Event Notification Report for January 25, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/24/2002 - 01/25/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38649
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAMON RITTER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAMON RITTER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 08:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 08:54 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A non-licensed supervisor tested above the limit for blood alcohol content during a random test. The individual's site access has been suspended and the licensee is conducting a review of the individual's recent work. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
A non-licensed supervisor tested above the limit for blood alcohol content during a random test. The individual's site access has been suspended and the licensee is conducting a review of the individual's recent work. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38651
Rep Org: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Licensee: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ARMSTRONG (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ARMSTRONG (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
PETE ESELGROTH (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT
"On 11-14-2001 [an employee] of Exelon Power Labs called and reported that (2) U0203FBBR-AA valves had been sent to their lab from Exelon - Limerick for evaluation with the complaint that the valves were leaking in the energized position. The valve is being used in the normally closed mode at an inlet pressure of 74 psig. Further, according to [the employee], there are additional U0203FBBR-AA valves at Limerick that are exhibiting the same problem.
"On 11-29-2001 one valve was returned to Automatic Valve for further evaluation. At inlet pressures of 74 & 125 PSIG it was determined that the valve did not reset after the solenoid was de-energized. It did not reset until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 psig respectively.
"When tested in the normally open mode - pressure to port 1 [...], there was leakage at exhaust port 3 when the solenoid was energized but the valve immediately reset at its maximum rated inlet pressure of 125 psig when the solenoid was de-energized.
"When the valve was disassembled a permanent set in the rubber in the top plunger seal was found that conformed to the shape of the top seat in the solenoid plunger guide. This deformation is normal and is not a concern.
"The plunger was then dissected for additional analysis. It was determined that the top seat was 0.020" below the top surface of the plunger or 0.007" below the maximum design standard of 0.013".
"With the top seat 0.020 below the top surface of the plunger, the top seal was touching the top orifice but was not compressing the internal spring and hence not creating a good seal. Consequently, there was severe leakage out of exhaust port 3 which is 0.125 in diameter. This severe leakage created a pressure differential across the top of the plunger, and thus a force tending to hold the plunger in place. This force could not be overcome by the external spring until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 psig.
"It was observed that all parts of the dissected plunger were present and in their proper location. Further, it was noted that the tested leak rates and performance characteristics of the valve prior to the plunger being dissected did not match field reports from Exelon. Consequently, Exelon was contacted and additional samples were requested.
"On January 3, 2002 a second U0203FBBR-AA valve was returned to Automatic direct from Exelon - Limerick by [...]. This valve exhibited the same operational characteristics in the normally closed mode as did the valve returned on November 29, 2001. That is, it leaked excessively when energized. And, as with the previous valve examined by Automatic Valve, the inlet pressure at port 1 had to be reduced to approximately 54 psig after the solenoid was de-energized before the valve returned to its normally closed position.
"A second test was run on the valve returned on January 3, 2002. Previously both returned valves were tested 'cold.' That is, they had been at room temperature for a number of hours or days. When tested, pressurized air was plumbed to port 1 and the solenoid was energized only long enough to confirm that there was leakage out of port 3. Then the solenoid was de-energized and the inlet pressure reduced to a value that the plunger would return to its normally closed position. With the second valve, the solenoid was left energized with 125 psig of air to port 1. After a period of approximately 60 minutes, the leak at port 3 greatly diminished and, when the solenoid was de-energized, the valve immediately returned to its closed position. This test was repeated three (3) times with the same results.
"In summary, evaluation of the (2) valves resulted in the following symptoms and concerns:
"1. A faulty valve will leak out of port 3 when the valve is used in its normally closed mode [...] or leak out of port 1 when the valve is used in its normally open mode [...]
"2. There is no concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally open mode (pressure at port 3) will return to their de-actuated position (port 3 open to port 2 and port 1 blocked) when the solenoid is do-energized. In this mode both the internal spring, the external spring, and inlet pressure at port 1 act to return the plunger to its normal do-actuated position.
"3. There does not seem to be a concern, based on field experience, that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally closed mode (pressure at port 1) will return to their de-actuated position (port 2 open to port 3 and port 1 blocked) when the solenoid is de-energized provided the solenoid has been energized for an extended period of time. Test on the valve returned on January 3rd indicate that this period of time is approximately 15 minutes at 80 psig inlet pressure and approximately 60 minutes at 125 psig. However, the impact of further degradation of the shell relative to the seal, when the valve has been energized over an extended period of time is unknown.
"4. There would not seem to be a concern in applications where the U0203FBBR-** valve is used in the normally closed mode (air at port 1) and the valve is normally de-energized provided that, when energized, it is not energized for a total period of time exceeding 6 months.
"5. There is a concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally closed mode will not return to their de-actuated position if the valve has been in its de-energized position for a sufficient amount of time for the valve and the internal top seal to cool down. If the valve is energized then is de-energized, within a period of approximately 60 minutes with 125 psig at port 1, or 15 minutes with 80 psig at port 1 there is a high probability that the valve will not return to its de-energized condition."
"On 11-14-2001 [an employee] of Exelon Power Labs called and reported that (2) U0203FBBR-AA valves had been sent to their lab from Exelon - Limerick for evaluation with the complaint that the valves were leaking in the energized position. The valve is being used in the normally closed mode at an inlet pressure of 74 psig. Further, according to [the employee], there are additional U0203FBBR-AA valves at Limerick that are exhibiting the same problem.
"On 11-29-2001 one valve was returned to Automatic Valve for further evaluation. At inlet pressures of 74 & 125 PSIG it was determined that the valve did not reset after the solenoid was de-energized. It did not reset until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 psig respectively.
"When tested in the normally open mode - pressure to port 1 [...], there was leakage at exhaust port 3 when the solenoid was energized but the valve immediately reset at its maximum rated inlet pressure of 125 psig when the solenoid was de-energized.
"When the valve was disassembled a permanent set in the rubber in the top plunger seal was found that conformed to the shape of the top seat in the solenoid plunger guide. This deformation is normal and is not a concern.
"The plunger was then dissected for additional analysis. It was determined that the top seat was 0.020" below the top surface of the plunger or 0.007" below the maximum design standard of 0.013".
"With the top seat 0.020 below the top surface of the plunger, the top seal was touching the top orifice but was not compressing the internal spring and hence not creating a good seal. Consequently, there was severe leakage out of exhaust port 3 which is 0.125 in diameter. This severe leakage created a pressure differential across the top of the plunger, and thus a force tending to hold the plunger in place. This force could not be overcome by the external spring until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 psig.
"It was observed that all parts of the dissected plunger were present and in their proper location. Further, it was noted that the tested leak rates and performance characteristics of the valve prior to the plunger being dissected did not match field reports from Exelon. Consequently, Exelon was contacted and additional samples were requested.
"On January 3, 2002 a second U0203FBBR-AA valve was returned to Automatic direct from Exelon - Limerick by [...]. This valve exhibited the same operational characteristics in the normally closed mode as did the valve returned on November 29, 2001. That is, it leaked excessively when energized. And, as with the previous valve examined by Automatic Valve, the inlet pressure at port 1 had to be reduced to approximately 54 psig after the solenoid was de-energized before the valve returned to its normally closed position.
"A second test was run on the valve returned on January 3, 2002. Previously both returned valves were tested 'cold.' That is, they had been at room temperature for a number of hours or days. When tested, pressurized air was plumbed to port 1 and the solenoid was energized only long enough to confirm that there was leakage out of port 3. Then the solenoid was de-energized and the inlet pressure reduced to a value that the plunger would return to its normally closed position. With the second valve, the solenoid was left energized with 125 psig of air to port 1. After a period of approximately 60 minutes, the leak at port 3 greatly diminished and, when the solenoid was de-energized, the valve immediately returned to its closed position. This test was repeated three (3) times with the same results.
"In summary, evaluation of the (2) valves resulted in the following symptoms and concerns:
"1. A faulty valve will leak out of port 3 when the valve is used in its normally closed mode [...] or leak out of port 1 when the valve is used in its normally open mode [...]
"2. There is no concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally open mode (pressure at port 3) will return to their de-actuated position (port 3 open to port 2 and port 1 blocked) when the solenoid is do-energized. In this mode both the internal spring, the external spring, and inlet pressure at port 1 act to return the plunger to its normal do-actuated position.
"3. There does not seem to be a concern, based on field experience, that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally closed mode (pressure at port 1) will return to their de-actuated position (port 2 open to port 3 and port 1 blocked) when the solenoid is de-energized provided the solenoid has been energized for an extended period of time. Test on the valve returned on January 3rd indicate that this period of time is approximately 15 minutes at 80 psig inlet pressure and approximately 60 minutes at 125 psig. However, the impact of further degradation of the shell relative to the seal, when the valve has been energized over an extended period of time is unknown.
"4. There would not seem to be a concern in applications where the U0203FBBR-** valve is used in the normally closed mode (air at port 1) and the valve is normally de-energized provided that, when energized, it is not energized for a total period of time exceeding 6 months.
"5. There is a concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally closed mode will not return to their de-actuated position if the valve has been in its de-energized position for a sufficient amount of time for the valve and the internal top seal to cool down. If the valve is energized then is de-energized, within a period of approximately 60 minutes with 125 psig at port 1, or 15 minutes with 80 psig at port 1 there is a high probability that the valve will not return to its de-energized condition."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 38652
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2002
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an employee entering an inadvertent container area with a camera inside a plastic bag. During an investigation requiring pictures, the camera was removed from the plastic bag. When the employee was taking pictures the plastic bag was left unattended. This is a violation of NCSA-705076.A03 control #3 and #5. #3 When unattended, all potential inadvertent containers shall be modified to prevent an unsafe accumulation in the container. #5 If flexible material is utilized, it shall be configured or secured such that it cannot be deformed into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential.
"The plastic bag was removed from the area.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"LOW, There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the unattended plastic bag. The uranium recovery system was not in operation however solution was in the system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"The recovery system would have to be in operation bearing solution with an unknown or high quantity of uranium. A leak from the system would occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid would spray into the plastic bag. The liquid would then have to collect 2.5 liters and deform the plastic bag to a depth of greater then 1.5 inches and an unsafe geometry.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Volume 2.5 liters or Geometry 1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"No uranium bearing material was involved in this event
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"An unattended plastic bag in an inadvertent container area was not configured or secured such that it could not be filled or deformed into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The plastic bag was removed from the area."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
"The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an employee entering an inadvertent container area with a camera inside a plastic bag. During an investigation requiring pictures, the camera was removed from the plastic bag. When the employee was taking pictures the plastic bag was left unattended. This is a violation of NCSA-705076.A03 control #3 and #5. #3 When unattended, all potential inadvertent containers shall be modified to prevent an unsafe accumulation in the container. #5 If flexible material is utilized, it shall be configured or secured such that it cannot be deformed into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential.
"The plastic bag was removed from the area.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"LOW, There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the unattended plastic bag. The uranium recovery system was not in operation however solution was in the system.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"The recovery system would have to be in operation bearing solution with an unknown or high quantity of uranium. A leak from the system would occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid would spray into the plastic bag. The liquid would then have to collect 2.5 liters and deform the plastic bag to a depth of greater then 1.5 inches and an unsafe geometry.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"Volume 2.5 liters or Geometry 1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"No uranium bearing material was involved in this event
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"An unattended plastic bag in an inadvertent container area was not configured or secured such that it could not be filled or deformed into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The plastic bag was removed from the area."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed.