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Event Notification Report for December 11, 2001

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           12/10/2001 - 12/11/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38029  38553  38554  38555  38556  
.
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38029       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/24/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/24/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:09[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE HAUNER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       1        Startup          |1        Startup          |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "During a reactor startup following a refueling outage, HPCI was declared    |
| inoperable and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.72(b)(3)(vi) as  |
| a single failure.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon completion of HPCI system operability testing, it was discovered that  |
| the HPCI system flow controller indicated approximately 500 GPM verses an    |
| expected 0 GPM. Since the plant is in MODE 2 and reactor pressure is greater |
| than 150 PSIG, HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14-day LCO was entered per |
| TS 3.5.1, condition F.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The preliminary investigation results are that air in the HPCI system flow  |
| transmitter sensing lines is causing the erroneous flow indication.          |
| Troubleshooting efforts are in progress."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
|                                                                              |
| ***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN KARRICK TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1536 EDT ON 12/10/01 
|
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a retraction of event number 38029 from May 24, 2001.  The initial  |
| report involved an erroneous reading on the flow-indicating controller       |
| (FIC-2309) for the HPCI system.  At the time of the discovery, the           |
| consequence of FIC-2309 reading high was believed to be a non-conservative   |
| speed demand signal to the HPCI turbine such that the actual HPCI injection  |
| flow would fall short of that required (assuming an auto start with no       |
| operator action).  As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable and a report    |
| was made.  A calculation has since concluded that actual HPCI operability    |
| would not have been lost given the as-found condition.  Also, the quarterly  |
| surveillance test to prove HPCI operability had just been successfully       |
| completed.  During the time HPCI was considered inoperable, it remained      |
| available for use (as documented in Operator logs).  Therefore, there was no |
| actual loss of HPCI as a single train safety system and there was no event   |
| or condition that could have prevented safety function fulfillment.  This    |
| event is being retracted.  A formal cancellation letter to withdraw the LER  |
| (331/2001-002) is also being mailed."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R3DO (Anne Marie Stone).                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38553       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:53[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        12/10/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:48[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/10/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |ANNE MARIE STONE     R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATT MAURER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)        SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT LOSS OF POWER TO THE C-315 TAILS WITHDRAWAL BUILDING DURING
AN   |
| IMPROPERLY PERFORMED POWER SWITCHING EVOLUTION (24-Hour Report)              |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Paducah:    |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0348 CST on 12-10-01, 480-volt power was inadvertently lost to the C-315 |
| tails withdrawal building during an improperly performed power switching     |
| evolution.  As a result of the power loss, the high voltage UF6 release      |
| detection system for the UF6 condensers, accumulators, and heated housings   |
| was rendered inoperable for approximately 10 minutes.  The high voltage UF6  |
| release detection system is required to be operable per TSR 2.3.4.4.  The    |
| function of the high voltage UF6 release detection system is to detect UF6   |
| releases and to sound an alarm in the local control room.  The power loss    |
| also caused the withdrawal systems to shut down and automatically isolate as |
| designed.  No UF6 releases occurred as a result of this evolution.  Power    |
| was restored and the building was returned to normal operation."             |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which     |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as            |
| designed."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38554       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:58[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        10/29/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:21[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDY HALLIDAY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CLIFFORD ANDERSON    R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1)         INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       66       Power Operation  |66       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVALID PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO  |
| A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM POWER DISTRIBUTION BUS  (60-Day Report in        |
| Accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1))                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Event Description"                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0121 hours on October 29, 2001, with the plant operating at 66 percent   |
| of rated thermal power, power was lost to Reactor Protection System (RPS)    |
| power distribution bus B as a result of an Electrical Protective Assembly    |
| (EPA) logic card failure."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The power sources for the RPS provide power to both the RPS and the Primary |
| Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits.  Loss of power to RPS    |
| power distribution bus B resulted in invalid actuation of RPS trip system B  |
| and [PCIS] trip system B.  The RPS trip was a partial actuation (a 'half     |
| scram'), and the PCIS trip was also a partial actuation (a 'half             |
| isolation')."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The portions of PCIS logic that are designed with separate 'inboard' and    |
| 'outboard' logic had the 'outboard' logic de-energized due to the power      |
| loss.  This resulted in the automatic closure of the outboard primary        |
| containment isolation valves [...] for the:  drywell pressure sensing line,  |
| pressure suppression chamber pressure sensing line, Reactor Water Cleanup    |
| system pump suction line, Reactor Water Cleanup system return line, and      |
| reactor water sample line."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The de-energized PCIS logic circuits also initiated automatic closure of    |
| Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) ventilation system outboard supply  |
| and exhaust isolation valves and automatically started Standby Gas Treatment |
| (SGT) subsystem B, as designed, to maintain the reactor building atmosphere  |
| at a slightly negative pressure."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Operating personnel restored power to RPS power distribution bus B by       |
| transferring to the alternate power source.  The invalid PCIS and RPS trip   |
| signals that were caused by the loss of power were reset, systems that       |
| isolated were restored to service, reactor building ventilation was restored |
| to normal, and SGT subsystem B was restored to a normal standby status."     |
|                                                                              |
| "Actions Taken"                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "1.  RPS power distribution bus B was energized from the alternate power     |
| source."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "2.  RPS and PCIS logic systems were reset."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "3.  The affected systems were restored to normal."                          |
|                                                                              |
| "4.  Troubleshooting of a logic card associated with the tripped EPA circuit |
| breaker revealed a failed capacitor.  The failed logic card was replaced     |
| with a refurbished logic card from stock."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "5.  Power to RPS power distribution bus B was transferred back to the       |
| normal (motor generator) source."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "6.  New capacitors will be installed on the logic cards, or refurbished     |
| logic cards will be installed, in the subject EPAs during the next available |
| maintenance window."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38555       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:40[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        12/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM OSELAND                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ANNE MARIE STONE     R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES MAY               |
| INTERMITTENTLY LIFT DURING THE MOST LIMITING ATWS TRANSIENTS  (Refer to      |
| event #38556 for a similar notification received from Dresden Unit 3.)       |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "While performing calculations associated with the power uprate project,     |
| Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station determined that the Standby Liquid Control |
| (SLC) system relief valves on Unit 1 and Unit 2 may intermittently lift      |
| during the most limiting ATWS [transients.  (The] specific scenario          |
| evaluated is a Main Steam Line isolation at rated power with failure of the  |
| normal, backup, and alternate rod insertion (ARI) scram functions.)  This    |
| issue also applies to the current rated power level during two-pump SLC      |
| operation.  Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, subpart 50.62,      |
| requires the SLC system to inject the equivalent of 86 gpm of 13-weight      |
| percent sodium pentaborate solution.  While the relief valve was lifted, the |
| system flow rate would not meet the required equivalent flow rate into the   |
| vessel.  Therefore, this condition is not in direct compliance with 10 CFR   |
| 50.62.  The NRC communicated a similar industry issue in Information Notice  |
| 2001-13."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Further plant specific analysis has demonstrated that an adequate volume of |
| boron would be injected to shut down the reactor and meet the appropriate    |
| acceptance criteria including reactor pressure, peak cladding temperature,   |
| peak suppression pool temperature, and peak containment pressure.  For these |
| reasons, the safety significance of this event is minimal."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "This phone call is being made as an informational call.  Written            |
| communications, as appropriate, will be submitted to provide additional      |
| detail.  The station will continue to communicate additional information     |
| with the NRC resident inspectors and with Region Ill as it is identified."   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38556       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:49[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        12/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB SCOTT                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ANNE MARIE STONE     R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES ON UNIT 3
MAY     |
| INTERMITTENTLY LIFT DURING THE MOST LIMITING ATWS TRANSIENTS  (Refer to      |
| event #38555 for a similar notification received from Quad Cities.)          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "While performing calculations associated with the power uprate project,     |
| Dresden Nuclear Power Station determined that the Standby Liquid Control     |
| (SLC) system relief valves on Unit 3 may intermittently lift during the most |
| limiting ATWS [transients.  (The] specific scenario evaluated is a Main      |
| Steam Line isolation at rated power with failure of the normal, backup, and  |
| alternate rod insertion (ARI) scram functions.)  This issue also applies to  |
| the current rated power level during two pump SLC operation.  Title 10 of    |
| the Code of Federal Regulations, subpart 50.62, requires the SLC system to   |
| inject the equivalent of 86 gpm of 13-weight percent sodium pentaborate      |
| solution.  While the relief valve was lifted, the system flow rate would not |
| meet the required equivalent flow rate into the vessel.  Therefore, this     |
| condition is not in direct compliance with 10 CFR 50.62.  The NRC            |
| communicated a similar industry issue in Information Notice 2001-13"         |
|                                                                              |
| "Further plant specific analysis has demonstrated that an adequate volume of |
| boron would be injected to shut down the reactor and meet the appropriate    |
| acceptance criteria including reactor pressure, peak cladding temperature,   |
| peak suppression pool temperature, and peak containment pressure.  For these |
| reasons, the safety significance of this event is minimal."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "This phone call is being made as an informational call.  Written            |
| communications, as appropriate, will be submitted to provide additional      |
| detail.  The station will continue to communicate additional information     |
| with the NRC resident inspectors and with [NRC] Region Ill as it is          |
| identified."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that although Dresden Units 2 and 3 are similar vintage  |
| boiling water reactors, this issue does not apply to Dresden Unit 2 because  |
| the piping runs are different.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.