002 - 02/06/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38316  38576  38670  38671  38672  


Fuel Cycle Facility                              Event Number:   38316       

                         
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 FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   NOTIFICATION DATE:
09/25/2001
   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]
 COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   EVENT DATE:        09/25/2001
           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 EVENT TIME:        09:30[EDT]
           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/05/2002
    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3 
  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH PERSON          ORGANIZATION 
LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      
  DOCKET:  0707002                              SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    

 NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RITCHIE                                                   
  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD                                            

EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY                                      
10 CFR SECTION:                                                              
NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN                                   
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             


                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE                                               
                                                                              
 The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      
 personnel:                                                                   
                                                                              
 "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a  
 block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior   
 spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA 
 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential           
 collection area is unknown.  This is a loss of one leg of double contingency 
 as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03.  The presence of an unknown (at this time)  
 amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the     
 facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of   
 NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system       
 piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE      
 0705_076.E03."                                                               
                                                                              
 "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of     
 material, which may affect this report."                                     
                                                                              
 "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The safety significance of this event is    
 potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing  
 material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown.   
 Measurements to quantify the material are in progress.  The apparent block   
 wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the 
 other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of         
 unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the    
 exterior building wall."                                                     
                                                                              
 "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           
 CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing     
 material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has      
 collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry   
 configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium             
 concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then 
 a potentially critical configuration could result.  Note that no spills or   
 leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at 
 this time.  The material in question has apparently been there for some      
 time."                                                                       
                                                                              
 "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):    
 Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical       
 integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of          
 material.  An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment   
 of the material.  Double contingency also relies upon administrative         
 controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume      
 containers that could collect a spill or leak."                              
                                                                              
 "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    
 LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):  Unknown at this time.  Enrichment 
 could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations.  The form is     
 most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2.  Measurements for determination of mass 
 and assay are currently in progress."                                        
                                                                              
 "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  
 OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The openings leading to the interior       
 spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of      
 NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential       
 collection area is unknown.  This is a loss of one leg of double contingency 
 as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03.  The presence of an unknown (at this time)  
 amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the     
 facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of     
 NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of  X-705 system      
 piping.  This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency 
 as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03."                                            
                                                                              
 "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  
 Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken   
 to determine amounts of material and assay."                                 
                                                                              
 The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be   
 notified.                                                                    
                                                                              
 ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 *****    
                                                                              
 The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      
 personnel:                                                                   
                                                                              
 "Update #1 - Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16          
 indicates a total maximum mass of 225/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of 
 8.2% is present (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative         
 values), which is less than the safe mass limit for uranium.  Investigations 
 to determine the extent of condition have identified three additional areas  
 of potential concern in X-705 Recovery.  These areas are:  the wall near the 
 A-loop overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the    
 wall near the top of the B-38 storage columns.  Each of these areas has      
 received preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for   
 uranium material holdup in the block walls.  Preliminary results indicate    
 that the amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow    
 and near the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6.  
 More detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to           
 differentiate between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) 
 are currently in progress and will be reported when available.  Preliminary  
 results indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38       
 storage column (near background readings).  Additional NDA scans are         
 currently in progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the  
 Recovery Area.                                                               
                                                                              
 "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The safety significance of this event is    
 now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the      
 openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is  
 less than the safe mass limit for uranium."                                  
                                                                              
 Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC     
 operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan).       
                                                                              
 ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 *****    
                                                                              
 The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      
 personnel:                                                                   
                                                                              
 "Update #2 - More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the      
 A-loop overflow column indicate a total maximum mass of 92/-46 grams 235U   
 with an enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass).  Quantitative  
 NDA scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total      
 maximum mass of 201/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less   
 than a safe mass).  It should be noted that these results incorporate        
 conservative assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material  
 in the wall matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be   
 much less upon final disposition."                                           
                                                                              
 "Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near 
 the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore,               
 quantification was not performed in this area."                              
                                                                              
 "[...]"                                                                      
                                                                              
 Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC     
 operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown).            
                                                                              
 (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)                    
                                                                              
 ***** UPDATE FROM CURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 0408 ON 02/05/02 *****     
                                                                              
 The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      
 personnel:                                                                   
                                                                              
 "Update #3 - To reestablish compliance, an approximately 24" X 80" section   
 of block wall was removed in accordance with NCSA-0705_135.  Following       
 removal of the primary area, five locations around the perimeter were then   
 subjected to additional NDA analysis.  Conservative NDA analysis indicated   
 less than 306 grams U235 total spread over the five additional locations.    
 In a second removal operation, additional blocks were removed at four        
 locations adjacent to the primary area where greater than 15 grams U235 was  
 indicated.  When combining all NDA estimates which make conservative         
 assumptions about the distribution of uranium-bearing material in the wall   
 matrix, up to 705 [grams] U235 may have been distributed in this area.  If   
 the mass were concentrated in one location, it would still be less than the  
 maximum subcritical mass [...] given in ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983."                  
                                                                              
 Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC     
 operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak) and NMSS EO (John Hickey).  
                                                                              
 (Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)                    


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!

Power Reactor                                    Event Number:   38576       

                         
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 FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/16/2001
    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  PA NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:39[EST]
   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    EVENT DATE:        12/16/2001

 NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN McCLINTOCK              LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/05/2002
 

EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         CLIFFORD ANDERSON    R1      
10 CFR SECTION:                                                              
AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL                                 
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             

UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR   INIT RX MODE  CURR PWR  CURR RX MODE   

                                                                             
3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  100      Power Operation  
                                                                             

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

 BOTH HIGH FLOW INSTRUMENTATION FOR REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU)
FOUND        
 INOPERABLE.                                                                  
                                                                              
 During performance of routine surveillance testing on the PBAPS Unit 3 RWCU  
 system high flow isolation instrumentation, it was discovered that both      
 channels of isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable.  Both  
 affected instruments were returned to operable status by 1828 hours on       
 12/16/01.                                                                    
                                                                              
 The RWCU system is designed to automatically isolate upon detection of a     
 high flow condition.  This isolation detection system utilizes two channels  
 of differential pressure instrumentation for high flow detection.  An        
 isolation of the RWCU system can be accomplished by actuation of either      
 channel of the logic.  A single channel trip would result in either an       
 inboard or outboard isolation.  A failure of both channels would result in a 
 failure of the system to isolate as required.                                
                                                                              
 On 12/16/01 at 1111 hours, surveillance testing of the "A" channel high flow 
 instrument (DPIS 3-12-124A) determined that this instrument failed to trip   
 due to entrapped air in the sensing line.  DPIS 3-12-124A was vented,        
 retested, and returned to operable status at 1536 on 12/16/01.               
                                                                              
 At 1645 hours, surveillance testing of the "B" channel RWCU high flow        
 instrument (DPIS 3-12-124B) determined that this instrument failed to trip   
 due to entrapped air in the sensing line.  DPIS 3-12-124B was vented,        
 retested, and returned to operable status at 1828 on 12/16/01.               
                                                                              
 At 1645 on 12/16/01, it was determined that both channels of Unit 3 RWCU     
 system high flow isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable    
 since the system had been placed in service during refueling outage 3R13.    
 Unit 3 entered Mode 2 on 10/08/01 at 2221 hours, requiring the Primary       
 Containment Isolation (PCIS) function to be operable.                        
                                                                              
 Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10 CFR                    
 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).                                                           
                                                                              
 The systems affected were the RWCU system isolation logic instruments, DPIS  
 3-12-124A and DPIS 3-12-124B.  These instruments actuate on high system flow 
 of 125%.  No plant effects or transient occurred as a result of this event.  
 The RWCU system isolation capability, on high system flow, was inoperable.   
 This isolation capability is required whenever the RWCU system is in service 
 with the reactor in Modes 1, 2, or 3.                                        
                                                                              
 DPISs 3-12-124A and 3-12-124B were filled, vented, tested satisfactorily,    
 and returned to operable status.                                             
                                                                              
 A station investigation to determine the cause of the air entrapment is in   
 progress.                                                                    
                                                                              
 The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       
                                                                              
 * * * RETRACTION 1413 2/5/2002 FROM KOVALCHICK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       
                                                                              
 "This notification is a retraction of Event Number (EN) 38576 which reported 
 a loss of safety function of thc RWCU primary containment isolation valves   
 due to entrapped air in the instrument sensing lines for the high flow       
 isolation for both isolation valves.                                         
                                                                              
 "On December 16, 2001, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system high flow     
 isolation instrumentation routine surveillance was performed. During the     
 routine surveillance, it was discovered that both high flow isolation        
 instruments tripped outside their Technical Specification Allowable Value    
 due to entrapped air in the system. resulting in both instruments being      
 declared inoperable.                                                         
                                                                              
 "An engineering evaluation determined that the test failure was caused by    
 the testing methodology and concluded that both instruments were operable    
 and the safety function was not impacted. Specifically, the evaluation       
 determined that the entrapped air existed in the test lines only, which are  
 isolated during normal plant operations.                                     
                                                                              
 "Therefore, because the safety function of the RWCU automatic isolation on   
 high flow was maintained, this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR          
 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).                                                           
                                                                              
 "The NRC resident has been notified."                                        
                                                                              
 Notified R1DO (Doerflein).                                                   



Power Reactor                                    Event Number:   38670       

                         
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 FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002
    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EST]
   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           EVENT DATE:        02/05/2002

 NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUG GOMEZ                   LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/05/2002
 

EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      
10 CFR SECTION:                                                              
ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA                             
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             

UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR   INIT RX MODE  CURR PWR  CURR RX MODE   

1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  0        Hot Standby      
                                                                             
                                                                             

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF A MAIN CIRCULATING WATER PUMP             
                                                                              
 The licensee initiated a manual reactor trip per procedure due to the loss   
 of a main circulating water pump for an unknown reason.  All plant systems   
 functioned properly and all rods fully inserted.  The plant is stable in Hot 
 Standby with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and the      
 atmospheric reliefs removing excess heat.  The licensee is investigating the 
 cause of the main circulating water pump trip.                               
                                                                              
 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local            
 authorities and the Public Service Commission.                               



General Information or Other                     Event Number:   38671       

                         
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 REP ORG:  TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH           NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002
LICENSEE:  RADIATION TECHNOLOGY INC.            NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:45[EST]
    CITY:  ODESSA                   REGION:  4  EVENT DATE:        01/14/2002
  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TX EVENT TIME:             [CST]
LICENSE#:  LO4633-000            AGREEMENT:  Y  LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/05/2002
  DOCKET:                                      
                                                PERSON          ORGANIZATION 
                                                JOHN PELLET          R4      
                                                                             

 NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HELEN WATKINS (via fax)                                   
  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                                              

EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY                                      
10 CFR SECTION:                                                              
NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE                                     
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             


                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE                                        
                                                                              
 The following is text of a TX licensee report regarding the event:           
                                                                              
 "In reviewing our quarterly dosimetry reports for the first three quarters   
 of 2001, we find that the employee identified on the attachment has exceeded 
 the annual TEDE for occupational]y exposed workers. The fourth quarter       
 report will not be available from our TLD supplier until sometime in         
 February.                                                                    
                                                                              
 "However, in compliance with TRCR 289.202(yy)(1)(B)(i) we are reporting this 
 overexposure as soon as known.                                               
                                                                              
 "In discussing this overexposure with the individual, he indicated it was    
 due to the quantity of work performed. No procedures or license conditions   
 were violated. Upon receipt of our fourth quarter report, we will advise you 
 of any addition exposure to this individual."                                
                                                                              
 The Quarterly doses were                                                     
 First Quarter - 574 mrem                                                     
 Second Quarter - 1868 mrem                                                   
 Third Quarter - 4847 mrem                                                    
                                                                              
 The State of Texas is investigating the event.                               



General Information or Other                     Event Number:   38672       

                         
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 REP ORG:  WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/05/2002
LICENSEE:  WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY          NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:26[EST]
    CITY:  PULLMAN                  REGION:  4  EVENT DATE:        01/31/2002
  COUNTY:                            STATE:  WA EVENT TIME:             [PST]
LICENSE#:   WN-C003-1            AGREEMENT:  Y  LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/05/2002
  DOCKET:                                      
                                                PERSON          ORGANIZATION 
                                                JOHN PELLET          R4      
                                                                             

 NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY FRAZEE (email)                                      
  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                                              

EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY                                      
10 CFR SECTION:                                                              
NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE                                     
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                             


                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT                                                       
                                                                              
 ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective    
 actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention)  A sealed 
 source was discovered to be leaking and contamination was found on one       
 researcher and at several locations within the researcher's lab.  The        
 contamination from a custom-made sodium-22 source was discovered during a    
 routine survey of the lab.  The WSU Radiation Safety Office (RSO) continues  
 to oversee clean-up of the lab.                                              
                                                                              
 The WSU researcher was contaminated on the inside of a knuckle of one hand.  
 The WSU RSO staff estimated about 2 nCi of Na-22 in a 0.5 centimeter wide    
 spot on the contaminated finger.  This was about 10,000 cpm when first       
 measured and immediately cleaned to 3000 cpm (0.04 mR/hr) by simple washing. 
 The researcher was taken to the Pullman Hospital for additional cleaning and 
 an X-ray of the finger to rule out the possibility of a metal sliver or      
 other removable contamination.  RSO staff were at the hospital to oversee    
 activities.                                                                  
                                                                              
 Contamination was only found in the lab, including on a jacket and the       
 floor.  No contamination was found outside the lab.  Staff and others who    
 had access to the lab are being checked to see if any contamination was      
 carried out of the lab on shoes or clothing.                                 
                                                                              
 What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-265     
 (Special Reports...Leaking Sources)                                          
                                                                              
 Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 18 millicuries Na-22                       
                                                                              
 Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body 
 part receiving dose; consequence) One individual was known to have some      
 contamination on a finger but the dose is unknown at this time.              
                                                                              
 Lost, Stolen or Damaged?  (mfg., model, serial number) The Na-22 source was  
 made by Brookhaven National Labs in December 2000.  Model and serial number  
 unknown at present.