Event Notification Report for January 18, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/17/2002 - 01/18/2002
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38646
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BHATE ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: AUBURN State: AL
County:
License #: AL 655
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES McKEES
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: BHATE ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: AUBURN State: AL
County:
License #: AL 655
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES McKEES
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 01/22/2002
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 17:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2002
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 17:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SON NINH (R2)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
SON NINH (R2)
SUSAN FRANT (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
"...A Troxler Electronics Model 3430, Serial Number 30208 gauge had been stolen between 5:00 pm and 5:30 pm on Friday, January 18, 2002.
"On Friday evening January 18, 2002, two Bhate employees stopped after work for dinner at Nifflers Restaurant in Auburn, Alabama. At approximately 5:30 pm they came out of Nifflers and discovered the nuclear gauge. which had been chained to the bed of the truck was gone. Someone had cut the chain and taken the gauge, which was locked inside the transportation case.
"The device was found either Friday night or Saturday morning by the Auburn Police Department where it had been abandoned on Spring Hill Road in Auburn, Alabama.
"On Saturday afternoon, January 19, 2002, the Auburn Police Department contacted Dr. Charles Ray of Auburn University, who serves as an advisor to their local Haz-Mat team. Later that same afternoon, the Auburn Police Dept delivered to device to Auburn University, who placed the device, still inside the locked case, in their radioactive materials storage area. At approximately 8:00 am on the morning of Tuesday January 22, 2002, a representative of Bhate picked up the device from Auburn University. The case was still locked and the 'trigger lock' was also still in place.
"Several employees of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control were available and on pager at all times during this holiday weekend. It appears no one from the Agency was notified. The Agency plans to cite the licensee for failure to make immediate notification of the stolen device as required by 420-3-26-.03(51)(a) of the Alabama Administrative Code. A fax sent to the Agency's offices after hours does not constitute immediate notification."
"...A Troxler Electronics Model 3430, Serial Number 30208 gauge had been stolen between 5:00 pm and 5:30 pm on Friday, January 18, 2002.
"On Friday evening January 18, 2002, two Bhate employees stopped after work for dinner at Nifflers Restaurant in Auburn, Alabama. At approximately 5:30 pm they came out of Nifflers and discovered the nuclear gauge. which had been chained to the bed of the truck was gone. Someone had cut the chain and taken the gauge, which was locked inside the transportation case.
"The device was found either Friday night or Saturday morning by the Auburn Police Department where it had been abandoned on Spring Hill Road in Auburn, Alabama.
"On Saturday afternoon, January 19, 2002, the Auburn Police Department contacted Dr. Charles Ray of Auburn University, who serves as an advisor to their local Haz-Mat team. Later that same afternoon, the Auburn Police Dept delivered to device to Auburn University, who placed the device, still inside the locked case, in their radioactive materials storage area. At approximately 8:00 am on the morning of Tuesday January 22, 2002, a representative of Bhate picked up the device from Auburn University. The case was still locked and the 'trigger lock' was also still in place.
"Several employees of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control were available and on pager at all times during this holiday weekend. It appears no one from the Agency was notified. The Agency plans to cite the licensee for failure to make immediate notification of the stolen device as required by 420-3-26-.03(51)(a) of the Alabama Administrative Code. A fax sent to the Agency's offices after hours does not constitute immediate notification."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38638
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: OWENSBY AND KRITIKOS
Region: 4
City: SULPHUR State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: OWENSBY AND KRITIKOS
Region: 4
City: SULPHUR State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 01/18/2002
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2002
Notification Time: 12:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY ACCIDENT WITH POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION
Louisiana state licensee Owensby and Kritikos had an industrial radiography accident at the Citgo refinery in Lake Charles , La. It appears that the source drive cable crossed an electric line and a spark exploded the Iridium-192 source. They believe the source is in a safe condition, but there was considerable contamination outside the device. They also believe some people may have contamination on their clothing which may have been tracked to other areas. A health physicist has been dispatched to the scene. The state also told the licensee to isolate the area.
Louisiana state licensee Owensby and Kritikos had an industrial radiography accident at the Citgo refinery in Lake Charles , La. It appears that the source drive cable crossed an electric line and a spark exploded the Iridium-192 source. They believe the source is in a safe condition, but there was considerable contamination outside the device. They also believe some people may have contamination on their clothing which may have been tracked to other areas. A health physicist has been dispatched to the scene. The state also told the licensee to isolate the area.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38639
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: M. HANNEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: M. HANNEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/19/2002
Notification Time: 00:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 21:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2002
Notification Time: 00:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2002
Event Time: 21:23 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
ANTON VEGEL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
THREE OUT OF FOUR TIME DELAY SETTINGS FOR THE REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE ISOLATION CONDENSER INITIATION SWITCHES FOUND OUT OF CALIBRATION.
During performance of DIS 1300-01, Sustained High Reactor Pressure Calibration, three of the four time delay settings for the reactor high pressure Isolation Condenser initiation switches were found to be out of Technical Specification tolerance. The maximum time delay allowed per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.3.5.2.3 is 15 seconds. The time delays for high pressure switches 2-263-53A, 53A, and 53C were 15.6, 15.4, and 15.4 seconds respectively. The 2-263-53D switch was found in tolerance at 14.8 seconds. Each time delay was adjusted to be back in tolerance. This combination of three out-of-tolerance time delays could have prevented the Isolation Condenser from receiving an initiation signal within the 15 second Technical Specification required time limit.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
During performance of DIS 1300-01, Sustained High Reactor Pressure Calibration, three of the four time delay settings for the reactor high pressure Isolation Condenser initiation switches were found to be out of Technical Specification tolerance. The maximum time delay allowed per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.3.5.2.3 is 15 seconds. The time delays for high pressure switches 2-263-53A, 53A, and 53C were 15.6, 15.4, and 15.4 seconds respectively. The 2-263-53D switch was found in tolerance at 14.8 seconds. Each time delay was adjusted to be back in tolerance. This combination of three out-of-tolerance time delays could have prevented the Isolation Condenser from receiving an initiation signal within the 15 second Technical Specification required time limit.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.