Event Notification Report for October 29, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/2001 - 10/29/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38799
Facility: MAINE YANKEE
Region: 1 State: ME
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DON PENDAGAST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: ME
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DON PENDAGAST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 03/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2002
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING UNPLANNED EFFLUENT RELEASES
The licensee notified the State of Maine regarding three separate inadvertent liquid releases which occurred during the period from 10/29/2001 through 11/12/2001. Each release involved approximately 1800 gallons of water, with a combined total activity of 0.03 Ci.
The licensee stated that the official notification had been delayed due to disagreements regarding the wording of the notification with the state. NRC Region 1 has been informed of this notification.
The licensee notified the State of Maine regarding three separate inadvertent liquid releases which occurred during the period from 10/29/2001 through 11/12/2001. Each release involved approximately 1800 gallons of water, with a combined total activity of 0.03 Ci.
The licensee stated that the official notification had been delayed due to disagreements regarding the wording of the notification with the state. NRC Region 1 has been informed of this notification.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38554
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY HALLIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY HALLIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2001
Event Time: 01:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2001
Event Time: 01:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 66 | Power Operation | 66 | Power Operation |
INVALID PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM POWER DISTRIBUTION BUS (60-Day Report in Accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1))
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Event Description"
"At 0121 hours on October 29, 2001, with the plant operating at 66 percent of rated thermal power, power was lost to Reactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution bus B as a result of an Electrical Protective Assembly (EPA) logic card failure."
"The power sources for the RPS provide power to both the RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits. Loss of power to RPS power distribution bus B resulted in invalid actuation of RPS trip system B and [PCIS] trip system B. The RPS trip was a partial actuation (a 'half scram'), and the PCIS trip was also a partial actuation (a 'half isolation')."
"The portions of PCIS logic that are designed with separate 'inboard' and 'outboard' logic had the 'outboard' logic de-energized due to the power loss. This resulted in the automatic closure of the outboard primary containment isolation valves [...] for the: drywell pressure sensing line, pressure suppression chamber pressure sensing line, Reactor Water Cleanup system pump suction line, Reactor Water Cleanup system return line, and reactor water sample line."
"The de-energized PCIS logic circuits also initiated automatic closure of Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) ventilation system outboard supply and exhaust isolation valves and automatically started Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem B, as designed, to maintain the reactor building atmosphere at a slightly negative pressure."
"Operating personnel restored power to RPS power distribution bus B by transferring to the alternate power source. The invalid PCIS and RPS trip signals that were caused by the loss of power were reset, systems that isolated were restored to service, reactor building ventilation was restored to normal, and SGT subsystem B was restored to a normal standby status."
"Actions Taken"
"1. RPS power distribution bus B was energized from the alternate power source."
"2. RPS and PCIS logic systems were reset."
"3. The affected systems were restored to normal."
"4. Troubleshooting of a logic card associated with the tripped EPA circuit breaker revealed a failed capacitor. The failed logic card was replaced with a refurbished logic card from stock."
"5. Power to RPS power distribution bus B was transferred back to the normal (motor generator) source."
"6. New capacitors will be installed on the logic cards, or refurbished logic cards will be installed, in the subject EPAs during the next available maintenance window."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Event Description"
"At 0121 hours on October 29, 2001, with the plant operating at 66 percent of rated thermal power, power was lost to Reactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution bus B as a result of an Electrical Protective Assembly (EPA) logic card failure."
"The power sources for the RPS provide power to both the RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits. Loss of power to RPS power distribution bus B resulted in invalid actuation of RPS trip system B and [PCIS] trip system B. The RPS trip was a partial actuation (a 'half scram'), and the PCIS trip was also a partial actuation (a 'half isolation')."
"The portions of PCIS logic that are designed with separate 'inboard' and 'outboard' logic had the 'outboard' logic de-energized due to the power loss. This resulted in the automatic closure of the outboard primary containment isolation valves [...] for the: drywell pressure sensing line, pressure suppression chamber pressure sensing line, Reactor Water Cleanup system pump suction line, Reactor Water Cleanup system return line, and reactor water sample line."
"The de-energized PCIS logic circuits also initiated automatic closure of Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) ventilation system outboard supply and exhaust isolation valves and automatically started Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem B, as designed, to maintain the reactor building atmosphere at a slightly negative pressure."
"Operating personnel restored power to RPS power distribution bus B by transferring to the alternate power source. The invalid PCIS and RPS trip signals that were caused by the loss of power were reset, systems that isolated were restored to service, reactor building ventilation was restored to normal, and SGT subsystem B was restored to a normal standby status."
"Actions Taken"
"1. RPS power distribution bus B was energized from the alternate power source."
"2. RPS and PCIS logic systems were reset."
"3. The affected systems were restored to normal."
"4. Troubleshooting of a logic card associated with the tripped EPA circuit breaker revealed a failed capacitor. The failed logic card was replaced with a refurbished logic card from stock."
"5. Power to RPS power distribution bus B was transferred back to the normal (motor generator) source."
"6. New capacitors will be installed on the logic cards, or refurbished logic cards will be installed, in the subject EPAs during the next available maintenance window."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.