Event Notification Report for December 12, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/11/2001 - 12/12/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38557
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38557 |
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| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/11/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:16[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:39[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ED BREWER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LEONARD WERT R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INVALID ACTUATION OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WHILE THE UNIT WAS
IN |
| COLD SHUTDOWN (60-Day Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1), is being made |
| under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an |
| invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the reactor protection |
| system (RPS). On October 17, 2001, at 1039 with Unit 2 in MODE 5 with a |
| boron concentration of 2531 ppm, an invalid reactor trip signal was |
| generated from 2 out of 4 logic for overtemperature delta-T. The reactor |
| trip breakers opened as designed upon receipt of the invalid reactor trip |
| signal. All control rods and shutdown rods were already fully inserted |
| before the invalid reactor trip signal trip signal was generated. At the |
| time of the invalid reactor trip signal, reactor protection channel III had |
| been properly removed from service for maintenance testing. Other |
| maintenance technicians were in the process of setting up test equipment in |
| reactor protection channel I for upcoming resistance temperature detector |
| cross calibrations. The technicians thought that the place where they were |
| connecting the test equipment was isolated from the circuit and would have |
| no effect on the plant. During the connections, a momentary spike occurred |
| on reactor protection channel I. This completed the 2 out of 4 logic for an |
| overtemperature delta-T reactor trip, and a reactor trip occurred. The |
| control room operators entered appropriate procedures and verified proper |
| equipment operation for the existing plant conditions. Both trains A [and] B |
| of the reactor protection system actuated. This was a complete actuation, |
| and the system performed as designed for the existing plant conditions. |
| This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program |
| for resolution." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify |
| applicable state, county, and local agencies. |
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