Event Notification Report for October 17, 2001
*** NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION***
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/16/2001 - 10/17/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38220 38376 38395
.
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38220 |
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| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/17/2001|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 08/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:45[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSSELL STROUD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/16/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY GODY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 97 Power Operation |55 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE A LEAK FROM THE FUEL POOL INTO
CONTAINMENT |
| |
| "On August 17, 2001 at approximately 1245 MST, Palo Verde Unit 3 was at |
| approximately 97 percent power and at normal RCS temperature and pressure, |
| when operations personnel detected an increase in containment sump level. |
| Subsequent investigation revealed the quick operating closure device (QOCD) |
| (EQID #PCE-M01) that isolates the containment from the fuel transfer tube |
| was leaking by borated water from the fuel transfer canal at approximately 1 |
| gallon per minute. Operations personnel entered TS LCO 3.6.1 Containment, |
| Required Action A. This action requires the containment be restored to an |
| operable status within one hour. |
| |
| "Since containment integrity was uncertain, and compliance with LCO 3.6 1 |
| Required Action A could not be met within one hour, operations personnel |
| entered LCO 3.6.1, Required Action 8.1 at 1345 MST. Required Action B.1 |
| requires the unit be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours, and Required Action 8.2 |
| requires the unit be placed in Mode 5 within 36 hours, Following operations |
| briefings, shutdown was commenced at approximately 1645 MST. At this time, |
| Palo Verde Unit 3 is continuing to reduce power in an orderly manner and |
| anticipates being in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) by approximately 1845 MST. |
| |
| "There were no other component failures, testing or work in progress that |
| contributed to this event. The QOCD leak is allowing 4400 part per million |
| borated water into the containment. There has been no release of |
| radioactivity to the environment and no impact to the health and safety of |
| the public has occurred or is anticipated. There is no elevated RCS activity |
| and heat removal is via normal steaming to the main turbine condenser. The |
| electric grid is stable." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1257 EDT ON 10/16/01 BY DANIEL HAUTALA TO FANGIE JONES * |
| * * |
| |
| "This notification is a retraction to the August 17, 2001, ENS #38220 which |
| reported a Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 shutdown required by |
| Technical Specification 3.6.1. In the condition described by this ENS, the |
| failure, a loss of containment integrity, never existed. Although personnel |
| conservatively declared containment inoperable, plant engineers have since |
| determined that containment integrity per Technical Specification 3.6.1 was |
| maintained. The water leakage into containment via the Quick Operating |
| Closure Device (QOCD) 0-rings did not constitute or create a potential |
| accident leakage path out of containment. Therefore, the subsequent plant |
| shutdown was not required by a Technical Specification action. |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| |
| The Region 4 Duty Officer (Bill Jones) has been notified. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38376 |
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| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/10/2001|
|LICENSEE: LAW ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL SER|NOTIFICATION TIME:
17:29[EDT]|
| CITY: DALLAS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/10/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: L02453 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/10/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR. (fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING DISCOVERY OF A LAW ENGINEERING AND
|
| ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES GAUGE ON A RESIDENTIAL STREET BY AN EMPLOYEE
OF |
| ANOTHER COMPANY |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas |
| Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control: |
| |
| "Texas Incident No.: I-7810" |
| |
| "License No.: L02453" |
| |
| "Licensee: Law Engineering and Environmental Services, Houston, Texas (Fort |
| Worth Subsite)" |
| |
| "Event date and time: 10/10/01 a.m." |
| |
| "Event location: Dallas, Texas (exact location unknown at this time - gauge |
| was transported to 10722 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75220[)]" |
| |
| "Event type: Found Nuclear Density Gauge, Troxler 3411 B, Serial #11251" |
| |
| "Notifications: Notified Troxler Electronic Labs, TDH Public Health Region |
| 3 to pickup gauge and have leak tested." |
| |
| "Event description: Gauge found in the middle of a residential street by an |
| employee of Giles Engineering, Texas License L04919-001. Gauge was found to |
| be un-locked - both case and control rod. The gauge was reported to be in |
| the 'On' position. No shipping papers were found in the case. No warning |
| stickers were reported to be on the exterior of the case. Troxler Labs |
| reports that the gauge was last seen by them over 2-years ago and was then |
| owned by Austin Testing Engineers - no evidence of Licensure through this |
| Agency. Gauge was tracked to Law Engineering in Fort Worth. TDH is holding |
| the gauge. Will have leak test performed. Licensee was unaware that the |
| gauge was missing and could not immediately find if the gauge was assigned |
| on a job for 10/10/01." |
| |
| "Transport vehicle description: None available at this time." |
| |
| "Media attention: None" |
| |
| (Contact the NRC operations officer for an agreement state point of |
| contact.) |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38395 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/16/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:18[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2) |EVENT DATE: 10/16/2001|
| LEU FABRICATION |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| LWR COMMERICAL FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/16/2001|
| CITY: WILMINGTON REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: NEW HANOVER STATE: NC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1097 AGREEMENT: Y |DOUGLAS COLLINS R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001113 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LON PAULSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - 24 HOUR |
| |
| The following is from a faxed report: |
| |
| At approximately 1630 on October 15, 2001 following an automatic shutdown of |
| Dry Conversion Process Line 2, a higher than normal moisture analytical |
| result was identified on Line 2A powder outlet cooling hopper. Manual |
| moisture sample results indicated free moisture content in the U02 powder |
| averaged 1.2% which is above the operational limit of 0.4% but well below |
| the safety limit of 11 .2%. |
| |
| The associated outlet hatch valve control valve seats were subsequently |
| determined to be leaking, leading to material with a higher than normal |
| moisture content in the cooling hopper. The associated active engineered |
| control (AEC) interlocks functioned as designed, the cooling hoppers were |
| isolated, and the conversion process was automatically shutdown, thus no |
| unsafe condition existed. |
| |
| The affected material has been transferred to favorable geometry containers |
| per procedure. |
| |
| Controls were reestablished within 4 hours by proper function of the |
| redundant dewpoint probe interlocks and automatic system shutdown. This |
| event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to |
| loss of one of two independent moderation controls. Line 2 conversion |
| remains shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective |
| actions. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Low safety significance - actual moisture content averaged 1.2% (12,200 ppm |
| H20) within the established uniform moderation limit of 11.2% for (112,000 |
| ppm H20) for the cooling hopper. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS. MODERATION. GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION.
ETC): |
| |
| Moderation |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Net U02 inside cooling hopper A was ~50 kgs (4.95 % enriched) with 1.22% H20 |
| (12,200 ppm H20). |
| Uniform moderation limit for cooling hopper is 11.2% (112,000 ppm H20) |
| assuming 5% enriched U02. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| Upstream moderation control on outlet hatch control system partially failed |
| due to valve seat. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| 1. Conversion Line 2 shutdown. |
| 2. Outlet hatch valve being replaced. |
| 3. Investigation and implementation of additional corrective actions |
| pending. |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the local and state authorities and NRC |
| Region 2 (David Ayres) |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021