Event Notification Report for September 26, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/25/2001 - 09/26/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38313 38314 38315 38316
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38313 |
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| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/24/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:51[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOSEPH PIERCE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS |
| |
| The licensee reported that Salem Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor due to |
| a loss of circulating water pumps, caused by a fault on the #2 station power |
| transformer. The fault isolation caused loss of one of the required two |
| off-site power sources to both Salem units. Auxiliary feedwater started on |
| low steam generator level after isolation of main feedwater due to the |
| reactor trip. All system functioned as required. The unit is stable in Hot |
| Standby and an investigation into the cause of the electrical disturbance is |
| underway. |
| |
| Two of four reactor coolant pumps tripped when the unit was tripped, which |
| is expected with the partial loss of off-site power. Presently, the only |
| major secondary equipment that is unavailable is associated with the loss of |
| power to two of four non-vital 4 Kv buses. There is one shutdown Technical |
| Specification in effect and that is associated with having only one off-site |
| power source. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38314 |
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| REP ORG: DEFENSE MICROELECTRONICS ACTIVITY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
|LICENSEE: DEFENSE MICROELECTRONICS ACTIVITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:22[EDT]|
| CITY: McCLELLAN REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/25/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID PENTROSE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
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| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INCORRECT ACTIVITY SOURCE PROVIDED BY VENDOR |
| |
| The licensee called to report that a sealed source installed in their |
| irradiator facility does not have the source activity specified. The source |
| is supposed to contain 200 Ci, but the licensee estimates the actual |
| activity at approximately 100 Ci. The source was installed by GE Vallecito |
| within the past several weeks. The licensee has contacted GE regarding the |
| apparent discrepancy. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38315 |
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| REP ORG: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
|LICENSEE: BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC|NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:25[EDT]|
| CITY: HOBBS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/22/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: NM |EVENT TIME: 00:00[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: WL241 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/25/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MILLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| BAKER HUGHES OIL FIELD OPERATIONS INC. REPORTED A STUCK WELL LOGGING SOURCE |
| |
| New Mexico state licensee Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations Inc. has a stuck |
| source 2018 ft below the surface which they are currently fishing for |
| retrieval. It contains 2 curies of Cesium-137, 18 curies |
| Americium-241/Beryllium and 0.8 microcuries Cesium-137. The location is |
| between Hobbs and Artesia, NM east of Loco Hills. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38316 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/25/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| At 0930 uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a |
| block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA |
| 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of Uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of |
| NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE |
| 0705_076.E03 |
| |
| Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of |
| material, which may affect this report. |
| |
| |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is potentially high (at this time) |
| because the exact amount of Uranium bearing material that could have entered |
| the opening in the block wall is unknown. Measurements to quantify the |
| material are In progress. The apparent block wall construction (as evidenced |
| by visual inspection of wall openings in the other areas of Recovery) |
| indicates the potential for the presence of unfavorable geometry voids |
| within and between the blocks compromising the exterior building wall. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing material entered the void |
| spaces of the block wall. 2) the material has collected in the multiple |
| voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry configuration. 3) the |
| material has a high enrichment and uranium concentration, and 4) the |
| material would become sufficiently moderated, then a potentially critical |
| configuration could result. Note that no spills or leaks of uranium bearing |
| material from present X-705 systems has occurred at this time. The material |
| in question has apparently been there for some time. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Double contingency for inadvertent Containers relies upon the physical |
| integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of |
| material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment of |
| the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative controls |
| limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume containers |
| that could collect a spill or leak. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT. ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Unknown at this time. Enrichment could be greater than 90% based upon |
| historical operations. The form Is most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. |
| Measurements for determination of mass arid assay are currently in |
| progress. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| The openings leading to the interior spaces of the block wall is a violation |
| of administrative control #3 of NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry |
| or volume of the potential collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one |
| leg of double contingency as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of |
| an unknown (at this time) amount of uranium bearing material that has |
| spilled (at some time in the facility's past) is a potential violation of |
| passive design feature 1 of NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical |
| integrity of X-705 system piping. This would represent a loss of the second |
| leg of double contingency as defined in NCSE-0705_076,E03. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken |
| to determine amounts of material and assay. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| notified. |
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