Event Notification Report for September 7, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/06/2001 - 09/07/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38132 38266 38267 38268 38269
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38132 |
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| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GENE MICHELSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL |
| STORAGE TANKS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and |
| D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks. [There was 33 inches of water in |
| D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.] This event would prevent both diesel |
| generators from fulfilling their required safety function. [Technical |
| Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability |
| manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered." |
| |
| "Actions Taken: Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12 |
| underground fuel oil storage tanks. [The licensee is] currently performing |
| [an] operability determination." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting |
| condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 09/06/01 AT 1407 ET BY STAN GAMBLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * |
| * * |
| |
| Subsequent testing verified that the water level in both tanks was below the |
| fuel oil transfer pump suction and that no water was found in the associated |
| Day Tanks. |
| |
| Since no water had been nor would it have been transferred from the Fuel Oil |
| Storage Tanks to the Day Tanks during operation of the Diesel Generators, a |
| condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented |
| the fulfillment of the safety function. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38266 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:52[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/06/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 06:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK RING R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+RICHARD WESSMAN IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4 HOUR REPORT - NRC BULLETIN 91-01 |
| |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report: |
| |
| At 0600, on 9-06-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| moisture sampling results on Unit 1 Cell 2 even R-114 system in building |
| C-337 were above allowable limits of NCSA CAS-011. NCSA CAS-011 sets the |
| limit for moisture content in R-114 at 1760 ppm. The sample results showed |
| that the actual moisture content in C-337 Unit 1 Cell 2 even R-114 system |
| was 2100 ppm. |
| |
| Set point calculations for the R-114 moisture meters used by Cascade |
| personnel to determine the moisture content of R-114 for Cascade coolant |
| systems was found biased low with respect to moisture content. The meters |
| are used to detect high moisture levels in the R-114. An R-114 system |
| containing a high moisture content is required to be independently verified |
| drained prior to removing the fluorinating process environment. Since the |
| setpoint calculation was potentially in error, R-114 with a potentially high |
| moisture content was not immediately drained according to NCSA CAS-002. |
| This control prevents a moderating environment within the process gas system |
| from exceeding 50% relative humidity at 70 degrees F. |
| |
| The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| The final determination of whether the moisture content limit has been |
| exceeded cannot be made until the moisture meter "as-found" calibration data |
| can be reviewed. This data a not currently available. However, the plant |
| is pro-actively taking the compensatory actions as though the moisture meter |
| were in error until such time as the calibration data can be reviewed as a |
| final determination made. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| In order for a criticality to be possible a fissile deposit containing |
| greater than a critical mass would have to absorb greater than 10 kg of |
| water. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC: |
| Two controls on moderation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| No known deposits of concern at this time. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on moderation. |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on immediately draining the |
| R-114 upon determination that it contains a high moisture content. The set |
| point calculation derived for the R-114 moisture meter was biased low with |
| respect to moisture content. Due to the set point calculation error the |
| R-114 system was not immediately drained as required by the NCSA which may |
| have allowed an unknown quantity of water to enter the process system. |
| Since the quantity of water in-leakage to the process system cannot be |
| quantified the process condition was exceeded and double contingency was not |
| maintained. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently verifying the |
| immediate draining of the R-114 upon determining that it contains a high |
| moisture content. The set point calculation derived for the independent |
| R-114 moisture meter was biased low with respect to moisture content. Due |
| to the set point calculation error the R-114 system was not independently |
| verified as being immediately drained as required by the NCSA which may have |
| allowed an unknown quantity of water to enter the process system. Since the |
| quantity of water in-leakage to the process system cannot be quantified the |
| process condition was exceeded and double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| Since double contingency is based on two controls on moderation, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| The R-114 system is in the process of being drained. The process system |
| will then be sampled for R-114 per CP3-CO-C02029 and appropriate actions |
| contained therein will be performed. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38267 |
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| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/2001|
|LICENSEE: SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:15[EDT]|
| CITY: PORT ST. JOE- REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/29/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 0194-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/06/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN MONNINGER R2 |
| |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLEY ADAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: MISSING NDC DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| |
| Today Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation faxed a copy of a letter to the |
| State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control stating that a device was |
| missing; NDC, Mass Monitor, Model # 104. The former Florida Coast Paper |
| facility had several fixed radioactive sources when it went bankrupt in |
| 1998. It was purchased by Smurfit-Stone and the radioactive sources have |
| all been removed with the exception of this source. It was a portable |
| device that had been kept in a locked steel toolbox within a locked |
| laboratory. It was last seen in late June. Numerous contractors have been |
| on site engaged in the removal of equipment prior to mill demolition. Mill |
| personnel have searched the mill repeatedly and now suspect that the device |
| was removed by one of the contractors. All facilities that have received |
| equipment from the mill have been asked to search for the device. Florida |
| is investigating this incident. Florida incident number for this event is |
| FL01-095. The NDC Mass Monitor contained 30 millicuries of americium-241. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38268 |
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| FACILITY: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATIREGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/07/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/06/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:38[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WILLIAM BAKER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM MADE INOPERABLE |
| |
| "Columbia Generating Station Reactor Core Isolation Cooing (RCIC) system has |
| been isolated and made inoperable per Technical Specification 3.5.3 and |
| unavailable due to manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve. The |
| manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve was required due to the loss |
| of automatic trip capability of the turbine trip valve [due to a solenoid |
| failure]. This loss of automatic trip capability under postulated |
| conditions could cause a water hammer event significant enough to threaten |
| primary containment. |
| |
| "The RCIC system is a single train system and is listed in plant procedures |
| as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). |
| |
| "The RCIC system will function automatically or manually to inject water |
| into the RPV if manually returned to service." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38269 |
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| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/07/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:30[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:24[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL FITZPATRICK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK RING R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 M/R Y 72 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO 2 LOW PRESSURE HEATER STRINGS ISOLATING |
| |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report: |
| |
| This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS actuation (scram) |
| (4 hour notification for U-2). |
| |
| At 12:24 AM CDT, Friday 9/7/01, U-2 was manually scrammed. The initiating |
| event was a loss of 2 of 3 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Strings. A high |
| level condition was initially received in the 21A Low Pressure Heater, which |
| caused the Condensate System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2A Low |
| Pressure Heater String to close. Subsequently, a high level condition was |
| also received in the 21C Low Pressure Heater, which caused the Condensate |
| System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2C Low Pressure Heater |
| String to close. With a second Low Pressure Heater String isolated, Unit 2 |
| was manually scrammed in accordance with LaSalle Procedure LOA-HD-201, |
| "Heater Drain System Trouble". |
| |
| All systems operated as designed, There were no ECCS actuations or Primary |
| Containment isolations. The lowest Reactor level reached was minus 20 inches |
| (141 inches above the top of active fuel) and was recovered to normal level |
| using feedwater. Reactor pressure responded normally. No Safety Relief |
| Valves actuated. All Control Rods fully inserted. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| |
| The cause of the Low Pressure Heater String loss is being investigated at |
| this time. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021