Event Notification Report for January 08, 2002

POSITIVE RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST

A contract supervisor tested positive for cocaine during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's site access has been denied, and a review of the individual's work activities is underway. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional event details and for a site contact telephone number.)

The licensee notified the NRC Region 1 office (John Ray) and the State Department of Environmental Protection.

SLOW RESPONSE TIME DURING A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) PUMP TIME RESPONSE SURVEILLANCE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 01/08/02 at 1305 hrs, while performing a HPCI pump time response surveillance, the HPCI pump achieved rated pressure and flow in 31.5 seconds. This exceeded the acceptance criteria of <29 seconds. HPCI was declared inoperable due to this surveillance failure. Plant personnel are evaluating the data to determine the cause of the failure. All other [emergency core cooling system (ECCS)] equipment and [reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)] are operable. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE 1235EST ON 2/21/02 FROM PATRICK FALLON TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the apparent slow HPCI response time obtained on 1/8/02 is not reportable. No specific equipment degradations or system malfunctions were identified that could have led to the delay in the system response time obtained on 1/8/02. Following additional testing and discussions with an outside equipment expert it was concluded that the HPCI system response time is a function of the time that the HPCI combined hydraulic and lubricating oil system has been in standby. Specifically, the time for the ramp generator to start, allowing steam admission to the turbine, is dependent on oil system pressurization, and is a function of the time that the oil system has been in standby. This is due to oil system drain down during system inactivity, the bulk of which occurs in the first few days.

"The response time of 31.5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 followed approximately 41 days of oil system inactivity. Subsequent runs on 1/10/02 and 1/12/02 resulted in response times of 25.7 and 24.7 seconds, respectively. The period of oil system inactivity prior to these two runs was very short, resulting in quicker oil system pressurization, and thus a shorter delay in the start of the ramp generator.

"Although the acceptance criteria for this test specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and in plant procedures was 29 seconds, the analyzed limit for HPCI injection to the vessel is actually 60 seconds. Thus, the response time of 31 .5 seconds obtained on 1/8/02 was well within the analyzed limit (60 seconds), less an allowance for instrument and sensor response time (5 second). Therefore, the high pressure injection safety function was maintained and this event is not reportable. Consequently, this notification is being retracted. "

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Jorgensen).

DISCOVERY OF A POTENTIAL UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING AN APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE ANALYSIS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"While investigating fire risk scenarios associated with the auxiliary feedwater system (see EN #38541), a potential unanalyzed condition involving an Appendix R safe shutdown fire analysis was discovered. The problem involves the availability of sufficient AFW flow capacity for a fire in the Central 26' and 46' areas of the Primary Auxiliary Building (Fire Area A01-B/Fire Zones 187 [and] 237)."

"Cables and equipment associated with all [four] AFW pumps (both turbine- and motor-driven pumps) are located in this fire area. A fire in this area could potentially cause a loss of normal Steam Generator instrumentation for both units. This would require shutdown of both units. An alternate cable routing is available for only the Red channel of instrumentation. This channel is only available for the 'B' train steam generators. Therefore, the present Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis assumes this shutdown would be accomplished using the 'B' steam generators for each unit and the P38B motor-driven AFW pump, which feeds the 'B' steam generator in each unit, along with the use of manual actions to mitigate the fire damage to cables associated with valves and instruments. The nominal capacity of this AFW pump is 200 GPM."

"An Appendix R calculation shows that approximately 200 gal/min is required during the initial start-up of AFW flow to maintain sufficient heat removal capability for one unit. Under the current conditions with procedural controls, only the one motor-driven AFW pump is made available, [and] there may not be enough capacity to provide adequate decay heat removal for both units. Without sufficient AFW flow, the Appendix R performance requirement of 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix R III.G.L.2.c, which requires the reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal, may not be met. This condition is potentially an unanalyzed Appendix R situation."

"As a compensatory measure, fire rounds are being conducted in the fire areas affected."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE @ 1349 ON 1/17/02 BY RODE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION

At 1625 CST on January 8, 2002, ENS Event Notification #38618 was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for identification of a potential unanalyzed condition involving the Appendix R safe shutdown fire analysis. The notification involved a concern with the availability of sufficient auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow capacity for a fire in the Central 26' and 46' areas of the Primary Auxiliary Building (Fire Area A01 -B/ Fire Zones 187 & 237). The information documented in the SSAMS (Safe Shutdown Analysis Management System) database, indicated that the Appendix R fire scenario for Fire Area A01-B relies on the use of a single motor driven AFW pump (P-038B) to provide RCS decay heat removal for both units. The design capacity of P-038B is approximately 200 gpm @ 1,300 psi. An Appendix R Calculation demonstrates that approximately 200 gal/min is initially required during fire safe shutdown to maintain sufficient heat removal capability for each Unit. Therefore, P-038B, alone, does not provide sufficient decay heat removal capacity for both units.

Upon closer examination of the analyses and documentation supporting the SSAMS, we have identified that this was not an unanalyzed condition but was due to a SSAMS documentation error. A PBNP Manual Action Feasibility Report (FPTE-012) had evaluated the feasibility of the use of two separate sets of aux. feed water pumps for fires in different areas of Fire Area A01-B. That report documented the capability for manually operating the steam supply valves to start the turbine driven pumps (each with a capacity in excess of 400 gpm which can be aligned to the unit's B' steam generators) for a fire in Fire Zones 187-199. For the fire in Fire Zone 237, the electric driven pumps can be manually aligned to the 'B' steam generators using the available cross-connect (i.e., opening valves AF-30 and AF-43). The two electric pumps provide a total capacity of 400 gpm, which is sufficient decay heat removal capacity for both units. This information was inadvertently omitted from the SSAMS database. Based on this more complete information, we have concluded that an unanalyzed condition did not exist and are retracting our event notification.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

Region 3 RDO (Vegel) was notified.

SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO AN AREA DOOR.

A safeguards system degradation related to an area door was discovered. Compensatory measures were put in place within 10 minutes. (Contact the HOO for additional information.)

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

***** RETRACTION FROM ANDREW OHRABLO TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1727 EST ON 01/08/02 *****

The licensee is retracting this event notification because it was determined to be loggable only. (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional details.)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Additionally, the power level stated on the original event notification was 100%. Power level both before and after was 94%."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Chuck Cain).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE THAT OCCURRED IN AMELIA, LA

"There were three equipment failures that were not reported until March 18, 2002. The one on January 8, 2001 was a locking mechanism failure on a INC IR-100 radiography camera with serial number 4473. The one on January 30, 2001 also involved a locking mechanism failure on a the same model radiography camera with serial number 4470. The one on July 30, 2001 involved a locking mechanism failure. It is the same model of camera with the 4471 serial number. All of the cameras were sent to Source Production Equipment Company for repair. These cameras utilize Ir-192. The rest of the information has been entered in NMED. "

The State of Louisiana logged this event as Event Report ID No.: LA020004.